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Mindock,	  Jennifer	  Ann	  (Ph.D.,	  Aerospace	  Engineering	  Sciences)	  Development	  and	  Application	  of	  Spaceflight	  Performance	  Shaping	  Factors	  for	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis	  Thesis	  directed	  by	  Associate	  Professor	  David	  M.	  Klaus	  	   	   	   	  The	  ability	  of	  crewmembers	  to	  perform	  various	  critical	  functions	  during	  spacecraft	  operations	  is	  widely	  recognized	  as	  being	  essential	  to	  mission	  success.	  	  This	  necessity	  motivates	  the	  desire	  to	  better	  characterize	  factors	  that	  can	  influence	  crewmember	  performance	  so	  that	  those	  with	  positive	  effects	  can	  be	  enhanced,	  while	  those	  with	  negative	  impacts	  can	  be	  minimized.	  	  Established	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis	  methods	  exist	  for	  analyzing	  performance	  within	  the	  context	  of	  myriad	  terrestrial	  scenarios.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  existing	  methods	  have	  their	  roots	  in	  nuclear	  power	  plant	  operations.	  	  While	  perhaps	  similar,	  the	  factors	  influencing	  performance	  traditionally	  used	  in	  these	  methods	  do	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  unique	  conditions	  encountered	  during	  spaceflight.	  	  Therefore,	  this	  research	  has	  identified	  a	  tailored	  set	  of	  factors	  that	  influence	  human	  task	  performance	  during	  space	  missions.	  	  This	  thesis	  describes	  an	  organizational	  scheme	  developed	  to	  aid	  in	  classifying	  and	  communicating	  the	  factors	  across	  disciplines	  and	  organizations.	  	  Definitions	  of	  identified	  factors	  are	  given	  for	  the	  spaceflight-­‐specific	  context.	  	  A	  visual	  display	  of	  the	  factors,	  called	  the	  Contributing	  Factor	  Map,	  is	  presented	  and	  its	  use	  as	  a	  risk	  communication	  tool	  is	  discussed.	  The	  Bayesian	  Network	  is	  discussed	  as	  a	  quantification	  approach	  allowing	  relationships	  between	  factors,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  factor	  relationships	  to	  performance	  outcomes,	  to	  be	  modeled.	  	  A	  method	  for	  determining	  a	  network	  structure	  was	  developed	  for	  domains	  such	  as	  human	  spaceflight,	  in	  which	  a	  global	  set	  of	  data	  for	  analysis	  is	  not	  available.	  	  This	  method	  applied	  the	  Analytic	  Hierarchy	  Process,	  and	  causal	  latency	  concepts	  from	  the	  
	   iv	  
Human	  Factors	  Analysis	  and	  Classification	  System	  in	  a	  novel	  way	  to	  guide	  choices	  for	  modeling	  the	  dominant	  set	  of	  factors	  and	  relationships	  in	  a	  simplified	  Bayesian	  Network	  structure.	  	  	  In	  addition,	  an	  approach	  for	  modeling	  the	  factors	  as	  statistical	  variables	  in	  a	  Bayesian	  Network	  making	  use	  of	  existing	  design	  requirements	  and	  human	  performance	  data	  is	  discussed.	  	  Applications	  of	  this	  modeling	  approach	  in	  terms	  of	  requirement	  completeness	  assessment	  and	  identification	  of	  future	  research	  needs	  are	  also	  described.	  	  Finally,	  an	  illustrative	  quantified	  Bayesian	  Network	  for	  the	  spaceflight	  domain	  is	  given,	  built	  on	  the	  factor	  identification	  and	  structure	  development	  work	  throughout	  the	  thesis.	  	  Its	  use	  in	  a	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis	  is	  demonstrated.	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CHAPTER	  1	  
1.	   INTRODUCTION	  	  
1.1	   RATIONALE	  AND	  MOTIVATION	  FOR	  THE	  RESEARCH	  	  
1.1.1	   BROAD	  RATIONALE	  FOR	  THE	  RESEARCH	  	   	  In	  various	  types	  of	  operational	  environments	  such	  as	  aviation,	  trucking,	  and	  nuclear	  power	  plants,	  human	  error	  is	  considered	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  contributors	  to	  accidents	  [1,	  2].	  	  In	  aviation,	  for	  example,	  there	  is	  common	  agreement	  that	  approximately	  70%	  to	  80%	  of	  accidents	  can	  be	  at	  least	  partially	  attributed	  to	  human	  error	  [3].	  	  In	  the	  human	  spaceflight	  domain	  such	  statistics	  are	  not	  so	  readily	  attainable;	  however,	  the	  importance	  of	  crew	  performance	  during	  space	  missions	  is	  widely	  recognized	  for	  mission	  success,	  as	  the	  human	  ability	  to	  respond	  to	  unexpected	  and	  dynamic	  situations	  depends	  on	  effective	  crew	  performance	  capabilities.	  	  Two	  primary	  functions	  that	  a	  human	  space	  system	  must	  provide	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  crew	  can	  be	  summarized	  as:	  1. Protect	  the	  crewmembers.	  2. Utilize	  the	  crewmembers’	  capabilities	  [4].	  These	   functions	  represent	   the	   fundamental	   tenets	  of	  human	  rating	   for	  a	  space	  vehicle	   [4],	  and	  engineers	  must	  consider	  how	  to	  best	  meet	  these	  needs	  by	  design.	  Risks	  that	  can	  cause	  harm	  to	  the	  crewmembers	  and/or	  negatively	  impact	  crewmembers’	  abilities	  to	  perform	  their	  tasks	  must	  be	  managed	  for	  safe	  and	  effective	  spaceflight.	  The	   importance	   of	   enabling	   effective	   crew	   operations	  motivates	   the	   need	   to	   characterize	  factors	   that	   can	   influence	   their	   performance.	   Doing	   so	   allows	   those	   factors	   exerting	   a	   positive	  influence	  to	  be	  enhanced,	  while	  those	  imparting	  a	  negative	  influence	  can	  be	  minimized.	  Analysis	  of	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these	  factors	  and	  resulting	  crew	  performance	  within	  operational	  scenarios	  can	  lead	  to	  insights	  for	  improving	  environmental	  conditions	  in	  the	  current	  habitat	  or	  for	  future	  design	  of	  mission	  elements	  comprising	  the	  spacecraft	  and	  its	  operations.	  	  Various	   Human	   Reliability	   Analysis	   (HRA)	   methods	   exist	   for	   analyzing	   the	   reliability	   of	  human	  performance	  within	  the	  context	  of	  operational	  scenarios.	  Most	  of	  the	  existing	  methods	  have	  their	  roots	   in	  nuclear	  power	  plant	  operations	   [2].	   	  The	   factors	   influencing	  human	  performance	   in	  this	   terrestrial	  working	  environment,	  however,	  do	  not	   take	   into	  account	   the	  unique	  conditions	  of	  spaceflight	   that	   can	   affect	   performance,	   such	   as	   physiological	   changes	   due	   to	   the	   crewmember’s	  exposure	  to	  microgravity	  or	  cognitive	  impacts	  arising	  as	  a	  result	  of	  limitations	  in	  the	  rather	  spartan	  habitat.	   NASA’s	   Human	   Integration	   Design	   Handbook	   [5]	   cites	   various	   specific	   research	   needs	  related	  to	  factors	  affecting	  human	  performance	  in	  space,	  such	  as:	  	  	  	   “-­‐Quantify	  the	  risk	  of	  impaired	  performance	  and	  injury	  due	  to	  reduced	  muscle	  mass,	  strength,	  and	  endurance	  as	  a	  function	  of	  mission	  duration	  and	  gravity	  level.	  -­‐Quantify	  the	  risk	  of	  reduced	  physical	  performance	  due	  to	  reduced	  aerobic	  capacity.	  -­‐Quantify	  the	  risk	  of	  impaired	  ability	  to	  maintain	  control	  of	  vehicles	  and	  other	  complex	  systems.”	  	   These	  types	  of	  physical	  impacts,	  along	  with	  a	  number	  of	  psychological	  and	  cognitive	  factors,	  must	  be	  considered	  when	  analyzing	  human	  performance	  in	  space.	  	  
1.1.2	   MOTIVATION	  FOR	  THE	  RESEARCH	  	   In	  2006,	  NASA	  held	  a	  Technical	  Interchange	  Meeting	  (TIM)	  to	  discuss	  which	  existing	  HRA	  methods	  would	  be	  most	  appropriate	  for	  application	  to	  NASA’s	  space	  missions.	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  TIM,	  a	  few	  methods	  were	  recommended	  for	  use	  in	  the	  near	  term,	  but	  there	  was	  also	  a	  recommendation	  to	  develop	  a	  set	  of	  factors	  affecting	  performance	  specifically	  for	  use	  in	  a	  spaceflight	  HRA	  analysis	  [6].	  	  This	  research	  begins	  to	  address	  that	  recommendation.	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   Related	  work	  is	  being	  undertaken	  in	  the	  Space	  and	  Life	  Sciences	  community	  within	  NASA.	  	  The	  Bioastronautics	  Roadmap	  [7]	  NASA	  developed	  in	  recent	  years	  to	  aid	  in	  management	  of	  risks	  to	  crew	  health	  and	  performance	  was	  reviewed	  by	  the	  Institute	  of	  Medicine [8].	  	  The	  results	  of	  this	  review	  reinforced	  the	  need	  to	  regularly	  examine	  human	  system	  risks	  [9],	  and	  accordingly,	  NASA	  has	  begin	  using	  a	  risk	  management	  approach	  called	  Continuous	  Risk	  Management	  (CRM)	  for	  managing	  human	  health	  and	  performance	  risks	  in	  the	  spaceflight	  context.	  CRM	  iterates	  through	  steps	  of	  risk	  identification,	  analysis,	  planning,	  tracking,	  and	  controlling,	  with	  continuous	  communication	  and	  documentation	  throughout.	  	  	  A	  Human	  System	  Risk	  Board	  (HSRB)	  was	  established	  to	  manage	  this	  process	  [10].	  	  In	  addition,	  a	  new	  Human	  Research	  Roadmap	  website	  (http://humanresearchroadmap.nasa.gov/	  ),	  communicating	  the	  content	  of	  the	  Integrated	  Research	  Plan	  for	  NASA’s	  Human	  Research	  Program	  [11],	  superseded	  the	  Bioastronautics	  Roadmap.	  	  This	  research	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  analysis	  portion	  of	  the	  human	  system	  risk	  application	  of	  CRM,	  as	  it	  brings	  quantitative	  analytical	  techniques	  from	  HRA	  forward	  to	  support	  these	  management	  efforts.	  	   	  
1.2	   DISSERTATION	  OVERVIEW	  	   	  This	  dissertation	  provides	  the	  background	  information	  describing	  the	  context	  and	  detailed	  motivation	  for	  the	  research	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  	  The	  spacecraft	  design	  context	  is	  described	  first,	  which	  sets	  the	  stage	  for	  risk	  quantification	  needs.	  	  Once	  risk	  quantification	  techniques	  are	  addressed,	  the	  dissertation	  focuses	  on	  the	  human	  contribution	  to	  risk,	  and	  describes	  the	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis	  context	  for	  the	  research.	  	  Next,	  the	  need	  to	  identify	  factors	  shaping	  human	  performance	  in	  spaceflight	  is	  discussed.	  Chapter	  3	  presents	  an	  organizational	  scheme	  used	  to	  provide	  structure	  to	  the	  influences	  on	  human	  performance	  in	  space	  identified	  through	  this	  research.	  	  Next,	  a	  visual	  display	  of	  factors	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influencing	  performance,	  called	  the	  Contributing	  Factor	  Map	  (CFM),	  is	  presented.	  	  Each	  of	  the	  factors	  shown	  on	  the	  CFM	  are	  then	  described	  by	  aerospace	  domain-­‐specific	  summaries	  and	  supporting	  references	  from	  the	  aerospace,	  human	  performance,	  and	  human	  reliability	  domains.	  	  Chapter	  3	  next	  discusses	  an	  application	  of	  the	  set	  of	  factors	  as	  common	  terminology	  for	  communicating	  across	  disciplines	  and	  organizations,	  especially	  in	  the	  context	  of	  human	  health	  and	  performance	  risks.	  Chapter	  4	  introduces	  the	  Bayesian	  Network	  as	  an	  approach	  for	  modeling	  the	  influences	  of	  the	  factors	  on	  each	  other	  and	  performance.	  	  It	  next	  describes	  a	  novel	  method	  for	  determining	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  Bayesian	  Network	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  global	  set	  of	  data	  spanning	  performance	  outcomes	  due	  to	  influences	  from	  the	  entire	  set	  of	  factors,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  in	  the	  human	  spaceflight	  domain.	  	  The	  Human	  Factors	  Analysis	  and	  Classification	  System	  (HFACS)	  is	  used	  as	  guidance	  for	  the	  development	  of	  initial	  network	  structural	  constraints.	  	  The	  Analytic	  Hierarchy	  Process	  (AHP)	  is	  then	  applied	  to	  support	  determination	  of	  the	  dominant	  set	  of	  factors	  to	  include	  in	  a	  simplified	  network	  structural	  model	  in	  the	  case	  when	  expert	  opinion,	  not	  data,	  is	  available.	  	  This	  method	  is	  demonstrated	  by	  an	  example,	  with	  illustrative	  results	  shown.	  Chapter	  4	  continues	  with	  the	  presentation	  of	  an	  approach	  for	  quantifying	  a	  Bayesian	  Network	  that	  makes	  use	  of	  existing	  requirements	  and	  human	  performance	  data	  relevant	  to	  the	  spaceflight	  domain.	  	  Information	  to	  characterize	  factors	  and	  their	  relationships	  such	  that	  they	  can	  be	  modeled	  as	  statistical	  variables	  in	  a	  Bayesian	  Network	  is	  described.	  	  Then,	  this	  chapter	  discusses	  how	  existing	  requirements	  and	  human	  performance	  data	  can	  inform	  the	  statistical	  models,	  and	  an	  example	  for	  two	  factors	  and	  their	  relationship	  is	  shown.	  	  This	  example	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  discussion	  of	  requirement	  and	  research	  gap	  analyses	  that	  can	  be	  supported	  by	  a	  model	  containing	  the	  characterization	  information	  as	  described	  in	  this	  chapter.	  Chapter	  5	  provides	  an	  example	  of	  how	  a	  Bayesian	  Network	  can	  be	  applied	  in	  a	  spaceflight	  domain	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis.	  	  An	  illustrative	  quantified	  network	  is	  shown,	  along	  with	  the	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process	  for	  using	  such	  a	  network	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  a	  scenario	  of	  interest.	  	  	  The	  work	  in	  the	  thesis	  is	  then	  related	  to	  its	  higher-­‐level	  context	  by	  describing	  how	  the	  example	  Bayesian	  Network	  results	  for	  an	  HRA	  would	  fit	  within	  a	  Probabilistic	  Risk	  Assessment.	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CHAPTER	  2	  
2. BACKGROUND	  	  
2.1	   SPACECRAFT	  DESIGN	  CONTEXT	  	  Human	  spacecraft	  design	  projects	  are	  complex	  socio-­‐technical	  endeavors	  requiring	  utilization	  of	  appropriate	  project	  management	  practices	  for	  spacecraft	  design	  and	  mission	  success	  to	  be	  possible.	  	  Project	  management	  is	  commonly	  viewed	  to	  have	  two	  equally	  important	  aspects,	  systems	  engineering	  and	  project	  control.	  	  Responsibilities	  for	  each	  of	  these	  aspects,	  including	  areas	  of	  overlap,	  are	  shown	  notionally	  in	  Figure	  1,	  as	  represented	  in	  the	  NASA	  Systems	  Engineering	  Handbook	  [12].	  	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  Aspects	  of	  Project	  Management	  [12]	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One	  of	  the	  fundamental	  responsibilities	  shown	  in	  the	  overlap	  area	  is	  that	  of	  risk	  management.	  	  In	  NASA’s	  Agency	  Risk	  Management	  Procedural	  Requirements	  [13]	  pp.3,	  risk	  is	  given	  the	  following	  definition:	  “In	  the	  context	  of	  mission	  execution,	  risk	  is	  the	  potential	  for	  performance	  shortfalls,	  which	  may	  be	  realized	  in	  the	  future,	  with	  respect	  to	  achieving	  explicitly	  established	  and	  stated	  performance	  requirements.	  	  The	  performance	  shortfalls	  may	  be	  related	  to	  institutional	  support	  for	  mission	  execution	  or	  related	  to	  any	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  following	  mission	  execution	  domains:	  	  (1)	  	  Safety	  (2)	  	  Technical	  	  (3)	  	  Cost	  (4)	  	  Schedule”	  	  This	  research	  will	  be	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  risks	  related	  to	  the	  safety	  and	  technical	  domains.	  	   Prior	  to	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  NASA	  operated	  under	  a	  paradigm	  Tumer	  et	  al.	  described	  in	  2005	  [14]	  as	  “rule-­‐based”,	  in	  which	  requirements	  were	  treated	  as	  the	  rule,	  and	  all	  available	  resources	  were	  applied	  to	  mitigate	  hazards	  identified.	  	  As	  cost	  constraints	  became	  tighter	  in	  the	  1990s,	  yet	  safety	  was	  not	  intended	  to	  be	  sacrificed,	  the	  level	  of	  risk	  acceptable	  for	  the	  mission	  as	  a	  whole	  was	  partitioned	  among	  the	  remaining	  mission	  execution	  domains	  of	  cost,	  schedule,	  and	  technical	  performance.	  	  This	  way	  of	  approaching	  the	  design	  process	  allowed	  for	  risk	  identification	  and	  analysis	  to	  support	  the	  decisions	  for	  accepting	  or	  implementing	  mitigations	  for	  the	  risks	  in	  the	  appropriate	  mission	  execution	  domains.	  	   The	  particular	  risk	  management	  process	  that	  guided	  this	  newer	  way	  of	  thinking	  is	  called	  Continuous	  Risk	  Management	  (CRM).	  	  The	  Software	  Engineering	  Institute	  at	  Carnegie	  Mellon	  University	  originally	  developed	  CRM	  in	  the	  1990s,	  with	  support	  from	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  industry,	  and	  NASA	  [10].	  	  	  CRM	  primarily	  focuses	  on	  managing	  risk	  during	  the	  implementation	  phases	  of	  a	  project,	  and	  in	  2008,	  NASA	  established	  a	  complementary	  process	  called	  Risk-­‐Informed	  Decision	  Making	  (RIDM).	  	  RIDM	  is	  intended	  to	  support	  important,	  direction-­‐setting	  decisions	  [15]	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that	  are	  then	  tracked	  throughout	  implementation	  using	  CRM.	  	  A	  complete	  Risk	  Management	  (RM)	  process	  is	  now	  seen	  as	  the	  combination	  of	  RIDM	  and	  CRM,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  2	  [15].	  
	  
Figure	  2:	  Risk	  Management	  Processes	  [15]	  	  	   The	  Risk-­‐Informed	  Decision	  Making	  Process	  consists	  of	  three	  main	  parts,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3.	  	  The	  first	  part,	  Identification	  of	  Alternatives,	  includes	  efforts	  to	  identify	  objectives	  that	  are	  then	  decomposed	  in	  a	  hierarchy	  leading	  to	  quantitative	  performance	  measures.	  	  Constraints	  are	  also	  identified	  during	  this	  stage,	  and	  the	  available	  alternatives	  are	  identified	  based	  on	  ways	  to	  meet	  the	  objectives	  while	  remaining	  within	  constraints	  [15].	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Figure	  3:	  Risk-­Informed	  Decision	  Making	  Process	  [13]	  	   The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  RIDM	  process,	  Risk	  Analysis	  of	  Alternatives,	  involves	  quantifying	  the	  performance	  measures	  for	  each	  alternative.	  	  There	  are	  various	  methodologies	  that	  can	  be	  used	  during	  this	  part	  of	  the	  RIDM	  process,	  depending	  on	  the	  details	  available	  for	  the	  design	  and	  whether	  the	  performance	  measure	  is	  in	  the	  safety,	  technical,	  cost,	  or	  schedule	  domain	  [13].	  	  The	  research	  described	  here	  fits	  within	  this	  step	  of	  the	  RIDM	  process,	  primarily	  supporting	  analysis	  of	  performance	  measures	  in	  the	  safety	  and	  technical	  domains.	  	  Logical	  modeling	  techniques	  such	  as	  fault	  tress	  and	  event	  trees	  are	  commonly	  used	  for	  such	  analyses,	  and	  this	  research	  supports	  an	  improved	  capability	  to	  include	  human	  spaceflight	  crews	  in	  these	  analyses.	  	   	  The	  third	  part	  of	  the	  RIDM	  process,	  Risk-­‐Informed	  Alternative	  Selection,	  is	  when	  the	  decision-­‐maker	  deliberates	  with	  the	  stakeholders	  and	  makes	  use	  of	  the	  analysis	  in	  coming	  to	  a	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decision.	  	  However,	  the	  process	  is	  called	  Risk-­‐Informed	  Decision	  Making,	  and	  not	  Risk-­‐Based	  Decision	  Making,	  as	  it	  is	  understood	  that	  the	  risk	  analysis	  inputs	  are	  one	  set	  of	  inputs	  to	  the	  process.	  	  Stakeholder	  concerns	  and	  non-­‐technical	  factors	  that	  may	  not	  have	  been	  captured	  in	  the	  previous	  parts	  of	  the	  process	  must	  be	  considered,	  as	  well.	  	  Once	  a	  decision	  is	  made,	  the	  stage	  is	  set	  for	  entering	  the	  Continuous	  Risk	  Management	  process,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  4.	  
	  
Figure	  4:	  Continuous	  Risk	  Management	  Process	  [13]	  	  	   The	  NASA	  Agency	  Risk	  Management	  Procedural	  Requirements	  document	  [13]	  pp.8	  describes	  the	  steps	  in	  the	  CRM	  process	  in	  this	  way:	  “(1)	  	  Identify:	  	  Identify	  contributors	  to	  risk	  (shortfalls	  in	  performance	  relative	  to	  the	  baseline	  performance	  requirements).	  	  
Note:	  	  Sometimes	  the	  relationship	  between	  an	  identified	  risk	  and	  performance	  
measures	  is	  indirect,	  but	  risks	  within	  the	  proper	  scope	  of	  CRM	  are	  addressed	  precisely	  
because	  they	  may	  affect	  one	  or	  more	  performance	  measures.	  	  
	  (2)	  	  Analyze:	  	  Estimate	  the	  probability	  and	  consequence	  components	  of	  the	  risk	  through	  analysis,	  including	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  probabilities	  and	  consequences	  and,	  as	  appropriate,	  estimate	  aggregate	  risks.	  	  (3)	  	  Plan:	  	  Decide	  on	  risk	  disposition	  and	  handling,	  develop	  and	  execute	  mitigation	  
plans,	  and	  decide	  what	  will	  be	  tracked.	  	  
	   11	  
	  (4)	  	  Track:	  	  Track	  observables	  relating	  to	  performance	  measures	  (e.g.,	  technical	  performance	  data,	  schedule	  variances).	  	  (5)	  	  Control:	  	  Control	  risk	  by	  evaluating	  tracking	  data	  to	  verify	  effectiveness	  of	  mitigation	  plans,	  making	  adjustment	  to	  the	  plans	  as	  necessary,	  and	  executing	  control	  measures.	  	  (6)	  	  Communicate	  and	  document:	  	  Communicate	  and	  document	  the	  above	  activities	  throughout	  the	  process.”	  	   Similar	  to	  how	  this	  research	  fits	  within	  the	  RIDM	  process,	  the	  second	  step	  of	  the	  CRM	  process,	  “Analyze”,	  provides	  context	  during	  the	  implementation	  phases	  of	  a	  project	  for	  this	  research.	  	  Again,	  this	  research	  is	  aimed	  at	  supporting	  the	  analysis	  of	  risks	  that	  have	  a	  component	  due	  to	  crew	  performance.	  	  
2.2	   RISK	  QUANTIFICATION	  	  With	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  context	  of	  risk	  management	  and	  analysis	  in	  evaluating	  and	  developing	  design	  options,	  ways	  to	  quantify	  risk	  must	  next	  be	  considered.	  	  A	  common	  analytical	  methodology	  for	  identifying	  and	  quantifying	  risks	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  systems	  is	  Probabilistic	  Risk	  Assessment	  (PRA).	  	  In	  the	  Probabilistic	  Risk	  Assessment	  Procedures	  Guide	  for	  NASA	  Managers	  and	  Practitioners	  [16],	  PRA	  is	  described	  as,	  	  “…a	  comprehensive,	  structured,	  and	  logical	  analysis	  method	  aimed	  at	  identifying	  and	  assessing	  risks	  in	  complex	  technological	  systems	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  cost-­‐effectively	  improving	  their	  safety	  and	  performance.”	  	  	  	  Currently,	  NASA’s	  Procedural	  Requirements	  document	  8705.5A,	  Technical	  Probabilistic	  Risk	  Assessment	  (PRA)	  Procedures	  for	  Safety	  and	  Mission	  Success	  for	  NASA	  Programs	  and	  Projects	  [17],	  requires	  aerospace	  programs	  and	  projects	  to	  include	  PRA	  techniques	  throughout	  the	  development	  phases	  to	  support	  key	  design	  decisions	  and	  reviews,	  with	  increasing	  scope	  and	  level	  of	  detail	  as	  the	  design	  process	  continues.	  	  The	  overall	  objectives,	  scope,	  and	  level	  of	  detail	  for	  a	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   In	  the	  middle	  of	  Figure	  5,	  one	  can	  see	  the	  activity	  for	  creating	  Fault	  Trees.	  	  Fault	  Trees	  are	  deductive	  logic	  models	  in	  which	  a	  high-­‐level	  system	  failure	  is	  hypothesized,	  and	  failure	  events	  in	  decreasing	  levels	  of	  generality	  are	  shown	  until	  reaching	  basic	  events	  such	  as	  component	  hardware	  failures,	  software	  errors,	  or	  human	  errors.	  	  The	  basic	  events	  are	  linked	  using	  logic	  gates	  (i.e.	  AND	  gates	  and	  OR	  gates),	  and	  their	  failure	  probabilities	  are	  combined	  using	  Boolean	  logic	  to	  obtain	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  top	  failure	  event	  occurring	  [16].	  	  The	  basic	  events	  modeling	  human	  errors	  are	  the	  points	  in	  a	  PRA	  where	  human	  performance	  and	  reliability	  are	  taken	  into	  account.	  	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis	  (HRA)	  methods	  provide	  the	  techniques	  for	  assigning	  error	  probabilities	  to	  the	  human	  error	  events,	  as	  indicated	  in	  Figure	  6.	  
	  	  
Figure	  6:	  How	  HRA	  Relates	  to	  PRA	  	  Now	  that	  the	  approach	  for	  including	  human	  performance	  in	  risk	  quantification	  efforts	  has	  been	  described,	  the	  need	  for	  a	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis	  (HRA)	  method	  can	  be	  understood.	  	  However,	  before	  beginning	  to	  fill	  the	  need	  for	  an	  HRA	  method	  within	  the	  spaceflight	  context,	  the	  functional,	  performance,	  and	  integration	  requirements	  [19]	  of	  a	  suitable	  method	  must	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  appropriate	  customers,	  such	  as	  NASA	  program	  personnel	  and	  PRA	  analysts.	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Another	  set	  of	  viewpoints	  to	  consider	  at	  this	  level	  of	  the	  research	  is	  that	  of	  human	  performance	  domain	  experts,	  whose	  performance	  data	  will	  inform	  the	  set	  of	  contributing	  factors	  and	  their	  effects.	  	  There	  will	  inevitably	  be	  tension	  between	  the	  “usability/practicality”	  [19]	  concerns	  of	  management	  users	  and	  HRA	  practitioners,	  and	  the	  “explanatory	  power”	  [19]	  concerns	  of	  domain	  experts	  wanting	  to	  ensure	  proper	  behavior	  modeling.	  	  The	  non-­‐trivial	  effort	  of	  finding	  common	  ground	  in	  the	  application	  of	  an	  appropriate	  HRA	  method	  has	  begun	  to	  be	  addressed	  in	  this	  research.	  	  	  	  
2.3	   HUMAN	  RELIABILITY	  ANALYSIS	  	  There	  exist	  more	  than	  35	  to	  40	  assorted	  approaches	  for	  analyzing	  human	  reliability	  in	  various	  environments,	  and	  many	  methods	  have	  their	  roots	  in	  the	  nuclear	  safety	  industry	  [2].	  	  In	  2006,	  NASA	  held	  a	  Technical	  Interchange	  Meeting	  (TIM)	  to	  discuss	  which	  methods	  would	  be	  most	  appropriate	  for	  application	  to	  NASA’s	  space	  missions.	  	  NASA	  currently	  uses	  the	  Cognitive	  Reliability	  and	  Error	  Analysis	  Method	  (CREAM)	  [2]	  for	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  human	  reliability	  [20].	  Many	  of	  the	  existing	  HRA	  approaches,	  including	  CREAM,	  describe	  procedures	  for	  conducting	  both	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  analyses.	  	  Recall,	  however,	  that	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  research,	  the	  analysis	  results	  must	  include	  human	  error	  probabilities	  (HEP)	  that	  are	  fed	  into	  the	  larger	  system	  PRA	  fault	  trees.	  	  Therefore,	  this	  work	  focused	  on	  the	  quantitative	  performance	  prediction	  aspect	  of	  HRA.	  	  At	  the	  point	  in	  the	  PRA	  analysis	  process	  when	  an	  HRA	  is	  required,	  the	  HRA	  analyst	  is	  typically	  concerned	  with	  a	  particular	  task	  performed	  by	  a	  human	  within	  a	  given	  scenario,	  and	  will	  produce	  the	  associated	  HEP.	  	  In	  the	  CREAM	  method,	  the	  analyst	  begins	  by	  determining	  if	  the	  task	  is	  mainly	  one	  of	  4	  cognitive	  functions	  shown	  in	  Figure	  7:	  Observation,	  Interpretation,	  Planning,	  or	  Execution	  [2].	  	  These	  cognitive	  functions	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  performance	  predictions.	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Cognitive	  Function	  Factor	   Level	  
Observation	   Interpretation	   Planning	   Execution	  Very	  efficient	   1.0	   1.0	   0.8	   0.8	  Efficient	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	  Inefficient	   1.0	   1.0	   1.2	   1.2	  Adequacy	  of	  organization	   Deficient	   1.0	   1.0	   2.0	   2.0	  Advantageous	   0.8	   0.8	   1.0	   0.8	  Compatible	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	  Working	  conditions	   Incompatible	   2.0	   2.0	   1.0	   2.0	  Supportive	   0.5	   1.0	   1.0	   0.5	  Adequate	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	  Tolerable	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	  Adequacy	  of	  MMI	  and	  operational	  support	   Inappropriate	   5.0	   1.0	   1.0	   5.0	  Appropriate	   0.8	   1.0	   0.5	   0.8	  Acceptable	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	  Availability	  of	  procedures/	  plans	   Inappropriate	   2.0	   1.0	   0.5	   2.0	  Fewer	  than	  capacity	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	  Matching	  current	  capacity	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	  
Number	  of	  simultaneous	  goals	   More	  than	  capacity	   2.0	   2.0	   5.0	   2.0	  Adequate	   0.5	   0.5	   0.5	   0.5	  Temporarily	  inadequate	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	  Available	  time	   Continuously	  inadequate	   5.0	   5.0	   5.0	   5.0	  Day-­‐time	  (adjusted)	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	  Time	  of	  day	  (circadian	  rhythm)	   Night-­‐time	  (unadjusted)	   1.2	   1.2	   1.2	   1.2	  Adequate,	  high	  experience	   0.8	   0.5	   0.5	   0.8	  Adequate,	  low	  experience	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	  
Adequacy	  of	  training	  and	  experience	   Inadequate	   2.0	   5.0	   5.0	   2.0	  Very	  efficient	   0.5	   0.5	   0.5	   0.5	  Efficient	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	  Inefficient	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	   1.0	  Crew	  collaboration	  quality	   Deficient	   2.0	   2.0	   2.0	   5.0	  
	  
Table	  2:	  CREAM	  Common	  Performance	  Conditions	  and	  Weight	  Factors	  [2]	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An	  example	  evaluation	  of	  factors	  and	  their	  associated	  weights	  for	  an	  Observation	  function	  is	  shown	  in	  Table	  3.	  	  For	  each	  factor,	  the	  analyst	  determines	  the	  condition	  level	  with	  support	  from	  experts	  having	  insight	  into	  the	  particular	  scenario	  being	  examined.	  	  The	  weight	  for	  each	  factor	  is	  then	  found	  from	  Table	  2,	  and	  the	  weights	  are	  multiplied	  together	  to	  give	  a	  total	  product.	  	  This	  product	  is	  multiplied	  by	  the	  nominal	  failure	  value	  found	  from	  Table	  1	  to	  produce	  a	  value	  that	  takes	  the	  conditions	  into	  account.	  	  
Factor	   Level	   Observation	  Weight	  Adequacy	  of	  organization	   Very	  efficient	   1.0	  Working	  conditions	   Compatible	   1.0	  Adequacy	  of	  MMI	  and	  operational	  support	   Supportive	   0.5	  Availability	  of	  procedures/plans	   Acceptable	   1.0	  Number	  of	  simultaneous	  goals	   More	  than	  capacity	   2.0	  Available	  time	   Continuously	  inadequate	   5.0	  Time	  of	  day	  (circadian	  rhythm)	   Night-­‐time	  (unadjusted)	   1.2	  Adequacy	  of	  training	  and	  experience	   Adequate,	  high	  experience	   0.8	  Crew	  collaboration	  quality	   Very	  efficient	   0.5	  
Total	  Product	   2.4	  
	  
Table	  3:	  Sample	  CREAM	  Common	  Performance	  Condition	  Evaluations	  	   	  One	  shortfall	  in	  this	  approach	  is	  that	  in	  multiplying	  the	  weight	  factors	  together,	  the	  assumption	  is	  that	  the	  factors	  are	  independent	  [21].	  	  Guidelines	  are	  given	  for	  how	  to	  take	  dependencies	  into	  account,	  however,	  they	  are	  not	  explicit,	  and	  provide	  the	  chance	  for	  different	  analysts	  to	  adjust	  for	  dependencies	  differently.	  	  One	  goal	  of	  this	  research	  has	  been	  to	  enable	  modeling	  of	  dependencies	  between	  Performance	  Shaping	  Factors	  explicitly.	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2.4	   SPACEFLIGHT	  EFFECTS	  ON	  THE	  CREW	  	   	  Given	  that	  NASA	  currently	  uses	  the	  Cognitive	  Reliability	  and	  Error	  Analysis	  Method	  (CREAM)	  [2]	  for	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  human	  reliability	  [22],	  we	  would	  like	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  Performance	  Shaping	  Factors	  (PSFs)	  for	  spaceflight	  may	  be	  different	  than	  those	  of	  existing	  methods,	  such	  as	  in	  CREAM,	  and	  why	  those	  differences	  are	  important.	  	  Let	  us	  look	  at	  each	  of	  the	  CREAM	  PSFs,	  and	  discuss	  examples	  of	  why	  important	  differences	  for	  spaceflight	  applications	  may	  exist.	  	  Table	  4	  is	  adapted	  from	  prior	  work	  [23].	  	  
Factor	   CREAM	  Definition	  [2]	   Potential	  Gap	  for	  Spaceflight	  Application	  Adequacy	  of	  organization	   The	  quality	  of	  the	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  team	  members,	  additional	  support,	  communication	  systems,	  Safety	  Management	  System,	  instructions	  and	  guidelines	  for	  externally	  oriented	  activities,	  role	  of	  external	  agencies,	  etc.	  
This	  factor	  may	  need	  to	  additionally	  include	  NASA	  organizational	  aspects	  such	  as	  mission	  planning	  responsibilities.	  	  The	  duration,	  destination,	  and	  orbits	  for	  the	  mission	  are	  aspects	  of	  mission	  planning	  determined	  by	  the	  organization.	  	  An	  example	  of	  why	  these	  aspects	  are	  important	  is	  the	  desire	  to	  select	  orbits	  to	  minimize	  radiation	  exposure,	  and	  thus	  reduce	  impacts	  to	  crew	  health	  and	  performance	  [24].	  Working	  conditions	   The	  nature	  of	  the	  physical	  working	  conditions	  such	  as	  ambient	  lighting,	  glare	  on	  screens,	  noise	  from	  alarms,	  interruptions	  from	  the	  task,	  etc.	  
Unlike	  working	  conditions	  on	  Earth,	  a	  spacecraft	  is	  a	  closed,	  isolated	  environment	  in	  microgravity	  or	  partial	  gravity	  conditions.	  	  There	  are	  additional	  health	  concerns	  without	  the	  benefit	  of	  atmospheric	  composition	  and	  toxin	  dilution	  provided	  by	  Earth’s	  environment.	  	  One	  example	  is	  carbon	  dioxide,	  produced	  by	  human	  metabolic	  processes	  [24].	  	  Carbon	  dioxide	  levels	  that	  are	  too	  high	  may	  degrade	  crewmember	  performance,	  and	  are	  a	  source	  of	  concern	  [25]	  that	  are	  not	  currently	  addressed	  in	  existing	  PSFs	  .	  Adequacy	  of	  MMI	  and	  operational	  support	  
The	  Man-­‐Machine	  Interface	  in	  general,	  including	  the	  information	  available	  on	  control	  panels,	  computerized	  workstations,	  and	  operational	  support	  provided	  by	  specifically	  designed	  decision	  aids.	  
In	  microgravity,	  the	  human	  neutral	  body	  position	  is	  altered	  from	  that	  on	  Earth.	  	  An	  upright	  posture	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  default,	  but	  more	  of	  a	  stooped	  position	  is	  the	  norm	  [5].	  	  	  This	  creates	  different	  positions	  that	  are	  comfortable	  for	  working	  with	  a	  user-­‐interface,	  and	  may	  influence	  performance	  differently	  than	  is	  captured	  in	  the	  current	  PSFs.	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Availability	  of	  procedures/	  plans	   Procedures	  and	  plans	  include	  operating	  and	  emergency	  procedures,	  familiar	  patterns	  of	  response	  heuristics,	  routines,	  etc.	  
This	  factor	  may	  not	  have	  an	  influence	  very	  different	  in	  microgravity	  than	  it	  does	  on	  Earth.	  	  It	  is	  a	  concern	  in	  spaceflight	  as	  well	  as	  on	  Earth,	  especially	  in	  situations	  where	  procedure	  inputs	  may	  come	  to	  the	  crew	  from	  various	  sources	  and	  in	  different	  formats	  with	  varying	  formality.	  	  This	  may	  force	  crewmembers	  to	  spend	  extra	  time	  coordinating	  the	  inputs	  [26].	  	  	  This	  factor	  must	  still	  be	  included	  in	  a	  set	  of	  spaceflight	  PSFs.	  Number	  of	  simultaneous	  goals	   The	  number	  of	  tasks	  a	  person	  is	  required	  to	  pursue	  or	  attend	  to	  at	  the	  same	  time	  (i.e.	  evaluating	  the	  effects	  of	  actions,	  sampling	  new	  information,	  assessing	  multiple	  goals,	  etc.).	  
This	  factor	  may	  have	  a	  different	  weight	  and	  threshold	  for	  its	  influence	  in	  spaceflight	  due	  to	  additional	  stressors	  in	  the	  environment.	  	  An	  example	  of	  how	  this	  factor	  can	  affect	  crew	  performance	  is	  when	  the	  Skylab	  4	  crew	  went	  on	  “strike”	  for	  a	  day	  due	  to	  over-­‐work	  [27].	  
Available	  time	   The	  time	  available	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  task	  and	  corresponds	  to	  how	  well	  the	  task	  execution	  is	  synchronized	  to	  the	  process	  dynamics.	  
Performance	  of	  tasks	  in	  space	  may	  take	  longer	  than	  anticipated	  by	  design	  on	  the	  ground	  [26,	  28],	  and	  this	  factor’s	  influence	  may	  be	  affected	  by	  such	  a	  difference.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  dynamic	  aspects	  of	  space	  flight	  during	  phases	  such	  as	  launch	  and	  entry	  may	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  specifically	  in	  this	  PSF.	  Time	  of	  day/circadian	  rhythm	   The	  time	  of	  day	  (or	  night)	  describes	  the	  time	  at	  which	  the	  task	  is	  carried	  out,	  in	  particular	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  person	  is	  adjusted	  to	  the	  current	  time	  (circadian	  rhythm).	  	  	  Typical	  examples	  are	  the	  effects	  of	  shift	  work.	  	  It	  is	  a	  well-­‐established	  fact	  that	  the	  time	  of	  day	  has	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  work,	  and	  that	  performance	  is	  less	  efficient	  if	  the	  normal	  circadian	  rhythm	  is	  disrupted.	  
This	  factor	  must	  be	  addressed	  in	  a	  way	  that	  captures	  the	  fact	  that	  day	  and	  night	  have	  different	  meanings	  in	  microgravity.	  	  In	  Low-­‐Earth	  Orbit,	  for	  example,	  there	  is	  a	  day/night	  cycle	  approximately	  every	  90	  minutes	  [24].	  	  	  A	  similar	  factor	  to	  consider	  in	  crewmember	  performance	  is	  the	  International	  Space	  Station	  (ISS)	  practice	  of	  “slam	  shifting”,	  which	  is	  when	  a	  large	  sleep	  schedule	  shift	  occurs	  due	  to	  an	  upcoming	  critical	  event,	  such	  as	  docking	  [26].	  	  	  Slam	  shifting	  may	  influence	  crewmember	  performance,	  and	  is	  not	  currently	  addressed	  specifically	  in	  a	  PSF.	  
Adequacy	  of	  training	  and	  experience	   The	  level	  and	  quality	  of	  training	  provided	  to	  operators	  as	  familiarisation	  to	  new	  technology,	  refreshing	  old	  skills,	  etc.	  	  It	  also	  refers	  to	  the	  level	  of	  operational	  
Because	  spaceflight	  crewmembers	  must	  not	  only	  work	  together,	  but	  live	  together	  as	  well,	  this	  factor	  may	  need	  to	  address	  aspects	  of	  psychosocial	  adaptation	  that	  benefit	  from	  training	  [26].	  	  In	  addition,	  on	  long-­‐duration	  missions	  for	  example,	  crewmembers	  may	  need	  to	  perform	  tasks	  for	  which	  they	  have	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experience.	  	   not	  been	  trained.	  	  The	  balance	  between	  skills-­‐based	  and	  task-­‐based	  training	  may	  be	  different	  in	  the	  spaceflight	  context	  than	  is	  captured	  in	  the	  current	  definition	  of	  this	  factor	  [26].	  Crew	  collaboration	  quality	   The	  quality	  of	  the	  collaboration	  between	  crew	  members,	  including	  the	  overlap	  between	  the	  official	  and	  unofficial	  structure,	  the	  level	  of	  trust,	  and	  the	  general	  social	  climate	  among	  the	  crew	  members,	  
The	  international	  nature	  of	  current	  space	  travel	  activities	  is	  not	  specifically	  addressed	  in	  the	  original	  definition	  of	  this	  factor,	  and	  may	  provide	  for	  different	  influences.	  Research	  based	  on	  Shuttle/Mir	  missions	  suggest	  that	  crew	  interpersonal	  compatibility	  is	  important	  for	  success	  [26],	  yet	  any	  differences	  compared	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  Earth-­‐based	  PSF	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  considered.	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2.5	   RESEARCH	  OBJECTIVES	  	   	   	  With	  the	  context	  and	  motivation	  of	  this	  research	  discussed,	  the	  next	  sections	  address	  how	  the	  research	  objectives	  were	  met.	  	  In	  summary,	  the	  objectives	  of	  this	  research	  were	  to:	  	  1. Identify	  factors	  influencing	  the	  performance	  of	  crewmembers	  in	  spaceflight.	  2. Develop	  a	  framework	  to	  quantify	  Performance	  Shaping	  Factor	  influences	  on	  task	  performance	  for	  spaceflight	  applications.	  3. Develop	  an	  approach	  to	  apply	  new	  Performance	  Shaping	  Factors	  within	  a	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis	  method	  for	  spaceflight	  applications.	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CHAPTER	  3	  
3. FACTOR	  IDENTIFICATION,	  ORGANIZATION	  AND	  DEFINITIONS	  	  
3.1	   FACTOR	  IDENTIFICATION	  AND	  ORGANIZATION	  SCHEME	  	  	   	   In	  order	  to	  identify	  factors	  that	  specifically	  influence	  human	  performance	  in	  space,	  a	  literature	  review	  was	  conducted	  spanning	  several	  disciplines.	  	  The	  intent	  was	  to	  avoid	  overlooking	  influential	  factors	  as	  a	  result	  of	  searching	  from	  a	  single	  point	  of	  view.	  	  Thus,	  literature	  from	  areas	  such	  as	  human	  health	  and	  performance	  (including	  medical,	  psychological,	  and	  cognitive	  perspectives),	  human	  factors,	  spacecraft	  design,	  spaceflight	  experience,	  and	  of	  course,	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis,	  was	  reviewed	  to	  identify	  relevant	  factors	  [1-­‐3,	  5,	  6,	  8,	  19,	  21,	  24-­‐30,	  32-­‐43].	  	  In	  addition,	  personal	  discussions	  have	  been	  held	  with	  medical,	  psychological,	  human	  factors,	  mission	  operations,	  crew,	  and	  safety	  personnel	  within	  NASA	  for	  suggested	  inputs	  on	  performance	  influences.	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  [10],	  NASA	  is	  “struggling	  with	  the	  identification	  of	  risk	  at	  the	  right	  level”.	  	  As	  progress	  through	  the	  work	  of	  identifying	  these	  factors	  was	  made,	  it	  became	  evident	  that	  there	  was	  a	  need	  to	  organize	  them	  in	  order	  to	  support	  the	  continued	  characterization	  of	  how	  they	  can	  affect	  performance.	  	  A	  hierarchical	  scheme,	  shown	  in	  Figure	  9,	  has	  been	  developed	  as	  part	  of	  this	  research	  to	  aid	  in	  factor	  organization	  and	  categorization.	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The	  diagram	  shown	  in	  Figure	  10	  also	  provides	  visual	  context	  for	  relating	  the	  set	  of	  factors	  influencing	  performance	  to	  overall	  mission	  success.	  	  Above	  the	  bottom	  horizontal	  line	  are	  the	  factors	  influencing	  performance	  of	  tasks.	  	  Below	  the	  line	  is	  an	  arrow	  pointing	  to	  the	  types	  of	  tasks	  crewmembers	  must	  perform,	  as	  used	  in	  the	  CREAM	  method	  [2].	  	  These	  functions	  must	  be	  performed	  as	  part	  of	  various	  mission	  scenarios,	  represented	  by	  the	  next	  arrow	  pointing	  down,	  and	  are	  often	  captured	  in	  a	  Probabilistic	  Risk	  Assessment	  (PRA)	  framework.	  	  When	  the	  mission	  scenarios	  are	  analyzed	  in	  such	  as	  framework,	  the	  outcome	  in	  terms	  of	  overall	  mission	  success	  can	  be	  evaluated.	  	  Typical	  outcomes	  of	  interest	  are	  represented	  by	  the	  lowest	  set	  of	  boxes	  in	  Figure	  10.	  	  	  Next	  we	  discuss	  each	  of	  the	  Contributing	  Factors	  shown	  in	  Figure	  10	  and	  some	  of	  their	  potential	  influences	  on	  other	  factors	  and/or	  performance	  of	  tasks.	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3.2 DEFINITIONS	  OF	  CONTRIBUTING	  FACTORS	  	   Identifying	  the	  contributing	  factors	  influencing	  performance	  in	  space	  is	  an	  early	  step	  toward	  defining	  a	  set	  of	  PSFs	  for	  spaceflight	  applications.	  	  This	  section	  discusses	  the	  set	  of	  Contributing	  Factors	  and	  their	  space-­domain	  definitions	  that	  form	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  determining	  the	  PSFs.	  	  The	  section	  is	  organized	  according	  to	  the	  organizational	  hierarchy.	  	  For	  references	  that	  are	  hundreds	  of	  pages	  in	  length,	  the	  associated	  page	  numbers	  are	  provided.	  	  
3.2.1 OPERATIONS	  DOMAIN	  	  The	  Operations	  Domain,	  as	  represented	  by	  the	  green	  box	  in	  the	  lower	  left	  corner	  of	  Figure	  10,	  is	  decomposed	  into	  the	  Domain	  Categories	  of	  Organization,	  Training,	  Team	  and	  Task	  Specific	  Characteristics.	  	  This	  section	  discusses	  the	  Contributing	  Factors	  within	  the	  Operations	  Domain.	  	  	  	  	  	  
3.2.1.1 Organizational	  Factors	  	  The	  Organization	  Domain	  Category,	  shown	  on	  the	  upper	  left	  side	  of	  the	  latency	  axis	  in	  Figure	  10,	  is	  decomposed	  into	  the	  Functional	  Groupings	  of	  Task	  Planning	  and	  Scheduling,	  Shift	  Scheduling,	  Mission	  Planning	  and	  Organizational	  Support.	  
Task	  Planning	  and	  Scheduling	  Task	  Timeline	  Task	  Timeline	  addresses	  if	  there	  are	  too	  few	  or	  too	  many	  tasks	  to	  be	  accomplished	  during	  a	  work	  period,	  the	  flexibility	  of	  their	  ordering	  or	  necessity	  for	  being	  accomplished	  during	  the	  work	  period,	  and	  if	  adequate	  direction	  and	  context	  is	  provided	  for	  tasks	  outside	  of	  the	  procedures.	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Procedure	  adequacy	  is	  addressed	  by	  quality	  of	  procedures	  factors.	  This	  factor	  also	  addresses	  the	  management	  of	  the	  balance	  between	  high	  intensity	  task	  timelines	  with	  adrenaline	  and	  excitement	  and	  lower	  intensity	  timelines	  to	  allow	  for	  rejuvenation,	  especially	  during	  long-­‐duration	  missions.	  [[26]	  pps.	  21,	  258,	  361;	  [24]	  pps.	  164-­‐165;	  [33,	  36]]	  Task	  List	  Task	  List	  refers	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  tasks	  that	  are	  not	  currently	  assigned	  on	  the	  task	  timeline,	  but	  are	  noted	  in	  case	  time	  is	  available	  to	  fit	  them	  in.	  	  The	  state	  of	  this	  factor	  may	  influence	  factors	  such	  as	  work	  load,	  performance	  pressure,	  or	  feelings	  of	  accomplishment.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  21,	  258;	  [24]	  pps.	  164-­‐165;	  [33,	  36]]	  Operational	  Task	  Allocation	  	  Operational	  Task	  Allocation	  refers	  to	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  operational,	  as	  opposed	  to	  design,	  task	  assignment	  to	  an	  individual,	  vehicle	  automation,	  and/or	  robotics.	  	  	  This	  factor	  addresses	  whether	  the	  tasks	  are	  assigned	  to	  crewmembers,	  ground	  personnel,	  or	  automation	  with	  the	  proper	  capabilities,	  availability,	  training,	  and	  experience,	  but	  does	  not	  include	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  training	  or	  experience	  themselves,	  as	  covered	  by	  training	  and	  task	  familiarity	  factors.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  21,	  269;	  [24]	  pps.	  139-­‐141;	  [29]	  pps.	  208-­‐209;	  [36,	  44]]	  
Shift	  Scheduling	  Length	  of	  Work	  Shifts	  Length	  of	  Work	  Shifts	  addresses	  whether	  the	  work	  period	  is	  too	  long	  and	  may	  contribute	  to	  fatigue,	  or	  too	  short	  to	  allow	  for	  transition	  into	  and	  out	  of	  tasks.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  88,	  94,	  107;	  [5]	  pp.	  181;	  [25]	  pp.	  49;	  [24]	  pp.	  164-­‐165;	  [44,	  46]]	  Frequency	  of	  Work	  Shifts	  Frequency	  of	  Work	  Shifts	  addresses	  whether	  the	  time	  in	  between	  consecutive	  work	  shifts	  is	  long	  enough	  for	  rest,	  relaxation,	  and	  recovery.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  88,	  94,	  107;	  [5]	  pp.	  181	  ;	  [24]	  pp.	  164-­‐165;	  [44,	  46]]
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Consecutive	  Days	  On	  Consecutive	  Days	  On	  addresses	  whether	  the	  number	  of	  consecutive	  days	  with	  work	  periods	  is	  too	  many	  and	  may	  contribute	  to	  fatigue,	  or	  too	  short	  to	  allow	  for	  accomplishment	  of	  longer-­‐duration	  tasks.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  21,	  94,	  107;	  [5]	  pp.	  181	  ;	  [24]	  pp.	  164-­‐165;	  [44,	  46]]	  Consecutive	  Days	  Off	  Consecutive	  Days	  Off	  refers	  to	  whether	  the	  time	  between	  groups	  of	  work	  shifts	  is	  too	  short	  to	  allow	  for	  rest,	  relaxation,	  and	  recovery,	  or	  if	  it	  is	  too	  long	  and	  contributes	  to	  slower	  adjustment	  to	  the	  work	  situation.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  21,	  94,	  107;	  [5]	  pp.	  181;	  [24]	  pp.	  164-­‐165;	  [44,	  46]]	  Sleep	  Shifting	  Sleep	  Shifting	  addresses	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  time	  zone	  shift(s)	  in	  terms	  of	  number	  of	  hours	  shifted,	  how	  often	  shifts	  have	  been	  required	  in	  recent	  days,	  and	  amount	  of	  sleep	  scheduled.	  	  This	  factor	  captures	  effects	  due	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  slam	  shifting,	  which	  is	  often	  undertaken	  before	  critical	  events	  such	  as	  docking.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  20,	  85,	  94,	  99,	  107;	  [24]	  pps.	  164-­‐165;	  [44,	  46]]	  
Mission	  Planning	  Mission	  Destination	  Mission	  Destination	  allows	  for	  influences	  of	  destination	  characteristics	  and	  environmental	  factors,	  such	  as	  radiation	  environment,	  thermal	  environment,	  magnetic	  properties,	  surface	  composition,	  and	  atmospheric	  composition	  to	  be	  included	  as	  more	  latent	  influences	  than	  the	  more	  direct	  vehicle	  physical	  environment	  factors.	  	  [[5]	  pps.	  443-­‐447;	  [24]	  pp.	  162;	  [34]	  pps.	  109-­‐110]	  Mission	  Duration	  Mission	  Duration	  allows	  for	  the	  influence	  the	  length	  of	  the	  mission	  itself	  may	  have	  on	  other,	  less	  latent,	  factors	  such	  as	  those	  in	  the	  psychological	  conditions,	  physiological	  adaptations,	  and	  non-­‐standard	  physical	  conditions	  groupings.	  	  [[24]	  pp.	  162;	  [26]	  pp.	  69;	  [34]	  pps.	  109-­‐110]	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Orbits	  and	  Trajectories	  Orbits	  and	  Trajectories	  accounts	  for	  the	  influences	  the	  mission	  design	  of	  orbits,	  maneuvers,	  and	  trajectories	  may	  have	  on	  factors	  such	  as	  mission	  destination,	  mission	  duration	  and	  the	  vehicle	  physical	  environment.	  [[24]	  pp.	  162]	  Mission	  Scenarios	  Mission	  Scenarios	  addresses	  the	  influences	  the	  planned	  scenarios	  have	  on	  shift	  scheduling,	  task	  planning	  and	  scheduling,	  other	  mission	  planning,	  and	  mental	  and	  physical	  characteristic	  factors.	  	  This	  includes	  accounting	  for	  whether	  scenarios	  exist	  to	  achieve	  a	  safe	  state	  or	  reach	  a	  safe	  environment,	  and	  the	  influence	  the	  knowledge	  of	  this	  capability	  may	  have	  on	  the	  crew.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  5,	  21]	  
Organizational	  Support	  [2]	  Ground	  Communications	  Availability	  and	  Ease	  Ground	  Communications	  Availability	  and	  Ease	  refers	  to	  the	  technological	  capabilities	  supporting	  communication	  between	  ground	  and	  flight.	  	  This	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  clarity,	  reliability	  during	  normal	  and	  emergency	  (e.g.	  sabotage	  or	  hurricane)	  conditions,	  and	  available	  frequency	  or	  time	  delay	  of	  voice,	  visual,	  and	  text	  communication.	  	  It	  includes	  bandwidth	  capabilities	  of	  the	  communication,	  as	  well.	  	  It	  is	  not	  intended	  to	  cover	  relationship	  aspects	  between	  the	  crewmembers	  and	  ground	  personnel.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  68,	  263;	  [47]	  pps.	  151-­‐154;	  [25];	  [24]	  pps.	  161,	  165,	  166]	  Ground	  Control/Crew	  Relationship	  Ground	  Control/Crew	  Relationship	  accounts	  for	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  relationship	  in	  terms	  of	  openness,	  honesty,	  and	  level	  of	  trust	  between	  crewmembers	  and	  ground	  control.	  	  This	  factor	  addresses	  the	  relationships	  between	  crewmembers	  and	  ground	  control,	  but	  does	  not	  include	  relationships	  to	  family	  and	  friends	  on	  the	  ground.	  	  Observed	  tension	  in	  this	  relationship	  is	  sometimes	  categorized	  as	  crew	  “displacement”.	  	  The	  factor	  “Level	  of	  Crew	  Autonomy”	  may	  be	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related	  because	  as	  crew	  autonomy	  decreases,	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  factor	  may	  increase.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  10,	  21,	  45,	  283;	  [30]	  pps.	  36,	  43;	  [24]	  pp.	  158]	  Safety	  Culture	  Safety	  Culture	  addresses	  the	  organization’s	  attention	  and	  dedication	  to	  safety,	  safety	  processes,	  open	  communication	  regarding	  safety	  issues,	  and	  support	  of	  safety-­‐conscious	  actions	  without	  inhibiting	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  organization.	  	  It	  also	  takes	  into	  account	  if	  the	  organizational	  safety	  culture	  allows	  for	  the	  development	  of	  complacency	  over	  time	  or	  if	  effective	  processes	  are	  in	  place	  to	  prevent	  that.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  269,	  [5]	  pp.	  232;	  [29]	  pp.	  241;	  [33,	  36,	  44,	  48]]	  Organizational	  Responsiveness	  Organizational	  Responsiveness	  refers	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  processes	  such	  as	  operational	  activity	  planning,	  system	  engineering,	  logistics,	  material	  and	  acquisitions	  to	  respond	  to	  crew	  needs.	  This	  may	  be	  related	  to	  “Ground	  Control/Crew	  Relationship”	  as	  the	  relationship	  may	  act	  as	  and	  initial	  channel	  for	  feedback	  from	  the	  crew	  to	  the	  ground	  regarding	  various	  needs.	  	  [44]	  Workplace	  Support	  Workplace	  Support	  allows	  for	  the	  influence	  of	  human	  resources,	  employee	  relations,	  psychological,	  and	  medical	  consultation	  support	  offered	  by	  the	  organization	  during	  a	  mission.	  	  This	  includes	  support	  offered	  to	  crew	  family	  members	  during	  a	  mission,	  as	  well.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  67;	  [30]	  pp.	  47;	  [29]	  pps.	  197-­‐205;	  [24]	  pps.	  169-­‐188;	  [33]]	  	  Level	  of	  Crew	  Autonomy	  Level	  of	  Crew	  Autonomy	  addresses	  the	  amount	  of	  independence	  from	  ground	  support	  the	  crewmembers	  have	  in	  decision-­‐making,	  planning,	  and	  implementation	  of	  activities	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  mission	  and	  its	  tasks.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  21,	  48,	  64,	  68-­‐69,	  289-­‐291;	  [24]	  pp.	  165;	  [49]]	  Performance	  Culture	  Performance	  Culture	  refers	  to	  the	  organization’s	  expectation	  for	  task	  accomplishment	  quality	  and	  quantity.	  	  There	  may	  be	  an	  expectation	  of	  flawless	  performance	  imposing	  additional	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stress.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  be	  related	  to	  “Task	  Planning	  and	  Scheduling”	  factors	  and	  “Psychological	  Conditions”	  factors	  such	  as	  “Morale”.	  	  [[24]	  pp.	  165;	  [44]]	  Warning	  Capabilities	  Warning	  capabilities	  refers	  to	  the	  technological	  abilities	  of	  the	  organization	  to	  give	  the	  crewmembers	  advanced	  notice	  of	  impending	  environmental	  (i.e.	  not	  easily	  detectable	  by	  vehicle	  systems)	  danger,	  such	  as	  a	  solar	  particle	  radiation	  event.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  183-­‐184]	  	  
3.2.1.2 Training	  Factors	  	  The	  Training	  Domain	  Category,	  shown	  on	  the	  upper	  left	  side	  of	  the	  latency	  axis	  in	  Figure	  10,	  is	  defined	  by	  its	  Functional	  Grouping	  Training	  Quality.	  
Training	  Quality	  [2,	  44]	  Applicability	  of	  Training	  Applicability	  of	  Training	  addresses	  the	  similarities	  between	  training	  for	  a	  task	  and	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  task	  in	  the	  operational	  setting,	  including	  how	  realistic	  the	  training	  is.	  	  It	  differs	  from	  Task	  Familiarity	  factors	  in	  that	  it	  covers	  the	  applicability	  of	  training	  materials,	  facilities,	  training	  hardware	  and	  software,	  simulators,	  and	  training	  processes	  for	  on-­‐orbit	  and	  ground	  training,	  but	  not	  the	  task-­‐specific	  context	  and	  circumstance	  similarities.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  55;	  [5]	  pps.	  218-­‐219;	  [33]]	  Recency	  of	  Training	  Recency	  of	  Training	  accounts	  for	  how	  much	  time	  has	  passed	  between	  training	  or	  similar	  task	  performance	  and	  the	  current	  operational	  setting.	  	  The	  training	  may	  have	  been	  on	  the	  ground	  or	  in-­‐flight.	  	  This	  differs	  from	  “Task	  Familiarity”	  factors	  in	  that	  it	  addresses	  the	  time	  gap	  between	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skill	  practice	  and	  current	  operations,	  not	  whether	  a	  task	  is	  novel	  in	  its	  occurrence	  in	  the	  operational	  setting.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  285;	  [50]]	  Level	  of	  Training	  Level	  of	  Training	  refers	  to	  whether	  the	  training	  the	  crewmember	  has	  received	  is	  at	  a	  beginning,	  moderate,	  or	  advanced	  level.	  	  [[5]	  pps.	  218-­‐219]	  Applicable	  Operational	  Experience	  Applicable	  Operational	  Experience	  accounts	  for	  whether	  the	  crewmember	  has	  had	  previous	  experience	  performing	  tasks	  in	  the	  operational	  environment	  beyond	  training	  exercises.	  	  [[5]	  pps.	  218-­‐219]	  	  Language	  or	  Cultural	  Barriers	  to	  Training	  Language	  or	  Cultural	  Barriers	  to	  Training	  addresses	  the	  international	  nature	  of	  many	  spaceflight	  efforts	  by	  taking	  into	  account	  that	  language	  and	  culture	  may	  influence	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  training	  process.	  	  [27]	  Crewmembers	  Training	  Together	  Crewmembers	  Training	  Together	  also	  refers	  to	  the	  international	  nature	  of	  many	  spaceflight	  efforts	  and	  other	  logistical	  factors	  that	  may	  cause	  difficulties	  in	  scheduling	  crewmember	  training	  activities	  together.	  	  This	  factor	  likely	  influences	  the	  factors	  within	  “Crew	  Collaboration	  Quality”.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  45,	  55,	  56,	  58;	  [25]]	  	  
3.2.1.3 Team	  Factors	  	  The	  Team	  Domain	  Category,	  shown	  near	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  latency	  axis	  in	  Figure	  10,	  is	  defined	  by	  its	  functional	  Grouping	  Crew	  Collaboration	  Quality.	  
 	   36	  
Crew	  Collaboration	  Quality	  [2]	  Coordination	  [11,	  36,	  44]	  Coordination	  is	  further	  decomposed	  into	  seven	  factors:	  
Workload	  Management	  Workload	  Management	  addresses	  how	  well	  the	  crewmembers	  as	  a	  team	  identify	  work	  priorities	  and	  efficiently	  allocate	  tasks	  within	  the	  team.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  be	  especially	  influential	  in	  management	  of	  situations	  requiring	  team	  coordination,	  such	  as	  emergencies,	  large	  maintenance	  efforts,	  or	  docking	  operations.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  be	  influenced	  by	  pre-­‐assigned	  operational	  task	  allocations.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  57,	  283;	  [5]	  pps.	  244-­‐245;	  [44]]	  
Space	  Flight	  Resource	  Management	  Space	  Flight	  Resource	  Management	  refers	  to	  how	  well	  the	  crewmembers	  utilize	  the	  resources	  on	  board	  the	  vehicle	  besides	  themselves,	  such	  as	  hardware	  and	  software.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  be	  especially	  important	  when	  international	  assets	  or	  international	  coordination	  is	  involved.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  57;	  [44]]	  
Shared	  Mental	  Models	  Shared	  Mental	  Models	  accounts	  for	  the	  influences	  of	  crewmembers	  on	  a	  team	  having	  a	  common	  understanding	  of	  the	  system,	  the	  situation	  and	  the	  team’s	  relationships	  to	  the	  system	  and	  situation.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  be	  influenced	  by	  training	  factors.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  54,	  56,	  62;	  [5]	  pps.	  225-­‐226]	  
Skill	  Set	  Mix	  Skill	  Set	  Mix	  addresses	  how	  complementary	  the	  combined	  set	  of	  crewmember	  skills	  may	  be.	  	  This	  includes	  technical	  skills,	  knowledge,	  and	  interpersonal	  skills,	  as	  well.	  	  This	  factor	  also	  includes	  the	  awareness	  and	  understanding	  of	  other	  team	  members’	  skills	  each	  individual	  may	  have.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  48,	  53,	  58;	  [30]	  pp.	  218;	  [5]	  pps.	  227-­‐228,	  238-­‐255;	  [24]	  pp.	  164;	  [36]]	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Understanding	  and	  Acceptance	  of	  Roles	  and	  Responsibilities	  Understanding	  and	  Acceptance	  of	  Roles	  and	  Responsibilities	  accounts	  for	  the	  awareness	  and	  adherence	  to	  the	  assignment	  of	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  given	  either	  externally	  or	  from	  within	  the	  team.	  	  The	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  assignment	  of	  the	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  is	  included	  in	  this	  factor,	  also,	  and	  is	  likely	  seen	  by	  the	  degree	  of	  acceptance.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  49,	  54,	  57,	  64-­‐65,	  283;	  [24]	  pps.	  164,	  166;	  [33,	  36]]	  
Task	  Leadership	  Task	  Leadership	  addresses	  the	  presence	  and	  suitability	  of	  the	  guidance	  within	  the	  team	  for	  accomplishing	  tasks.	  	  “Interpersonal	  Leadership”	  is	  a	  similar	  factor	  discussed	  as	  an	  aspect	  of	  cooperation,	  but	  differs	  from	  this	  task-­‐focused	  factor.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  49,	  55,	  63;	  [5]	  pps.	  241-­‐243;	  [36,	  44]]	  
Task	  Conflict	  Level	  Task	  Conflict	  Level	  refers	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  friction	  over	  how	  to	  accomplish	  tasks,	  handle	  work	  situations	  or	  choose	  alternatives.	  	  Certain	  levels	  of	  task	  conflict	  may	  be	  beneficial	  to	  performance,	  especially	  if	  crewmembers	  catch	  each	  others’	  mistakes	  or	  discuss	  ideas	  from	  different	  viewpoints.	  	  International	  and	  cultural	  differences	  may	  influence	  approaches	  to	  decision-­‐making	  and	  implementation,	  and	  may	  contribute	  to	  this	  factor,	  as	  well.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  54,	  61;	  [5]	  pp.	  232]	  Cooperation	  [11]	  Cooperation	  is	  further	  decomposed	  into	  four	  factors.	  	  These	  factors	  relate	  more	  to	  the	  interpersonal	  aspects	  of	  crew	  collaboration	  than	  the	  task-­‐focused	  coordination	  factors.	  
Interpersonal	  Leadership	  Interpersonal	  Leadership	  addresses	  the	  presence	  and	  suitability	  of	  counsel	  and	  guidance	  within	  the	  team	  for	  non-­‐task	  issues	  and	  situations.	  	  This	  type	  of	  leadership	  does	  not	  necessarily	  need	  to	  be	  provided	  by	  the	  same	  person	  or	  people	  as	  task	  leadership,	  and	  its	  quality	  can	  influence	  the	  underlying	  dynamics	  for	  task	  performance.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  49,	  55,	  63;	  [5]	  pps.	  241-­‐243]	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Interpersonal	  Conflict	  Level	  Interpersonal	  Conflict	  Level	  refers	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  friction	  due	  to	  personality,	  political,	  cultural,	  spiritual,	  religious,	  or	  any	  other	  personal	  differences.	  	  As	  with	  “Task	  Conflict	  Level”,	  certain	  levels	  of	  interpersonal	  conflict	  may	  be	  beneficial,	  such	  as	  when	  different	  views	  expand	  opposing	  perspectives	  and	  contribute	  to	  improved	  ideas.	  	  However,	  severe	  levels	  of	  interpersonal	  conflict	  may	  influence	  performance	  in	  damaging	  ways.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  45,	  49,	  54,	  58,	  61;	  [30]	  pps.	  34-­‐35;	  [5]	  pp.	  232]	  
Collective	  Efficacy	  Collective	  Efficacy	  addresses	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  team	  working	  together	  to	  accomplish	  tasks	  and	  create	  a	  cooperative	  living	  and	  working	  environment.	  	  This	  addresses	  the	  aspects	  of	  living	  and	  working	  together,	  especially	  for	  peripheral	  tasks	  such	  as	  living	  and	  working	  neatly	  and	  cleanly,	  that	  make	  the	  experience	  as	  a	  whole	  proceed	  more	  smoothly	  and	  effectively.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  45]	  
Team	  Cohesion	  Team	  Cohesion	  accounts	  for	  the	  sense	  of	  unity,	  trust	  and	  bonds	  present	  between	  the	  crewmembers,	  creating	  a	  desire	  to	  support	  each	  other	  and	  live	  and	  work	  together	  in	  a	  positive	  manner.	  	  If	  the	  state	  of	  cohesion	  is	  less	  than	  desirable,	  motivation	  to	  act	  as	  a	  collaborative	  team	  may	  be	  reduced.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  45,	  55,	  63;	  [5]	  pps.	  230-­‐231;	  [36]]	  Communication	  Within	  the	  Team	  [11]	  Communication	  Within	  the	  Team	  addresses	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  verbal	  and	  non-­‐verbal	  communication	  crewmembers	  have	  with	  each	  other.	  	  Certainly	  international,	  cultural	  and	  personality	  differences	  are	  influential	  to	  this	  factor,	  along	  with	  training,	  cooperation	  and	  even	  noise	  and	  vehicle	  communication	  hardware	  factors.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  9,	  45,	  54,	  57;	  [5]	  pps.	  229-­‐230,	  237;	  [36,	  44]]	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Team	  Psychosocial	  Adaptation	  [11]	  Team	  Psychosocial	  Adaptation	  refers	  to	  the	  social	  climate	  and	  social	  support	  available	  within	  the	  team.	  	  It	  addresses	  how	  well	  the	  crewmembers	  adjust	  psychologically	  and	  socially	  to	  the	  new	  working	  and	  living	  environment	  and	  develop	  an	  inclusive	  social	  structure.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  be	  influenced	  by	  task	  and	  shift	  scheduling	  factors	  in	  terms	  of	  providing	  time,	  such	  as	  meal	  times,	  for	  the	  crewmembers	  to	  be	  together	  in	  a	  social	  setting.	  	  It	  may	  also	  be	  influenced	  by	  vehicle	  habitability	  factors	  such	  as	  habitable	  volume	  for	  provision	  of	  community	  space.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  9,	  12,	  13,	  44,	  48,	  53,	  58,	  59,	  65;	  [5]	  pps.	  233,	  237;	  [30]	  pps.	  33-­‐50;	  [24]	  pp.	  158;	  [51]	  pps.	  427-­‐430]	  	  	  	  
3.2.1.4 Task	  Specific	  Characteristics	  	  The	  Task	  Specific	  Characteristics	  Domain	  Category,	  shown	  near	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  latency	  axis	  in	  Figure	  10,	  is	  decomposed	  into	  the	  Functional	  Groupings	  of	  Time	  Context,	  Task	  Familiarity,	  Work	  Load	  and	  Quality	  of	  Procedures.	  
Time	  Context	  Available	  Time	  Available	  Time	  addresses	  the	  dynamics	  of	  a	  situation	  by	  accounting	  for	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  available	  compared	  to	  what	  is	  needed	  for	  a	  task’s	  completion.	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  during	  dynamic	  phases	  of	  a	  mission	  such	  a	  launch	  or	  entry.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  258;	  [5]	  p.	  181;	  [47]	  pp.	  24;	  [2,	  33,	  36,	  44]]	  Beginning/Middle/End	  of	  Shift	  Beginning/Middle/End	  of	  Shift	  refers	  to	  any	  effects	  on	  performance	  due	  to	  the	  inertia	  of	  starting	  a	  shift,	  lulls	  during	  a	  shift,	  or	  fatigue	  or	  rushing	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  shift.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  94;	  [46]]	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Task	  Familiarity	  Context	  or	  Setting	  as	  Expected	  Context	  or	  Setting	  as	  Expected	  addresses	  whether	  the	  information	  provided	  by	  the	  context	  or	  setting	  for	  the	  task	  allows	  for	  the	  correct	  interpretation	  of	  the	  information	  or	  brings	  confusion	  to	  the	  true	  meaning	  and	  task	  requirements	  because	  it	  is	  not	  provided	  in	  the	  expected	  manner.	  	  [[5]	  pp.	  218;	  [36]]	  Novelty	  of	  Task	  Novelty	  of	  Task	  accounts	  for	  the	  influence	  of	  having	  experience	  performing	  a	  particular	  task.	  	  For	  example,	  performance	  (in	  terms	  of	  time	  to	  complete,	  number	  of	  errors,	  etc.)	  of	  a	  new	  task	  may	  differ	  from	  performance	  of	  a	  task	  that	  has	  been	  completed	  many	  times	  by	  the	  crewmember.	  [[5]	  pps.	  218-­‐219]	  
Work	  Load	  [2]	  Cognitive	  Work	  Load	  Cognitive	  Work	  Load	  refers	  to	  the	  number	  and	  complexity	  of	  simultaneous	  cognitive	  demands.	  	  Too	  little	  cognitive	  work	  load	  may	  affect	  performance	  by	  leading	  to	  boredom,	  complacency,	  or	  lack	  of	  proficiency.	  	  A	  large	  cognitive	  work	  load	  may	  be	  more	  than	  the	  crewmember	  can	  process	  and	  execute	  successfully.	  	  An	  appropriate	  amount	  of	  work	  load	  may	  offer	  beneficial	  stimulation.	  	  Abrupt	  changes	  in	  work	  load,	  such	  as	  in	  an	  emergency	  or	  after	  intense	  time	  periods,	  may	  influence	  performance,	  also.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  10,	  48,	  87-­‐89,	  100,	  284-­‐285,	  304;	  [5]	  pps.	  190-­‐222,	  911;	  [47]	  pp.	  25;	  [24]	  pp.	  164;	  [33,	  36,	  42,	  44,	  50]]	  Physical	  Work	  Rate	  Physical	  Work	  Rate	  addresses	  if	  physical	  tasks	  are	  required	  at	  a	  rate	  incompatible	  with	  human	  capabilities.	  	  This	  differs	  from	  the	  Available	  Time	  factor	  in	  that	  it	  is	  with	  respect	  to	  human	  capabilities,	  not	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  vehicle	  or	  system.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  87;	  [33]]	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Physical	  Work	  Load	  Physical	  Work	  Load	  addresses	  if	  physical	  tasks	  are	  required	  at	  an	  intensity	  or	  load	  incompatible	  with	  human	  capabilities.	  	  This	  addresses	  whether	  the	  task	  load	  is	  compatible	  with	  cardiovascular,	  pulmonary,	  and	  musculoskeletal	  capabilities.	  	  This	  does	  not,	  however,	  address	  user	  interface	  Strength	  Accommodations	  considerations.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  87;	  [5]	  pps.	  94-­‐102;	  [34]	  pp.	  156;	  [33]]	  	  
Quality	  of	  Procedures	  [2,	  44]	  Availability	  of	  Procedures	  Availability	  of	  Procedures	  addresses	  if	  procedures	  are	  close-­‐at-­‐hand	  or	  easily	  accessible,	  either	  electronically	  or	  physically.	  	  This	  also	  addresses	  whether	  procedures	  exist	  for	  the	  task	  or	  situation.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  255;	  [33,	  36]]	  Organization	  of	  Procedural	  Inputs/Information	  Availability	  Organization	  of	  Procedural	  Inputs/Info	  Available	  refers	  to	  how	  well	  the	  information	  needed	  to	  complete	  the	  task	  is	  consolidated	  or	  easily	  found	  by	  the	  crewmember.	  	  This	  addresses	  the	  effects	  of	  having	  to	  locate	  necessary	  information	  outside	  of	  pertinent	  procedures	  in	  order	  to	  complete	  the	  task.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  256,	  260-­‐261,	  285;	  [47]	  pps.	  136-­‐137;	  [33]]	  Familiarity	  of	  Response	  Patterns/Standardization	  Familiarity	  or	  Response	  Patterns/Standardization	  addresses	  the	  commonality	  and	  consistency	  of	  procedure	  styles	  and	  patterns.	  	  It	  accounts	  for	  the	  use	  of	  having	  bold,	  simple,	  highlighted,	  bulleted	  and	  indented	  formats	  consistently	  across	  procedures.	  	  It	  also	  addresses	  the	  use	  of	  common	  terminology	  and	  nomenclature.	  	  It	  may	  relate	  to	  “Applicability	  of	  Training”	  when	  using	  the	  same	  procedures	  and	  standard	  formats	  during	  training	  and	  operations,	  and	  “Task	  Familiarity”	  for	  experience	  with	  of	  patterns	  of	  steps.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  256;	  [47]	  pps.	  131-­‐133;	  [33]]	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Clarity,	  Ease	  of	  Use,	  Comprehensibility	  of	  Procedures	  Clarity,	  Ease	  of	  Use,	  Comprehensibility	  or	  Procedures	  accounts	  for	  the	  usability	  of	  the	  procedures.	  	  It	  addresses	  if	  the	  procedures	  are	  properly	  developed	  for	  an	  expert	  versus	  a	  new	  user.	  	  It	  also	  includes	  whether	  procedures	  support	  the	  crewmember’s	  ability	  to	  find	  a	  place	  in	  a	  procedure	  easily.	  	  Especially	  important	  are	  the	  procedure’s	  inclusion	  of	  images,	  especially	  for	  tasks	  such	  as	  maintenance	  on	  which	  crewmembers	  may	  not	  have	  specifically	  trained.	  	  This	  factor	  also	  addresses	  emergency	  procedure	  clarity,	  including	  providing	  them	  in	  each	  crewmember’s	  native	  language.	  	  A	  relationship	  to	  “Organizational	  Responsiveness”	  may	  exist	  to	  account	  for	  data	  availability	  within	  the	  organization	  for	  procedure	  writers	  to	  create	  accurate	  procedures.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  256,	  258,	  286;	  [33,	  36]]	  	  
3.2.2 VEHICLE	  DESIGN	  DOMAIN	  	  The	  Vehicle	  Design	  Domain,	  as	  represented	  by	  the	  blue	  box	  in	  the	  lower	  left	  corner	  of	  Figure	  10,	  is	  decomposed	  into	  the	  Domain	  Categories	  of	  Physical	  Environment	  and	  Human	  System	  Interaction.	  	  This	  section	  discusses	  the	  Contributing	  Factors	  within	  the	  Vehicle	  Design	  Domain.	  	  	  	  	  	  
3.2.2.1 Physical	  Environment	  	  The	  Physical	  Environment	  [1]	  Domain	  Category,	  shown	  near	  the	  upper	  left	  in	  Figure	  10,	  is	  decomposed	  into	  the	  Functional	  Groupings	  of	  Vehicle	  Physical	  Environment,	  Vehicle	  Architecture	  and	  Habitability.	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Vehicle	  Physical	  Environment	  Noise	  Level	  Noise	  Level	  refers	  to	  the	  acoustic	  environment	  in	  the	  vehicle.	  	  Noises	  may	  exist	  due	  to	  launch,	  entry,	  or	  emergency	  conditions,	  or	  from	  equipment	  with	  moving	  parts	  such	  as	  motors,	  fans	  and	  payloads	  during	  nominal	  operations.	  	  This	  factor	  addresses	  the	  influences	  of	  noise	  over	  various	  time	  frames,	  from	  intense	  acoustic	  levels	  over	  brief	  time	  spans,	  to	  lower	  levels	  persistent	  over	  time.	  [[26]	  pps.	  21,	  98,	  258,	  270;	  [5]	  pps.	  181,	  396-­‐417;	  [47]	  pps.	  53-­‐60;	  [25,	  43];	  [24]	  pps.	  104,	  116-­‐118,	  164;	  [52]	  pps.	  95-­‐122;	  [36]]	  	  Vibration	  Level	  Vibration	  Level	  accounts	  for	  any	  physical	  vibration	  imparted	  to	  the	  crewmember.	  	  It	  may	  be	  influenced	  by	  “Orbits	  and	  Trajectories”	  and	  “Mission	  Scenarios”.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  influence	  physical	  comfort,	  organ	  health,	  fatigue,	  vision,	  and	  motor	  control.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  21;	  [47]	  pps.	  60-­‐62;	  [5]	  pp.	  418;	  [24]	  pps.	  104,	  118-­‐120;	  [52]	  pps.	  95-­‐122;]	  Lighting	  (Ambient)	  Lighting	  (Ambient)	  refers	  to	  the	  ambient	  lighting	  throughout	  the	  vehicle.	  	  Localized,	  or	  task,	  lighting	  is	  addressed	  in	  the	  factor	  “Situation-­‐Specific	  Lighting”.	  	  This	  factor	  takes	  into	  account	  such	  conditions	  as	  a	  90-­‐minute	  day-­‐night	  cycle	  in	  Low	  Earth	  Orbit	  and	  stowage	  obstructing	  ambient	  light.	  	  It	  also	  addresses	  the	  influence	  of	  ambient	  lighting	  on	  color	  perceptions,	  glare,	  circadian	  rhythm	  function,	  fatigue,	  mood,	  and	  task	  performance.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  85,	  99-­‐108,	  115,	  263,	  270-­‐272;	  [5]	  pps.	  624-­‐643;	  [47]	  pps.	  107-­‐109;	  [52]	  pps.	  95-­‐122;	  [24]	  pps.	  104,	  121,	  164;	  [36,	  43]]	  Temperature	  Temperature	  addresses	  the	  thermal	  conditions	  within	  the	  vehicle.	  	  “Mission	  Planning”	  factors	  such	  as	  “Mission	  Destination”,	  “Orbits	  and	  Trajectories”,	  and	  “Mission	  Scenarios”	  influence	  the	  external	  thermal	  conditions	  for	  the	  vehicle.	  	  This	  factor	  accounts	  for	  any	  temperature	  influences	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on	  comfort,	  health,	  and	  performance.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  98;	  [5]	  pps.	  332-­‐338;	  [47]	  pps.	  30-­‐32;	  [52]	  pps.	  61-­‐73;	  [25,	  43];	  [24]	  pps.	  55,	  104,	  111-­‐113,	  164;	  [34]	  pps.	  91-­‐93]	  Humidity	  Level	  Humidity	  Level	  addresses	  the	  moisture	  conditions	  within	  the	  vehicle.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  be	  influenced	  by	  “Mission	  Scenarios”	  due	  to	  crew	  activities,	  such	  as	  exercise	  countermeasures,	  that	  produce	  increased	  respiration	  and	  perspiration.	  	  It	  may	  influence	  comfort,	  health,	  and	  performance	  similar	  to	  the	  factor	  “Temperature”.	  	  [[5]	  pp.	  339;	  [47]	  pp.	  29;	  [34]	  pps.	  91-­‐93;	  [25];	  [24]	  pp.	  105]	  Air	  Flow	  Air	  Flow	  refers	  to	  the	  circulation	  of	  air	  within	  the	  vehicle.	  	  Except	  for	  phases	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  planetary	  bodies,	  the	  lack	  of	  gravity,	  and	  therefore	  convection,	  during	  spaceflight	  often	  requires	  air	  flow	  within	  the	  vehicle	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  fans.	  	  The	  state	  of	  this	  factor	  may	  influence	  comfort,	  health,	  and	  performance.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  263;	  [5]	  pp.	  340;	  [47]	  pp.	  33;	  [24]	  pp.	  110]	  CO2	  Level	  CO2	  (Carbon	  Dioxide)	  Level	  addresses	  the	  affects	  caused	  by	  this	  gas	  produced	  by	  human	  respiration.	  This	  factor	  may	  be	  influenced	  by	  “Mission	  Scenarios”	  due	  to	  crew	  activities,	  such	  as	  exercise	  countermeasures,	  that	  produce	  increased	  respiration.	  	  It	  may	  also	  be	  influenced	  by	  “Air	  Flow”,	  as	  pockets	  of	  CO2	  have	  been	  noted	  to	  develop	  in	  areas	  immediately	  near	  crewmembers	  without	  circulation.	  	  It	  may	  influence	  comfort,	  health,	  and	  performance.	  	  [[5]	  pps.	  314-­‐331;	  [47]	  pp.	  27;	  [52]	  pps.	  21-­‐25;	  [34]	  pps.	  91-­‐93;	  [25]]	  	  Oxygen	  Level	  Oxygen	  Level	  takes	  into	  account	  influences	  due	  to	  having	  too	  much	  or	  too	  little	  oxygen	  in	  the	  vehicle	  atmosphere,	  leading	  to	  hyperoxia	  or	  hypoxia,	  respectively.	  	  The	  presence	  of	  atmospheric	  particulates	  such	  as	  lunar	  dust	  and	  high	  partial	  pressures	  of	  other	  gases	  such	  as	  CO	  and	  CO2	  may	  lead	  to	  altered	  levels	  of	  oxygen	  in	  the	  vehicle	  atmosphere,	  influenced	  by	  “Mission	  Scenarios”.	  	  This	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factor	  influences	  health	  and	  cognitive	  performance.	  	  [[25];	  [5]	  pps.	  182-­‐183,	  314-­‐331;	  [47]	  pp.	  27;	  [52]	  pps.	  13-­‐21;	  [34]	  pps.	  91-­‐93;	  [53]]	  Atmospheric	  Particulates	  Atmospheric	  Particulates	  addresses	  effects	  due	  to	  particles	  in	  the	  vehicle	  environment.	  	  “Habitability”	  factors	  such	  as	  “Cleanliness	  of	  Environment”	  will	  influence	  this	  factor	  due	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  nuisance	  dust	  or	  lunar	  dust,	  for	  example.	  	  “Safety	  Accommodations”	  may	  influence	  this	  factor,	  as	  well,	  depending	  on	  the	  type	  of	  fire	  prevention	  devices	  present	  in	  the	  vehicle	  and	  the	  particles	  produced	  by	  them.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  influence	  “Oxygen	  Level”	  by	  causing	  obstructions	  on	  the	  lungs	  and	  may	  increase	  possibility	  of	  eye	  injury.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  263,	  317-­‐330;	  [5]	  pps.	  342,	  345;	  [47]	  pps.	  42-­‐43;	  [52]	  pps.	  37-­‐57;	  [34]	  pps.	  91-­‐93;	  [25];	  [24]	  pp.	  110,	  125]	  Odor	   Odor	  refers	  to	  scents	  within	  the	  vehicle	  and	  their	  influences.	  	  Odors	  may	  be	  due	  to	  vehicle	  component	  off-­‐gassing,	  chemicals	  used	  in	  operations,	  and	  human	  waste.	  	  It	  may	  influence	  comfort,	  health,	  and	  performance.	  	  [[5]	  pp.	  499;	  [24]	  pps.	  111,	  121-­‐122]	  Acceleration/Gravity	  Level	  Acceleration/Gravity	  Level	  accounts	  for	  influences	  due	  to	  linear,	  rotational,	  and	  impact	  accelerations	  for	  dynamic	  phases	  of	  missions,	  along	  with	  the	  level	  of	  gravity	  during	  non-­‐dynamic	  phases	  of	  missions	  such	  as	  interplanetary	  cruise.	  	  Limits	  exist	  for	  the	  amount	  of	  each	  type	  of	  acceleration	  that	  human	  bodies	  can	  withstand,	  and	  health	  and	  performance	  degradations	  occur	  before	  those	  limits	  are	  reached.	  	  The	  limits	  may	  differ	  depending	  on	  the	  conditioning	  of	  a	  crewmember	  to	  various	  gravity	  levels,	  and	  whether	  the	  crewmember	  is	  injured	  or	  ill.	  	  This	  factor	  also	  addresses	  when	  a	  crewmember	  is	  present	  in	  a	  certain	  gravity	  level	  while	  operating	  a	  remote	  asset,	  such	  as	  a	  rover	  or	  robotic	  arm,	  at	  a	  different	  gravity	  level.	  	  [[47]	  pps.	  45-­‐53;	  [5]	  pps.	  375-­‐395;	  [24]	  pps.	  115-­‐116;	  [51]	  pps.	  279-­‐345;	  [34]	  pps.	  58-­‐59]	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Atmospheric	  Pressure	  Level	  Atmospheric	  Pressure	  Level	  addresses	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  state	  of	  the	  vehicle	  atmospheric	  pressure.	  	  The	  pressure	  level	  may	  be	  altered	  due	  to	  leakage,	  hull	  penetration,	  or	  damage.	  	  This	  factor	  affects	  health	  and	  potentially	  cognitive	  performance.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  304;	  [5]	  pps.	  314-­‐331;	  [47]	  27-­‐28;	  [25];	  [24]	  pps.	  104-­‐105,	  164;	  [52]	  pps.	  1-­‐30;	  [34]	  pps.	  64,	  91-­‐92;	  [53,	  54]]	  	  	  	  Toxic	  Substance	  Level	  Toxic	  Substance	  Level	  accounts	  for	  the	  presence	  of	  any	  toxic	  substance	  or	  gas	  within	  the	  vehicle	  environment.	  	  This	  may	  be	  caused	  by	  items	  such	  as	  hydrazine	  from	  vehicle	  thrusters	  deposited	  on	  an	  Extra-­‐Vehicular	  Activity	  suit	  and	  brought	  back	  inside	  the	  vehicle,	  a	  leak	  of	  an	  ammonia	  cooling	  line,	  or	  fire	  suppression	  devices.	  	  This	  factor	  influences	  health	  and	  cognitive	  performance.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  255;	  [5]	  pps.	  342,	  345-­‐353;	  [47]	  pps.	  26,	  34-­‐35,	  41-­‐42;	  [52]	  pps.	  37-­‐57;	  [25,	  27,	  54];	  [24]	  pps.	  56,	  111]	  Radiation	  Exposure	  Level	  Radiation	  Exposure	  Level	  refers	  to	  effects	  from	  acute	  and	  long-­‐term	  exposure	  to	  radiation.	  	  “Orbits	  and	  Trajectories”	  can	  influence	  this	  factor,	  as	  design	  choices	  such	  as	  avoidance	  of	  flying	  through	  the	  South	  Atlantic	  Anomaly	  can	  reduce	  exposure.	  	  “Warning	  Capabilities”	  may	  also	  influence	  this	  factor	  because,	  for	  example,	  if	  a	  solar	  radiation	  event	  can	  be	  detected	  by	  the	  ground	  and	  communicated	  to	  the	  crew,	  they	  can	  evacuate	  to	  a	  more	  shielded	  location	  within	  the	  vehicle	  if	  one	  exists.	  	  Radiation	  Exposure	  Level	  certainly	  influences	  health	  and	  likely	  cognitive	  performance,	  as	  well.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  16,	  171-­‐190,	  263;	  [47]	  pps.	  63-­‐68;	  [30]	  pps.	  54-­‐74;	  [5]	  pps.	  419-­‐474;	  [51]	  pps.	  365-­‐412;	  [34]	  pps.	  51-­‐54;	  [25];	  [24]	  pps.	  104,	  113-­‐115,	  164]	  	  	  
Vehicle	  Architecture	  Arrangement	  of	  Functional	  Areas	  Arrangement	  of	  Functional	  Areas	  addresses	  the	  topology	  or	  configuration	  of	  areas	  within	  the	  vehicle.	  	  It	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  influence	  of	  having	  equipment	  or	  facilities	  used	  in	  logical	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sequences	  of	  operations	  placed	  relatively	  close	  together	  and	  of	  areas	  that	  have	  interfering	  functions	  to	  be	  physically	  separate.	  	  Example	  considerations	  are	  placing	  a	  noisy	  component	  distant	  from	  sleeping	  quarters	  and	  locating	  waste	  management	  separate	  from	  food	  preparation	  and	  dining	  areas.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  270,	  272;	  [47]	  pps.	  76,	  94;	  [5]	  pps.	  490-­‐491,	  507-­‐513,	  530-­‐533,	  544,	  572-­‐577;	  [24]	  pp.	  164;	  [52]	  pps.	  142-­‐145;	  [43]]	  Access	  to	  Work	  Items	  Access	  to	  Work	  Items	  refers	  to	  the	  level	  of	  ease	  with	  which	  a	  crewmember	  may	  physically	  access,	  obtain,	  or	  reach	  physical	  components	  or	  visually	  view	  needed	  displays	  or	  information.	  	  It	  capture	  effects	  of	  design	  aspects	  such	  as	  avoiding	  the	  placement	  of	  frequently	  used	  components	  in	  hard-­‐to-­‐reach	  locations.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  be	  influenced	  by	  “Inventory	  Management	  Capability”	  if	  stowage	  is	  obstructing	  access	  to	  or	  viewing	  of	  components.	  	  [[5]	  pps.	  517-­‐523]	  Presence	  of	  Location	  Aids	  Presence	  of	  Location	  Aids	  addresses	  aspects	  of	  the	  vehicle	  architecture	  employed	  to	  assist	  the	  crewmember	  in	  quickly	  recognizing	  location	  within	  the	  vehicle.	  	  Aids	  may	  include	  colors	  for	  particular	  modules,	  consistency	  of	  the	  orientation	  of	  labels	  within	  modules	  (e.g.	  “up”	  remains	  consistent	  throughout	  the	  vehicle),	  and	  labels,	  arrows,	  and/or	  diagrams	  to	  indicate	  module	  names,	  orientations,	  and	  locations	  (similar	  to	  road	  signs).	  	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  270;	  [5]	  pps.	  578-­‐586;	  [47]	  pps.	  95-­‐96;	  [52]	  pps.	  145-­‐146]	  Support	  of	  Traffic	  Flow,	  Translation	  Paths	  Support	  of	  Traffic	  Flow,	  Translation	  Paths	  addresses	  the	  vehicles	  accommodations	  for	  crewmember	  motion	  throughout.	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  in	  emergency	  egress	  situations,	  and	  may	  be	  related	  to	  “Presence	  of	  Locations	  Aids”	  in	  this	  respect.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  also	  be	  influenced	  by	  the	  protrusion	  of	  temporary	  stowage,	  which	  can	  be	  captured	  by	  the	  factor	  “Inventory	  Management	  Capability”.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  270,	  272;	  [5]	  pps.	  587-­‐591;	  [47]	  pps.	  96-­‐98;	  [52]	  pp.	  146]	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Availability	  of	  Hatches	  Availability	  of	  Hatches	  refers	  to	  the	  presence	  and	  ease	  of	  use	  of	  hatches	  in	  the	  vehicle	  and	  their	  accessibility.	  	  It	  may	  also	  cover	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  their	  size	  and	  shape,	  especially	  if	  suited	  operation	  is	  required.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  be	  especially	  important	  in	  emergency	  situations.	  	  [[5]	  pps.	  592-­‐594;	  [47]	  pps.	  99-­‐101]	  Availability	  of	  Windows	  Availability	  of	  Windows	  addresses	  whether	  windows	  are	  present	  in	  the	  spacecraft,	  and	  the	  suitability	  of	  their	  optical	  quality,	  size,	  shape,	  orientation	  and	  accessibility.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  influence	  task	  performance	  when	  viewing	  supports	  task	  completion,	  such	  as	  in	  a	  docking	  manuever.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  also	  influence	  psychological	  factors,	  especially	  for	  missions	  and	  mission	  phases	  when	  viewing	  opportunities	  are	  available,	  such	  as	  a	  planetary	  orbit.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  21,	  276;	  [5]	  pps.	  595-­‐623;	  [47]	  pps.	  104-­‐107;	  [52]	  pp.	  148;	  [24]	  pp.	  175]	  Anthropometric	  Accommodations	  Anthropometric	  Accommodations	  accounts	  for	  how	  well	  the	  vehicle	  provides	  for	  the	  fit	  of	  crewmembers.	  	  It	  addresses	  clearance	  for	  translation	  and	  seating,	  altered	  posture	  in	  microgravity	  considerations,	  and	  clothing	  or	  suit	  effects	  on	  crewmember	  size.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  274;	  [47]	  pps.	  17-­‐19;	  [5]	  pps.	  40-­‐52;	  [33]]	  Safety	  Accommodations	  Safety	  Accommodations	  refers	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  items	  such	  as	  fire	  extinguishers	  and	  emergency	  lighting.	  	  It	  also	  includes	  features	  such	  as	  rounded,	  not	  sharp,	  corners	  on	  hardware,	  acceptable	  touch	  temperatures	  and	  electrical	  hazard	  protection.	  	  [[47]	  pps.	  111-­‐119,	  125-­‐129;	  [26]	  pp.	  269;	  [29]	  pps.	  243-­‐255;	  [24]	  pps.	  193-­‐211,	  591]	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Habitability	  Microorganism	  Virulence	  Microorganism	  Virulence	  addresses	  the	  potential	  effects	  of	  increased	  microorganism	  virulence	  in	  microgravity.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  have	  influences	  from	  “Acceleration/Gravity	  Level”	  and	  “Cleanliness	  of	  Environment”.	  	  It	  may	  affect	  crewmember	  health	  and	  performance.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  290;	  [47]	  pps.	  41-­‐45;	  [52]	  pps.	  77-­‐90]	  Cleanliness	  of	  Environment	  Cleanliness	  of	  Environment	  refers	  to	  the	  sanitary	  conditions	  of	  the	  vehicle.	  	  It	  includes	  the	  sanitary	  conditions	  of	  surfaces	  and	  the	  air,	  and	  the	  vehicle’s	  capabilities	  for	  supporting	  the	  conditions	  by	  providing	  food	  preparation	  surfaces,	  materials	  for	  cleaning	  the	  surfaces,	  and	  facilities	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  accumulation	  of	  garbage	  such	  as	  food	  packaging.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  21,	  290,	  308;	  [5]	  pps.	  342-­‐344,	  371-­‐374,	  490,	  503-­‐506,	  524-­‐529,	  537-­‐543;	  [47]	  pps.	  41-­‐45,	  91-­‐92;	  [52]	  pps.	  77-­‐90,	  153-­‐154;	  [24]	  pps.	  593,	  594;	  [25]]	  Inventory	  Management	  Capability	  Inventory	  Management	  Capability	  addresses	  the	  vehicle’s	  accommodation	  for	  tracking,	  stowage,	  and	  organization	  of	  items	  including	  hardware,	  food,	  and	  supplies.	  	  This	  includes	  having	  both	  the	  space	  for	  inventory	  and	  a	  method	  for	  tracking	  it,	  automated	  or	  not.	  	  	  This	  factor	  influences	  “Support	  of	  Traffic	  Flow,	  Translation	  Paths”	  and	  “Access	  to	  Work	  Items”	  due	  to	  its	  relation	  to	  keeping	  inventory	  out	  of	  traffic	  flow	  and	  in	  known,	  non-­‐obstructing	  locations.	  	  It	  also	  relates	  to	  “Suit	  Design”	  because	  of	  the	  logistics	  of	  suit	  sizing	  for	  each	  crewmember	  and	  the	  need	  to	  maintain	  spare	  parts.	  	  This	  factor	  influences	  efficiency	  of	  performance,	  and	  potentially	  psychological	  conditions.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  21,	  259,	  275-­‐276;	  [5]	  pps.	  507,	  517-­‐523;	  [47]	  pps.	  84-­‐89;	  [52]	  pps.	  152-­‐153;	  [29]	  pp.	  163]	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Habitable	  Volume	  Habitable	  Volume	  addresses	  the	  internal	  pressurized	  volume	  of	  the	  vehicle	  available	  for	  crew	  occupation	  and	  activity.	  	  It	  excludes	  volume	  taken	  by	  equipment	  and	  stowage,	  and	  is	  therefore	  related	  to	  “Internal	  Management	  Capability”.	  	  This	  factor	  addresses	  the	  volume	  available	  for	  each	  crewmember,	  and	  includes	  influences	  due	  to	  social	  density	  and	  potential	  overcrowding.	  	  It	  has	  potential	  psychological	  and	  performance	  effects.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  21,	  272,	  308;	  [5]	  pps.	  507-­‐513,	  517-­‐529,	  552-­‐572;	  [47]	  pps.	  81,	  83,	  89,	  93-­‐94;	  [24]	  pps.	  149-­‐151,163;	  [52]	  pps.	  140-­‐142;	  [43,	  55]]	  	  Food	  System	  Food	  System	  refers	  to	  the	  capabilities	  of	  the	  vehicle	  for	  providing	  safe	  and	  acceptable	  food	  and	  water,	  including	  appropriate	  systems	  for	  preparation,	  consumption	  and	  clean-­‐up.	  	  It	  accounts	  for	  influences	  due	  to	  a	  limited	  variety	  of	  food,	  a	  lack	  of	  fresh	  food,	  any	  altered	  taste	  of	  food	  in	  spaceflight,	  and	  shelf	  life	  considerations.	  	  It	  also	  addresses	  the	  balance	  needed	  among	  the	  food	  quality	  and	  the	  power	  and	  crew	  time	  for	  the	  supporting	  system.	  	  This	  factor	  influences	  nutrition,	  as	  well	  as	  psychological	  and	  team	  factors.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  297-­‐316;	  [5]	  pps.	  354-­‐370,	  483-­‐498;	  [47]	  pps.	  35-­‐42,	  69-­‐75;	  [52]	  pps.	  150-­‐151,	  239-­‐259;	  [25];	  [24]	  pps.	  175,	  581-­‐586;	  [34]	  pps.	  95-­‐102]	  	  	  Nutrition	  Nutrition	  accounts	  for	  influences	  of	  the	  nutritional	  content	  of	  food	  on	  the	  crewmembers.	  	  This	  factor	  addresses	  the	  potential	  for	  inadequate	  caloric	  intake,	  nutrient	  loss	  in	  food	  due	  to	  radiation,	  and	  inadequate	  nutrition	  due	  to	  availability	  and	  quality	  of	  food	  as	  captured	  in	  “Food	  System”.	  	  This	  factor	  influences	  health	  and	  likely	  psychological	  conditions,	  as	  well.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  297-­‐316;	  [5]	  pps.	  483-­‐498;	  [47]	  pps.	  69-­‐75;	  [52]	  pps.	  167-­‐173,	  223-­‐234;	  [30]	  pps.	  169-­‐183;	  [34]	  pps.	  95-­‐102]	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Confinement	  Confinement	  captures	  influences	  due	  to	  being	  in	  an	  enclosed	  space	  for	  the	  mission	  time	  within	  the	  vehicle.	  	  This	  may	  have	  effects	  on	  psychological	  conditions	  and	  performance,	  especially	  as	  mission	  duration	  increases.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  10,	  48,	  66,	  69;	  [29]	  pp.	  163;	  [24]	  pp.	  166]	  Availability	  of	  Private	  Space	  Availability	  of	  Private	  Space	  addresses	  the	  existence,	  volume,	  and	  level	  of	  privacy	  available	  to	  crewmembers	  in	  the	  vehicle,	  including	  personal	  sleeping	  quarters.	  	  It	  covers	  aspects	  of	  private	  space	  such	  as	  how	  thin	  or	  thick	  walls	  of	  separation	  are	  for	  visual	  and	  auditory	  privacy,	  and	  the	  availability	  of	  space	  away	  from	  ground	  observation	  cameras.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  relate	  to	  fatigue	  and	  psychological	  conditions.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  20,	  21;	  [5]	  pps.	  499,	  530-­‐533;	  [47]	  pp.	  89;	  [52]	  pps.	  149-­‐150;	  [24]	  pps.	  164,	  587-­‐588;	  [43]]	  Level	  of	  Sensory	  Stimulation	  Level	  of	  Sensory	  Stimulation	  refers	  to	  the	  levels	  of	  visual,	  auditory,	  tactile,	  and	  olfactory	  inputs	  in	  the	  vehicle	  environment.	  	  Taste	  is	  accounted	  for	  in	  “Food	  System”.	  	  This	  factor	  addresses	  how	  a	  lack	  of	  novelty	  or	  stimulation	  may	  create	  a	  monotonous	  environment,	  but	  also	  how	  too	  much	  stimulation	  may	  lead	  to	  fatigue	  (e.g.	  if	  too	  much	  noise	  or	  information	  is	  constantly	  in	  the	  environment).	  	  [[24]	  pp.	  166;	  [43,	  49]]	  Availability	  of	  Recreation/Personal	  Activities	  Availability	  of	  Recreation/Personal	  Activities	  addresses	  the	  suitability	  of	  the	  vehicle	  in	  supporting	  the	  crewmembers’	  needs	  for	  activities	  such	  as	  exercise,	  playing	  instruments,	  reading,	  watching	  movies,	  or	  conducting	  cultural,	  religious,	  or	  spiritual	  events.	  	  It	  also	  covers	  if	  the	  vehicle	  supports	  individual	  needs	  and	  choices	  of	  activities.	  	  This	  factor	  does	  not	  address	  the	  scheduling	  aspects	  of	  personal	  activities,	  as	  this	  would	  be	  covered	  in	  “Organization”	  factors.	  	  This	  factor	  will	  influence	  psychological	  conditions	  and	  potentially	  health	  and	  performance,	  as	  well.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  45;	  [5]	  pp.	  544;	  [47]	  pps.	  81-­‐82,	  92;	  [52]	  pps.	  151-­‐152,	  154;	  [24]	  pps.	  164,	  590-­‐592]	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Availability	  of	  Personal	  Items	  Availability	  of	  Personal	  Items	  accounts	  for	  the	  influence	  of	  having	  access	  to	  items	  such	  as	  personal	  office	  supplies,	  personal	  hygiene	  products,	  clothing,	  additional	  hardware	  such	  as	  batteries	  for	  personal	  devices,	  and	  tokens	  of	  home	  of	  cultural,	  religious,	  spiritual,	  community	  or	  family	  significance.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  affect	  psychological	  conditions	  and	  performance.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  277;	  [5]	  pps.	  499,	  534-­‐536;	  [47]	  pps.	  90-­‐91;	  [52]	  pps.	  125-­‐136;	  [24]	  pps.	  166,	  588-­‐589]	  Décor	  of	  Environment	  Décor	  of	  Environment	  addresses	  the	  visual	  aspects	  of	  the	  vehicle	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  ability	  to	  provide	  an	  appealing	  sense	  of	  comfort,	  relaxation,	  and	  home	  to	  the	  crewmembers.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  be	  influenced	  by	  factors	  such	  as	  “Cleanliness	  of	  Environment”,	  Inventory	  Management	  Capability”,	  and	  “Presence	  of	  Location	  Aids”,	  such	  as	  coloring	  of	  module	  interiors.	  	  Décor	  of	  Environment	  may	  influence	  psychological	  conditions	  and	  performance.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  21;	  [52]	  pps.	  146-­‐148;	  [29]	  pp.	  163;	  [43]]	  	  	  Hygiene	  Support	  Hygiene	  Support	  refers	  to	  the	  support	  of	  body,	  face,	  and	  teeth	  cleaning,	  using	  the	  restroom,	  and	  the	  fit	  of	  the	  appropriate	  equipment	  required	  to	  perform	  these	  functions	  in	  microgravity.	  	  This	  factor	  also	  addresses	  the	  vehicle’s	  capabilities	  for	  processing	  waste	  and	  debris	  created	  as	  a	  result	  of	  hygiene	  activities.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  influence	  health,	  psychological	  conditions,	  and	  performance.	  [[43];	  [5]	  pps.	  354,	  499-­‐502;	  [47]	  pps.	  75-­‐81;	  [24]	  pp.	  588;	  [52]	  pps.	  125-­‐136,	  149,	  265-­‐272;	  [34]	  pp.	  103]	  Availability	  of	  Medical	  Care	  Availability	  of	  Medical	  Care	  refers	  to	  the	  vehicle	  support	  for	  medical	  events,	  in	  terms	  of	  supplies	  and	  equipment	  on-­‐board,	  the	  shelf-­‐life	  of	  the	  supplies,	  and	  support	  for	  the	  power	  and	  volume	  required	  to	  operate	  equipment	  for	  both	  diagnosis	  and	  treatment.	  	  It	  does	  not	  address	  the	  availability	  of	  personnel	  with	  medical	  skills,	  as	  that	  is	  taken	  into	  account	  under	  “Crew	  Collaboration	  
 	   53	  
Quality”.	  	  This	  factor	  influences	  crew	  health	  and	  potentially	  psychological	  conditions,	  as	  well,	  through	  knowledge	  of	  adequacy	  of	  the	  capabilities.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  241;	  [5]	  pps.	  514-­‐516;	  [47]	  pps.	  82-­‐84;	  [30]	  pps.	  239-­‐263;	  [52]	  pps.	  151-­‐152;	  [29]	  pps.	  61-­‐134;	  [24]	  pps.	  589-­‐590]	  	  
3.2.2.2 Human	  System	  Interaction	  	  The	  Human	  System	  Interaction	  Domain	  Category,	  shown	  in	  the	  middle	  left	  of	  Figure	  10,	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  User	  Interfaces	  Functional	  Grouping.	  
User	  Interfaces	  [2,	  36]	  Mobility	  Aids	  and	  Restraints	  Availability	  and	  Quality	  Mobility	  Aids	  and	  Restraints	  Availability	  and	  Quality	  addresses	  the	  suitability	  of	  the	  vehicle	  in	  supporting	  crewmembers’	  needs	  for	  items	  such	  as	  foot	  restraints,	  anchors,	  translation	  aids,	  cords,	  seat	  tracks,	  Velcro	  and	  masses	  with	  which	  to	  react.	  	  These	  items	  may	  be	  for	  supporting	  tasks	  requiring	  mobility	  or	  a	  stationary	  position.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  affect	  fatigue	  conditions	  and	  performance	  of	  tasks.	  	  [[47]	  pps.	  101-­‐104;	  [5]	  pps.	  679-­‐698;	  [52]	  pps.	  154-­‐158;	  [24]	  pps.	  594-­‐595;	  [43]]	  Identifiability	  Identifiability	  refers	  most	  directly	  to	  the	  quality,	  availability	  and	  accuracy	  of	  labeling.	  	  This	  factor	  includes	  addressing	  if	  labels	  are	  readable	  due	  to	  font	  size,	  font	  color,	  label	  color,	  location	  and	  language.	  	  It	  also	  addresses	  if	  labels	  are	  missing,	  on	  incorrect	  components	  or	  incomplete.	  Identifiability	  may	  influence	  situational	  awareness	  and	  performance	  of	  tasks.	  	  [[47]	  pps.	  145-­‐147;	  [5]	  pps.	  802,	  874-­‐879;	  [33]]	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Information	  Displays	  and	  Decision	  Aids	  Information	  Displays	  and	  Decision	  Aids	  accounts	  for	  influences	  of	  display	  colors,	  text	  language,	  placement,	  distinction	  in	  environment,	  update	  timeliness,	  confirmation	  of	  information,	  modes	  of	  presentation,	  display	  controls,	  perceptual	  thresholds	  and	  intuitiveness	  of	  use.	  	  This	  factor	  includes	  audio	  displays	  and	  characteristics	  such	  as	  intelligibility,	  sound	  level	  and	  frequency,	  as	  well.	  	  This	  factor	  logically	  influences	  situational	  awareness	  and	  performance.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  253-­‐265,	  285;	  [47]	  pps.	  132-­‐133,	  137-­‐145;	  [5]	  pps.	  231,	  755-­‐822;	  [29]	  pps.	  210-­‐213;	  [33]]	  Standardization	  Standardization	  addresses	  the	  commonality	  and	  consistency	  of	  the	  design	  and	  implementation	  of	  hardware,	  tools,	  labels,	  displays,	  controls,	  software	  and	  software	  navigation.	  [[26]	  pps.	  263,	  270,	  274;	  [5]	  pp.	  746;	  [47]	  pps.	  110,	  131-­‐133]	  Control	  Panels/Input	  Devices	  Control	  Panels	  accounts	  for	  the	  influences	  of	  control	  placement,	  intuitiveness	  of	  use,	  efficiency,	  responsiveness	  and	  ability	  to	  provide	  user	  feedback	  for	  physical	  and	  software	  controls.	  	  This	  may	  include	  items	  such	  as	  keyboards,	  mice,	  joysticks,	  buttons	  and	  touch	  screens.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  287-­‐288;	  [5]	  pps.	  823-­‐873;	  [47]	  pps.	  132-­‐133,	  138-­‐139,	  147-­‐150;	  [29]	  pps.	  213-­‐215;	  [24]	  pp.	  138]	  Hardware	  Tool	  Availability	  Hardware	  Tool	  Availability	  addresses	  whether	  tools	  appropriate	  for	  the	  task	  and	  environment	  exist	  and	  are	  accessible	  to	  the	  crewmember.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  be	  influenced	  by	  inventory	  management	  capabilities	  with	  respect	  to	  tool	  physical	  accessibility.	  	  The	  existence	  of	  tools	  designed	  for	  use	  specifically	  in	  microgravity	  is	  included	  with	  this	  factor.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  256,	  274-­‐275,	  288;	  [5]	  pps.	  663-­‐671;	  [33];	  [36,	  43]]	  Situation-­‐Specific	  Lighting	  Situation-­‐Specific	  Lighting	  accounts	  for	  the	  influences	  of	  task	  lighting,	  or	  lighting	  used	  specifically	  for	  particular	  work	  areas.	  	  This	  factor	  differs	  from	  the	  factor	  “Lighting	  (Ambient)”,	  as	  it	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captures	  localized	  lighting	  conditions,	  instead	  of	  ambient	  lighting	  throughout	  the	  vehicle.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  271;	  [5]	  pps.	  624-­‐643;	  [47]	  pps.	  107-­‐109]	  Hardware	  Ease	  of	  Use	  Hardware	  Ease	  of	  Use	  addresses	  the	  usability	  of	  hardware	  such	  as	  vehicle	  systems	  hardware,	  experiment	  racks,	  lockers,	  panels,	  equipment	  connectors,	  cabling,	  exercise	  and	  health	  care	  equipment,	  printers	  and	  laptops.	  	  It	  addresses	  the	  intuitiveness,	  physical	  ease	  and	  mental	  ease	  of	  using	  the	  hardware,	  but	  does	  not	  include	  the	  existence	  and	  availability	  of	  equipment	  designed	  specifically	  for	  use	  in	  microgravity,	  as	  that	  is	  addressed	  in	  “Hardware	  Tool	  Availability”.	  	  Hardware	  Ease	  of	  Use	  also	  includes	  considerations	  for	  the	  ease	  of	  maintaining	  hardware.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  256,	  261;	  [5]	  pps.	  653-­‐728;	  [47]	  pps.	  110-­‐129,	  130-­‐131;	  [52]	  pps.	  159-­‐164;	  [25,	  33,	  36]]	  	  Software	  Ease	  of	  Use	  Software	  Ease	  of	  Use	  refers	  to	  the	  usability	  of	  software	  on	  the	  vehicle,	  especially	  that	  which	  is	  used	  to	  accomplish	  specific	  tasks	  and	  is	  used	  directly	  by	  the	  crew	  for	  performing	  these	  tasks.	  	  This	  factor	  differs	  from	  “Information	  Management	  Support”,	  which	  includes	  addressing	  infrastructure	  software.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  256,	  260;	  [5]	  pp.	  802-­‐804;	  [47]	  pps.	  130-­‐131;	  [25,	  33]]	  Information	  Management	  Support	  Information	  Management	  Support	  accounts	  for	  influences	  due	  to	  the	  information	  and	  communication	  network	  capabilities	  on	  the	  vehicle,	  provided	  by	  hardware	  and	  software.	  	  This	  factor	  differs	  from	  the	  software	  ease	  of	  use	  and	  information	  display	  factors	  in	  that	  it	  does	  not	  address	  task-­‐specific	  user	  interface	  software	  or	  display	  details.	  	  It	  addresses	  the	  infrastructure	  and	  information	  provided	  by	  the	  vehicle,	  such	  as	  information	  models,	  internet	  access,	  networking	  and	  backup	  capabilities.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  256,	  260;	  [5]	  pps.	  896-­‐900;	  [47]	  pps.	  158-­‐162;	  [29]	  pps.	  209-­‐210;	  [33]]	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Human/Vehicle	  Automation	  Integration	  Human/Vehicle	  Automation	  Integration	  addresses	  the	  adequacy	  of	  the	  level	  and	  quality	  of	  the	  complementary	  behavior	  of	  vehicle	  automation	  to	  the	  tasks	  that	  the	  human	  crewmembers	  perform.	  	  This	  factor	  takes	  into	  account	  whether	  the	  vehicle	  automation	  helps	  the	  crewmember	  to	  improve	  performance,	  or	  if	  in	  some	  cases,	  it	  hinders	  performance	  of	  tasks.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  258,	  289-­‐291;	  [5]	  pps.	  219-­‐220,	  901-­‐923;	  [47]	  pps.	  154-­‐158;	  [50]]	  Human/Robotics	  Integration	  Human/Robotics	  Automation	  Integration,	  similar	  to	  “Human/Vehicle	  Automation	  Integration”,	  addresses	  the	  adequacy	  of	  the	  level	  and	  quality	  of	  the	  complementary	  behavior	  of	  robotics	  automation	  to	  the	  tasks	  that	  the	  human	  crewmembers	  perform.	  	  Robotics	  may	  refer	  to	  robotic	  arms,	  humanoids,	  rovers,	  or	  other	  non-­‐vehicle	  components.	  	  This	  factor	  also	  takes	  into	  account	  whether	  the	  robotics	  automation	  helps	  the	  crewmember	  to	  improve	  performance,	  or	  if	  in	  some	  cases,	  it	  hinders	  performance	  of	  tasks.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  283;	  [5]	  pps.	  901-­‐923;	  [47]	  pps.	  154-­‐158;	  [50]]	  Caution	  and	  Warning	  Functionality	  Caution	  and	  Warning	  Functionality	  refers	  to	  the	  capabilities	  of	  the	  vehicle	  for	  providing	  visual,	  auditory,	  or	  other	  sensory	  alarms	  to	  the	  crewmembers	  in	  ways	  that	  can	  be	  perceived	  in	  the	  spaceflight	  environment	  and	  throughout	  all	  mission	  phases.	  	  This	  factor	  also	  addresses	  the	  influence	  of	  caution	  and	  warning	  alarm	  thresholds	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  alarm	  activation	  too	  frequently,	  not	  frequently	  enough,	  missing	  or	  false	  activations.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  261;	  [5]	  pps.	  219-­‐220,	  880-­‐895;	  [47]	  pps.	  159-­‐162;	  [29]	  pps.	  209-­‐210;	  [36]]	  Orientation	  of	  User	  Interfaces	  Orientation	  of	  User	  Interfaces	  accounts	  for	  the	  influence	  of	  having	  user	  interfaces	  throughout	  the	  vehicle	  consistently	  aligned	  with	  a	  common	  “up”	  orientation	  and	  being	  aligned	  conveniently	  with	  appropriate	  equipment,	  tools,	  or	  facilities.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  be	  particularly	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important	  in	  the	  design	  of	  large	  vehicles	  such	  as	  space	  stations,	  with	  multiple	  sections	  allowing	  the	  opportunity	  for	  varied	  orientations.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  259;	  [5]	  pp.	  758;	  [47]	  pps.	  23,	  95,	  96,	  104,	  108,	  139,	  141,142,	  147;	  [43]]	  Range	  of	  Motion	  Accommodations	  Range	  of	  Motion	  Accommodations	  addresses	  the	  capabilities	  of	  the	  vehicle	  design	  to	  allow	  for	  potentially	  altered	  range	  of	  motion,	  such	  as	  that	  of	  arms,	  legs	  and	  torso,	  due	  to	  crewmembers’	  presence	  in	  microgravity.	  	  [[5]	  pps.	  53-­‐60;	  [47]	  pp.	  18]	  Reach	  Envelope	  Accommodations	  Reach	  Envelope	  Accommodations	  refers	  to	  how	  well	  the	  vehicle	  design	  places	  system	  interfaces	  within	  the	  reach	  of	  crewmembers.	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  while	  crewmembers	  are	  seated	  or	  restrained	  during	  dynamic	  mission	  phases	  such	  as	  launch,	  ascent,	  entry,	  descent,	  and	  landing,	  when	  other	  factors	  such	  as	  vibration	  and	  acceleration	  influence	  the	  ability	  to	  reach	  interfaces.	  	  [[5]	  pps.	  61-­‐67;	  [47]	  pp.	  18]	  Body	  Surface	  Area,	  Volume,	  and	  Mass	  Properties	  Accommodations	  Body	  Surface	  Area,	  Volume,	  and	  Mass	  Properties	  Accommodations	  allows	  for	  consideration	  of	  how	  items	  such	  as	  neutral	  posture	  and	  clothing	  fit	  may	  be	  altered	  in	  microgravity.	  	  Mass	  properties	  must	  be	  considered	  especially	  when	  tasks	  may	  involve	  reaction	  from	  tools	  or	  equipment	  motion,	  because	  gravity	  is	  not	  present	  to	  facilitate	  countermotion	  prevention.	  	  This	  factor	  is	  also	  influenced	  by	  whether	  a	  crewmember	  is	  suited	  or	  not.	  	  It	  additionally	  takes	  into	  account	  how	  multiple	  crewmembers	  working	  in	  the	  same	  area	  may	  or	  may	  not	  have	  enough	  space	  to	  perform	  their	  tasks	  without	  interfering	  with	  each	  other.	  	  [[47]	  pps.	  18-­‐19;	  [5]	  pps.	  40-­‐52,	  68-­‐76]	  Strength	  Accommodations	  Strength	  Accommodations	  addresses	  the	  capabilities	  of	  the	  vehicle	  design	  to	  allow	  for	  potentially	  altered	  muscular	  strength	  of	  the	  crewmembers	  due	  to	  presence	  in	  microgravity.	  	  This	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factor	  includes	  accommodations	  for	  the	  strength	  of	  finger,	  hand,	  arm,	  leg,	  back	  and	  other	  muscles,	  especially	  in	  the	  context	  of	  performing	  tasks.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  274;	  [5]	  pps.	  77-­‐83;	  [47]	  pps.	  19-­‐20]	  	  Suit	  Design	  Suit	  Design	  addresses	  influences	  present	  when	  the	  crewmember	  is	  suited,	  either	  inside	  or	  outside	  the	  vehicle.	  	  Suit	  Design	  accounts	  for	  mobility,	  dexterity,	  center	  of	  gravity,	  mass	  and	  energy	  expenditure	  changes	  that	  may	  exist	  when	  suited.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  influence	  reach,	  strength,	  range	  of	  motion,	  and	  physical	  fatigue.	  	  It	  may	  also	  be	  related	  to	  inventory	  management	  capability	  and	  habitable	  volume	  factors	  due	  to	  the	  approach	  to	  suit	  sizing	  for	  individuals	  or	  groups	  and	  the	  need	  for	  spare	  parts.	  	  Suit	  Design	  may	  also	  influence	  fatigue,	  discomfort,	  pain	  and	  injury	  conditions.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  333-­‐358;	  [5]	  pps.	  46-­‐65;	  [47]	  pps.	  163-­‐171]	  	  
3.2.3 HUMAN	  DOMAIN	  	  The	  Human	  Domain,	  as	  represented	  by	  the	  lowest	  box	  in	  the	  left	  corner	  of	  Figure	  10,	  is	  decomposed	  into	  the	  Domain	  Categories	  of	  Individual	  Mental	  Characteristics	  and	  Individual	  Physical	  Characteristics.	  	  This	  section	  discusses	  the	  Contributing	  Factors	  within	  the	  Human	  Domain.	  	  	  
3.2.3.1 Individual	  Mental	  Characteristics	  	  The	  Individual	  Mental	  Characteristics	  Domain	  Category,	  shown	  near	  the	  bottom	  left	  side	  of	  Figure	  10,	  is	  decomposed	  into	  the	  Functional	  Groupings	  of	  Situational	  Awareness,	  Cognitive	  Adaptations	  and	  Psychological	  Conditions.	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Situational	  Awareness	  Perceived	  Urgency	  of	  Situation	  Perceived	  Urgency	  of	  Situation	  considers	  the	  criticality	  and	  priority	  of	  the	  task	  at	  hand	  as	  understood	  by	  the	  crewmember,	  especially	  addressing	  the	  task’s	  contribution	  to	  health	  and	  safety	  versus	  nominal	  research,	  educational	  or	  personal	  tasks.	  	  The	  crewmember’s	  perception	  of	  urgency	  is	  likely	  influenced	  by	  the	  time	  available	  for	  the	  task	  and	  the	  mental	  model	  of	  the	  situation.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  also	  be	  influenced	  by	  the	  level	  of	  excitement	  or	  boredom	  present;	  e.g	  “go	  fever”	  or	  “get-­‐home-­‐itis”	  may	  increase	  the	  perception	  of	  urgency.	  	  [[5]	  pps.	  219-­‐220;	  [47]	  pp.	  24;	  [33,	  36,	  44]]	  Mental	  Model	  of	  Situation	  and/or	  System	  Mental	  Model	  of	  Situation	  and/or	  System	  accounts	  for	  the	  crewmember’s	  accuracy	  and	  appropriateness	  of	  understanding	  the	  system’s	  current	  state,	  characteristics,	  capabilities,	  and	  interactions	  with	  the	  environment.	  	  Training	  and	  automation	  factors	  will	  likely	  have	  influences	  on	  this	  factor.	  	  It	  is	  foreseeable	  that	  this	  factor	  affects	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  task	  performance.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  56;	  [5]	  pps.	  911;	  [47]	  pp.	  24;	  [27,	  44,	  50]]	  
Cognitive	  Adaptations	  Memory/Knowledge	  Memory/Knowledge	  refers	  to	  the	  available	  set	  of	  information	  the	  crewmember	  possesses	  in	  memory	  from	  which	  to	  draw	  upon	  during	  a	  task.	  	  This	  factor	  is	  likely	  influenced	  by	  training	  and	  experience	  factors,	  along	  with	  task	  familiarity	  factors.	  	  The	  state	  of	  this	  factor	  may	  be	  expected	  to	  influence	  situational	  awareness	  factors	  and	  performance.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  67,	  255;	  [5]	  pps.	  174-­‐177;	  [47]	  pp.	  23;	  [51]	  pp.	  419;	  [33,	  36,	  44]]	  Attention/Alertness	  Attention/Alertness	  addresses	  the	  state	  of	  watchfulness,	  awareness,	  focus	  and	  vigilance	  of	  the	  crewmember.	  	  Factor	  such	  as	  task	  allocation,	  work	  load,	  and	  level	  of	  excitement	  or	  boredom	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likely	  influence	  this	  factor.	  	  Attention/Alertness	  is	  expected	  to	  affect	  performance	  of	  tasks,	  especially	  during	  long-­‐duration	  missions.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  67;	  [5]	  pps.	  168,	  171-­‐173,	  181;	  [47]	  pp.	  23;	  [51]	  pp.	  419;	  [33,	  36,	  42,	  44]]	  
Psychological	  Conditions	  Pressure	  [36]	  Pressure	  is	  further	  decomposed	  into	  four	  factors:	  
Stress	   Stress	  accounts	  for	  influences	  due	  to	  being	  in	  an	  environment	  with	  different	  risk	  or	  danger	  levels	  than	  typical	  daily	  terrestrial	  environments,	  or	  the	  perception	  of	  that	  being	  the	  case.	  	  This	  factor	  addresses	  accumulated	  feelings	  of	  tension	  due	  to	  an	  underlying	  constant	  requirement	  for	  attention	  to	  safety,	  the	  environment,	  and	  performance.	  	  Stress	  may	  be	  influenced	  by	  many	  factors	  in	  the	  operations	  domain,	  such	  as	  training	  quality.	  	  It	  may	  also	  be	  influenced	  by	  many	  factors	  in	  the	  vehicle	  design	  domain,	  such	  as	  temperature.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  20,	  21,	  48,	  67,	  285;	  [5]	  pp.	  181;	  [36,	  38]]	  
High	  Public	  Interest	  and	  Visibility	  High	  Public	  Interest	  and	  Visibility	  refers	  to	  the	  somewhat	  unique	  situation	  of	  crewmembers’	  activities	  being	  monitored	  and	  recorded	  for	  general	  public	  viewing.	  	  This	  visibility,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  more	  common	  visibility	  of	  activities	  to	  coworkers	  and	  family	  members,	  may	  create	  additional	  pressure	  on	  crewmembers	  to	  perform	  well.	  	  [[29]	  pp.	  163]	  
Performance	  Pressure	  Performance	  Pressure	  addresses	  the	  influences	  of	  perceived	  expectations	  to	  perform	  tasks	  with	  few	  to	  no	  mistakes.	  	  This	  feeling	  of	  needing	  to	  meet	  a	  standard	  of	  perfection	  may	  have	  beneficial	  or	  detrimental	  performance	  effects.	  	  It	  may	  be	  influenced	  by	  organizational	  and	  cultural	  factors.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  20;	  [51]	  pp.	  419;	  [24]	  pp.	  166]
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Peer	  Performance	  Pressure	  Peer	  Performance	  Pressure	  accounts	  for	  influences	  caused	  by	  high	  levels	  of	  performance	  by	  peers,	  either	  in	  quality	  or	  quantity	  of	  task	  performance.	  	  There	  may	  be	  a	  feeling	  that	  because	  others	  have	  gone	  or	  are	  going	  “the	  extra	  mile”,	  each	  crewmember	  must	  also	  exceed	  expectations.	  	  This	  type	  of	  pressure	  may	  influence	  crewmembers	  to	  improve	  performance	  or	  to	  attempt	  additional	  activities.	  	  The	  influence	  may	  be	  positive	  or	  negative.	  	  [[5]	  pp.	  232]	  Level	  of	  Trust	  in	  Situation/System	  Level	  of	  Trust	  in	  Situation/System	  addresses	  the	  confidence	  the	  crewmember	  has	  in	  the	  situation	  and/or	  the	  system	  itself.	  	  This	  includes	  considerations	  for	  trust	  in	  the	  vehicle	  behavior	  and	  automation,	  robotics	  behavior	  and	  automation,	  and	  ground	  support	  team	  members	  and	  systems.	  	  The	  positive	  or	  negative	  state	  of	  the	  level	  of	  trust	  may	  manifest	  in	  crewmember	  calm,	  anxiety	  or	  fear,	  and	  may	  influence	  the	  performance	  of	  tasks.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  9-­‐11,	  13;	  [5]	  pps.	  182,	  911;	  [24]	  pp.	  164;	  [36,	  50]]	  Level	  of	  Excitement	  or	  Boredom	  Level	  of	  Excitement	  or	  Boredom	  refers	  to	  the	  influences	  due	  to	  stimulation	  from	  activities	  or	  the	  situation,	  or	  a	  lack	  of	  stimulation.	  	  Excitement	  may	  be	  especially	  influential	  near	  the	  beginning	  and	  end	  of	  a	  mission,	  as	  well	  as	  any	  novel	  portion	  of	  a	  mission	  providing	  a	  thrill	  due	  to	  its	  rarity,	  such	  as	  a	  rendezvous	  and	  docking.	  	  Excitement	  may	  contribute	  to	  phenomena	  similarly	  found	  in	  aviation	  such	  as	  “go	  fever”	  or	  “get-­‐home-­‐it-­‐is”,	  that	  are	  tendencies	  to	  not	  deviate	  from	  a	  plan	  despite	  changing	  conditions,	  and	  may	  influence	  the	  perceived	  urgency	  of	  the	  situation.	  	  Boredom	  may	  be	  a	  significant	  factor	  on	  long-­‐duration	  missions,	  when	  stimulation	  may	  be	  lower	  in	  intensity,	  duration	  and	  frequency.	  	  Both	  boredom	  and	  excitement	  may	  influence	  performance.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  20,	  48,	  64,	  68]	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Feelings	  of	  Accomplishment	  or	  Frustration	  Feelings	  of	  Accomplishment	  or	  Frustration	  addresses	  the	  influences	  that	  my	  exist	  when	  a	  crewmember	  feels	  they	  have	  completed	  a	  task	  and	  done	  it	  well,	  or	  when	  tasks	  are	  unable	  to	  be	  completed	  at	  all	  or	  to	  a	  level	  with	  which	  the	  crewmember	  is	  satisfied.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  be	  influenced	  by	  training	  and	  work	  load,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  the	  relationships	  with	  the	  ground	  team,	  especially	  with	  respect	  to	  desired	  feedback.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  64;	  [24]	  pps.	  158,	  164-­‐165]	  Influence	  of	  Family,	  Friends	  and	  Society	  Influence	  of	  Family,	  Friends	  and	  Society	  is	  further	  decomposed	  into	  four	  factors:	  
Relationships	  to	  Family	  and	  Friends	  Relationships	  to	  Family	  and	  Friends	  addresses	  the	  influence	  the	  state	  of	  relationships	  with	  family,	  friends	  and	  coworkers	  may	  have	  on	  performance.	  	  Strong	  relationships	  providing	  support	  may	  positively	  influence	  performance,	  while	  relationship	  strains	  such	  as	  family	  or	  marital	  distress	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  influence	  performance	  negatively.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  10;	  [24]	  pp.	  158]	  
Health	  and	  Happiness	  of	  Family	  and	  Friends	  Health	  and	  Happiness	  of	  Family	  and	  Friends	  refers	  to	  the	  effects	  on	  performance	  that	  may	  exist	  due	  to	  the	  state	  of	  family	  members’,	  friends’	  and	  coworkers’	  physical,	  mental	  or	  emotional	  health.	  	  Healthy	  supporters	  on	  Earth	  may	  provide	  a	  positive	  influence	  on	  crewmember	  performance,	  while	  troubles	  with	  an	  area	  of	  health	  of	  people	  close	  to	  a	  crewmember	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  influence	  performance,	  as	  well.	  	  This	  factor	  is	  likely	  influenced	  by	  the	  available	  workplace	  support	  for	  individuals	  on	  the	  ground,	  where	  appropriate	  support	  can	  help	  provide	  peace	  of	  mind	  and	  increased	  ability	  to	  focus	  to	  the	  crewmember	  while	  they	  are	  physically	  away.	  [[26]	  pps.	  10,	  22,	  24]	  
Isolation	  from	  Family	  and	  Friends	  Isolation	  from	  Family	  and	  Friends	  accounts	  for	  the	  impacts	  resulting	  from	  the	  physical	  separation	  from	  family,	  friends	  and	  colleagues	  during	  a	  mission.	  	  Not	  having	  physical	  proximity	  to	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the	  support	  system	  provided	  by	  these	  people	  may	  influence	  performance,	  especially	  as	  mission	  duration	  increases.	  	  It	  may	  also	  be	  more	  influential	  during	  significant	  family	  or	  friend	  events.	  	  This	  factor	  is	  affected	  by	  ground	  communications	  availability	  and	  ease.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  6,	  8,	  15,	  48,	  64,	  68;	  [29]	  pp.	  163;	  [5]	  pp.	  181;	  [24]	  pp.	  166]	  
Isolation	  from	  Society	  Isolation	  from	  Society	  addresses	  the	  influences	  due	  to	  crewmembers	  being	  physically	  separated	  from	  Earth	  and	  their	  respective	  societies	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  This	  factor	  includes	  accessibility	  to	  news	  and	  the	  internet	  to	  ease	  the	  feelings	  of	  separation	  and	  isolation	  that	  may	  exist,	  and	  is	  influenced	  by	  ground	  communication	  availability	  and	  ease.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  be	  more	  influential	  as	  mission	  duration	  increases,	  especially	  if	  Earth	  is	  not	  in	  view,	  or	  during	  significant	  world	  or	  societal	  events	  such	  as	  natural	  disasters	  or	  war.	  	  It	  may	  also	  support	  positive	  influences	  on	  performance,	  such	  as	  when	  perspective	  of	  the	  Earth	  as	  a	  whole	  contributes	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  unity.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  6,	  8,	  12,	  13,	  15,	  22,	  48,	  64]	  Morale	  Morale	  is	  further	  decomposed	  into	  three	  factors:	  
Morale/Motivation/Attitude	  Morale/Motivation/Attitude	  addresses	  the	  effects	  that	  a	  crewmember’s	  set	  of	  values,	  drive,	  ambitions	  and	  inspiration,	  leading	  to	  a	  level	  of	  willingness	  to	  perform	  tasks	  and/or	  support	  team	  efforts,	  may	  have	  on	  health	  and	  performance.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  6,9-­‐11,	  14,	  30;	  [51]	  pp.	  419;	  [36];	  [24]	  pp.	  164;	  [33,	  42,	  44]]	  
Level	  of	  Happiness	  Level	  of	  Happiness	  accounts	  for	  influences	  due	  to	  deep	  feelings	  of	  happiness	  or	  depression,	  or	  a	  level	  of	  contentment	  with	  professional	  and	  personal	  conditions.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  be	  increasingly	  important	  as	  mission	  duration	  increases,	  and	  may	  influence	  fatigue,	  physical	  conditions,	  and	  performance.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  6,	  9-­‐11,	  14,	  30;	  [51]	  pps.	  424-­‐425]	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Mood	   Mood	  refers	  to	  less	  permanent	  feelings	  than	  those	  accounted	  for	  in	  “Level	  of	  Happiness”.	  	  This	  factor	  accounts	  for	  surface-­‐level	  feelings	  and	  temperament,	  rather	  than	  the	  deeper	  levels	  captured	  by	  “Level	  of	  Happiness”.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  6,	  9-­‐11,	  14,	  30,	  101;	  [51]	  pps.	  424-­‐425;	  [24]	  pp.	  164]	  
3.2.3.2 Individual	  Physical	  Characteristics	  The	  Individual	  Physical	  Characteristics	  Domain	  Category,	  shown	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  latency	  axis	  in	  Figure	  10,	  is	  decomposed	  into	  the	  Functional	  Groupings	  of	  Fatigue	  Conditions,	  Physiological	  Adaptations,	  Non-­‐Standard	  Physical	  Conditions	  and	  Existing	  Physical	  Conditions.	  
Fatigue	  Conditions	  Physical	  (Aerobic	  and	  Muscular)	  Fatigue	  Conditions	  [44]	  Physical	  (Aerobic	  and	  Muscular)	  Fatigue	  Conditions	  refers	  specifically	  to	  aerobic	  and/or	  muscular	  fatigue	  due	  to	  overexertion	  through	  aerobic	  or	  muscular	  activity.	  	  This	  factor	  does	  not	  include	  general	  physical	  or	  cognitive	  fatigue.	  	  It’s	  state	  may	  be	  influenced	  by	  recent	  extra-­‐vehicular	  activities	  and	  the	  duration	  of	  those	  activities.	  	  Similarly,	  it	  may	  be	  affected	  by	  exercise	  countermeasure	  activities,	  their	  intensities,	  frequencies,	  and	  durations.	  	  	  [[30]	  pps.	  101-­‐116;	  [47]	  pp.	  20;	  [5]	  pps.	  507-­‐513;	  [47]	  pp.	  20;	  [26]	  pps.	  361-­‐362;	  [53]]	  Non-­‐Aerobic	  and	  Non-­‐Muscular	  Fatigue	  	  Non-­‐Aerobic	  and	  Non-­‐Muscular	  Fatigue	  addresses	  the	  effects	  a	  sense	  of	  weariness	  or	  exhaustion,	  beyond	  specific	  muscular	  or	  aerobic	  fatigue,	  may	  have	  on	  health	  or	  performance	  of	  tasks.	  	  This	  type	  of	  fatigue	  may	  be	  influenced	  by	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  such	  as	  shift	  scheduling,	  work	  load,	  crew	  collaboration	  quality,	  habitability,	  vehicle	  physical	  environmental	  factors,	  circadian	  rhythm,	  hormone	  function	  and	  sleep.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  67,	  85,	  87;	  [5]	  pp.	  182;	  [51]	  pp.	  419,	  424;	  [24]	  pp.	  164;	  [36,	  42,	  44]]	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Physiological	  Adaptations	  [44]	  Fluid	  Shift	  Fluid	  Shift	  refers	  to	  the	  influence	  bodily	  fluids	  shifting	  towards	  the	  head	  in	  microgravity	  may	  have	  on	  performance	  of	  tasks	  or	  other	  factors.	  	  The	  fluid	  shift	  may	  induce	  feelings	  of	  head	  fullness,	  nasal	  stuffiness	  and	  sinus	  congestion.	  	  The	  headward	  fluid	  shift	  also	  leads	  to	  reduced	  overall	  blood	  volume,	  which	  in	  turn	  may	  contribute	  to	  orthostatic	  intolerance,	  or	  a	  propensity	  toward	  fainting,	  upon	  gravity	  re-­‐exposure.	  	  [[30]	  pp.	  151;	  [56]	  pps.	  105-­‐113;	  [26]	  pps.	  44,	  304;	  [5]	  pp.	  181]	  Vestibular	  Function	  Vestibular	  Function	  addresses	  influences	  on	  health	  and	  performance	  due	  to	  altered	  balance	  and	  spatial	  orientation	  capabilities	  during	  a	  mission.	  	  The	  removal	  of	  gravity	  inputs	  to	  the	  inner	  ear	  and	  pressure	  sensors	  of	  the	  body	  and	  resulting	  dominance	  of	  visual	  inputs	  may	  alter	  the	  ability	  to	  remain	  balanced	  and	  in	  a	  desired	  spatial	  orientation.	  	  Balance	  reflexes	  during	  a	  fall	  upon	  return	  to	  gravity	  may	  be	  altered.	  	  Any	  of	  these	  changes	  may	  influence	  performance	  upon	  re-­‐exposure	  to	  gravity	  before	  re-­‐adaptation	  occurs.	  	  [[56]	  pp.	  135;	  [30]	  pps.	  119-­‐136,	  189-­‐190;	  [25]	  pp.	  46;	  [33]]	  Nervous	  System	  Function	  Nervous	  System	  Function	  refers	  to	  effects	  on	  performance	  or	  other	  physiological	  adaptations	  that	  alterations	  to	  the	  network	  of	  neurons	  throughout	  the	  body	  may	  have.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  be	  particularly	  impacted	  by	  radiation	  exposure.	  	  Nervous	  System	  Function	  influences	  the	  performance	  of	  balance,	  spatial	  orientation,	  sensorimotor,	  and	  postural	  functions,	  for	  example.	  	  [[56]	  pps.	  135-­‐180;	  [26]	  pp.	  44;	  [30]	  pps.	  63-­‐64]	  Sensorimotor	  Function	  Sensorimotor	  Function	  takes	  into	  account	  effects	  of	  changes	  to	  skills	  such	  as	  hand-­‐eye	  	  coordination	  and	  locomotion.	  	  Nervous	  system	  and	  vestibular	  system	  changes	  may	  influence	  sensorimotor	  functions	  such	  as	  hand-­‐eye	  coordination.	  	  In	  addition,	  locomotion	  in	  microgravity	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becomes	  dominantly	  driven	  by	  small	  movements,	  especially	  with	  the	  hands	  and	  arms,	  instead	  of	  the	  larger	  leg	  movements	  on	  Earth.	  	  This	  adjustment,	  in	  combination	  with	  user	  interfaces,	  task	  procedures,	  and	  physical	  work	  load	  factors,	  may	  influence	  the	  accomplishment	  of	  tasks.	  	  [[56]	  pps.	  135-­‐180;	  [26]	  pp.	  285;	  [5]	  pps.	  103-­‐118;	  [47]	  pp.	  23;	  [25,	  33]]	  	  Proprioceptive	  and	  Postural	  Function	  Proprioceptive	  and	  Postural	  Function	  addresses	  influences	  on	  performance	  due	  the	  body’s	  altered	  ability	  to	  sense	  the	  location	  of	  its	  parts	  such	  as	  arms	  and	  legs	  with	  respect	  to	  itself,	  and	  its	  subsequent	  altered	  ability	  to	  control	  their	  location	  without	  visual	  feedback.	  	  This	  factor	  also	  accounts	  for	  adjusted	  neutral	  body	  posture	  in	  microgravity.	  	  In	  gravity,	  humans	  stand	  upright	  with	  the	  gravity	  vector	  approximately	  in	  line	  with	  the	  spine.	  	  This	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  case	  in	  microgravity,	  as	  a	  more	  rounded,	  curved-­‐spine	  posture	  is	  the	  norm.	  	  This	  factor,	  especially	  in	  combination	  with	  user	  interfaces,	  may	  influence	  performance	  of	  tasks.	  	  [[30]	  pps.	  79,	  199-­‐136;	  	  [5]	  pp.	  48;	  [47]	  pp.	  18;	  [52]	  pps.	  139-­‐142;	  [56]	  pps.	  135,	  158-­‐164,	  167-­‐168;	  [26]	  pp.	  274;	  [25]]	  Visual	  Perception	  Function	  Visual	  Perception	  Function	  refers	  to	  influences	  on	  performance	  due	  to	  changes	  in	  sight	  or	  visual	  acuity	  and	  perception	  capabilities.	  	  Vision	  may	  become	  dimmed	  or	  limited	  upon	  return	  to	  gravity	  during	  periods	  of	  orthostatic	  intolerance.	  	  During	  a	  mission,	  vision	  may	  be	  affected	  by	  radiation	  exposure,	  such	  as	  when	  cosmic	  ray	  particles	  create	  the	  perception	  of	  a	  flash	  of	  light	  to	  crewmembers.	  	  It	  may	  be	  altered	  when	  orientation	  cues	  cause	  visual	  confusion,	  or	  during	  periods	  of	  high	  acceleration,	  high	  vibration,	  reduced	  oxygen,	  or	  reduced	  pressure.	  	  Exposure	  to	  particles	  such	  as	  lunar	  dust	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  atmosphere	  on	  a	  planetary	  surface	  may	  alter	  visual	  perception.	  Head	  congestion	  due	  to	  fluid	  shift	  and	  lighting	  conditions	  may	  have	  additional	  influences	  on	  this	  factor,	  with	  consequent	  effects	  on	  performance	  of	  tasks.	  	  [[56]	  pps.	  173-­‐176;	  [30]	  pps.	  64,	  123,	  129-­‐131;	  [5]	  pps.	  119-­‐144;	  [47]	  pp.	  22;	  [44]]	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Auditory	  Perception	  Function	  Auditory	  Perception	  Function	  addresses	  the	  effects	  any	  altered	  hearing	  or	  auditory	  perception	  abilities	  may	  have	  on	  performance.	  	  Hearing	  threshold	  shifts	  have	  been	  observed	  in	  space,	  and	  this	  may	  be	  due	  to	  chronic	  or	  intense	  noise	  in	  the	  environment,	  headward	  fluid	  shift,	  increased	  carbon	  dioxide	  levels,	  or	  toxins	  in	  the	  vehicle.	  	  Auditory	  perception	  may	  be	  altered	  even	  when	  thresholds	  are	  nominal	  due	  to	  background	  vehicle	  noise,	  atmospheric	  pressure	  and	  composition	  differences	  from	  Earth,	  and	  the	  size	  and	  layout	  of	  the	  vehicle.	  	  [[30]	  pp.	  244;	  [5]	  pps.	  145-­‐166;	  [47]	  pp.	  22-­‐23]	  Bone	  Strength	  Bone	  Strength	  accounts	  for	  changes	  in	  skeletal	  system	  strength	  that	  may	  influence	  performance	  of	  tasks.	  	  This	  factor	  allows	  for	  consideration	  of	  changes	  in	  bone	  mineral	  density,	  bone	  mass	  and	  mechanical	  strength.	  	  Bone	  mineral	  density	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  decrease	  in	  microgravity,	  along	  with	  bone	  mass	  in	  the	  lower	  body.	  	  Some	  upper	  body	  bones	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  have	  unchanged	  or	  even	  slightly	  increased	  bone	  mass.	  	  These	  changes	  may	  influence	  performance	  of	  tasks	  in	  microgravity,	  however,	  a	  greater	  influence	  on	  performance	  likely	  exists	  upon	  return	  to	  gravity	  when	  bone	  fracture	  injury	  may	  have	  an	  increased	  likelihood	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  changes.	  	  [[30]	  pps.	  3-­‐26;	  [56]	  pps.	  247-­‐261;	  [25]	  pp.	  46;	  [34]	  pps.	  58-­‐59]	  	  	  	  	  Muscle	  Performance	  Muscle	  Performance	  addresses	  the	  influences	  that	  any	  changes	  in	  muscle	  strength,	  power,	  endurance	  or	  flexibility	  may	  have	  on	  health	  and	  performance.	  	  Muscle	  capabilities	  may	  change	  due	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  gravitational	  loading,	  altered	  modes	  of	  locomotion,	  hormonal	  changes,	  nutrition,	  and	  stress.	  	  Exercise	  countermeasures	  may	  prevent	  these	  changes	  from	  having	  strong	  effects,	  however.	  	  [[30]	  pps.	  77-­‐96;	  [5]	  pps.	  99-­‐101;	  [56]	  pps.	  231-­‐241;	  [26]	  pps.	  11,	  359;	  [25]	  pp.	  46;	  [34]	  pps.	  58-­‐59]	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Spinal	  Lengthening	  Spinal	  Lengthening	  refers	  to	  the	  effects	  on	  performance	  that	  increased	  height	  may	  introduce.	  	  In	  space,	  gravity	  is	  not	  present	  to	  compress	  the	  spine	  as	  on	  Earth,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  the	  spine	  lengthens.	  	  This	  may	  influence	  performance	  due	  to	  resulting	  discomfort	  or	  an	  improper	  new	  fit	  of	  a	  spacesuit.	  	  [[30]	  pp.	  17]	  Cardiovascular/Cardiopulmonary	  Function	  Cardiovascular/Cardiopulmonary	  Function	  addresses	  the	  influences	  that	  cardiovascular	  and	  cardiopulmonary	  system	  changes	  may	  have	  on	  crewmember	  performance.	  	  Cardiac	  muscle	  mass	  may	  decrease,	  which	  may	  have	  a	  stronger	  effect	  on	  performance	  upon	  gravity	  re-­‐exposure.	  	  Aerobic	  capacity	  as	  indicated	  by	  maximal	  oxygen	  uptake	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  decrease	  in	  flight,	  but	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  decrease	  post-­‐flight.	  	  This	  may	  have	  performance	  effects	  depending	  on	  the	  intensity	  of	  cardiac	  demands	  of	  tasks	  required	  after	  landing.	  	  Cardiac	  arrhythmias	  have	  also	  been	  noted	  in	  space,	  although	  many	  factors	  such	  as	  stress	  and	  reduced	  sleep	  quantity	  and	  quality	  may	  have	  contributed.	  	  [[30]	  pps.	  139-­‐163;	  [47]	  pp.	  20-­‐21;	  [56]	  pps.	  63-­‐82;	  [34]	  pps.	  58-­‐59]	  Hormone	  Function	  Hormone	  Function	  refers	  to	  the	  effects	  on	  performance	  due	  to	  altered	  hormone	  function.	  For	  example,	  hormones	  are	  a	  part	  of	  the	  regulation	  of	  bodily	  fluids,	  and	  as	  fluids	  are	  redistributed	  in	  microgravity,	  hormone	  changes	  have	  been	  observed.	  	  In	  addition,	  hormones	  that	  regulate	  metabolism	  may	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  change	  in	  mineral	  balance	  as	  load-­‐bearing	  bones	  lose	  calcium.	  Certainly	  circadian	  rhythm	  changes	  influence	  hormone	  levels	  and	  homeostasis.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  have	  wide-­‐ranging	  effects	  on	  other	  physiological,	  psychological,	  health,	  and	  performance	  factors.	  [[56]	  pps.	  89-­‐101;	  [26]	  pp.	  95]	  Hunger	  Level	  Hunger	  Level	  accounts	  for	  influences	  due	  to	  a	  change	  in	  appetite.	  	  Hormone	  effects	  on	  metabolism	  may	  influence	  this	  factor.	  	  Reduced	  appetites	  have	  been	  noted	  during	  spaceflight,	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possibly	  due	  to	  additional	  influences.	  	  For	  example,	  food	  generates	  heat,	  and	  convective	  cooling	  does	  not	  occur	  in	  microgravity	  because	  warmer	  air	  does	  not	  “rise”	  to	  carry	  heat	  away	  from	  the	  body.	  	  The	  warmer	  conditions	  may	  decrease	  appetite.	  	  Exercise	  countermeasures	  performed	  during	  a	  mission	  may	  also	  decrease	  appetite,	  along	  with	  busy	  schedules	  of	  activities	  or	  EVAs,	  or	  a	  lack	  of	  variety	  in	  food	  choices.	  	  Alternatively,	  on	  long-­‐duration	  missions,	  there	  may	  be	  the	  potential	  for	  boredom	  to	  contribute	  to	  increased	  appetite.	  	  This	  factor	  may	  influence	  health	  and	  performance.	  [[30]	  pps.	  169-­‐183;	  [26]	  pps.	  44,	  304]	  Hydration	  Level	  Hydration	  Level	  refers	  to	  any	  effects	  induced	  by	  altered	  thirst	  and	  hydration	  level	  during	  a	  mission.	  	  Decreased	  level	  of	  thirst	  has	  been	  observed,	  especially	  during	  the	  early	  stage	  of	  spaceflight	  when	  fluid	  shifting	  toward	  the	  upper	  body	  stimulates	  hypothalamic	  receptors	  in	  a	  way	  to	  potentially	  decrease	  thirst.	  	  Intense	  schedules	  and	  the	  taste	  of	  water	  in	  the	  vehicle,	  influenced	  by	  the	  storage	  and	  sterilization	  approaches,	  may	  contribute	  to	  a	  decreased	  desire	  to	  drink	  water.	  	  The	  level	  of	  exercise	  or	  stress,	  and	  therefore	  respiration	  and	  perspiration,	  also	  influence	  hydration	  level.	  	  This	  factor,	  similar	  to	  “Hunger	  Level”,	  may	  influence	  health	  and	  performance.	  	  [[30]	  pp.	  181;	  [5]	  pp.	  354;	  [25]]	  	  Circadian	  Rhythm	  Function	  Circadian	  Rhythm	  Function	  allows	  consideration	  of	  the	  effects	  that	  changes	  to	  the	  crewmember’s	  circadian	  rhythm	  may	  have	  on	  health	  and	  performance.	  	  Circadian	  rhythm	  may	  be	  altered	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  day	  and	  night	  have	  different	  meanings	  in	  microgravity.	  	  In	  Low-­‐Earth	  Orbit,	  for	  example,	  there	  is	  a	  day/night	  cycle	  approximately	  every	  90	  minutes.	  	  The	  International	  Space	  Station	  practice	  of	  “slam	  shifting”,	  which	  is	  when	  a	  large	  sleep	  schedule	  shift	  occurs	  due	  to	  an	  upcoming	  critical	  event	  such	  as	  docking,	  may	  alter	  the	  state	  of	  this	  factor.	  	  Circadian	  Rhythm	  may	  influence	  hormonal,	  sleep	  quantity	  and	  quality,	  fatigue	  and	  cognitive	  functions,	  and	  consequently	  health	  and	  performance.	  	  [[26]	  pps.	  85-­‐116;	  [5]	  pps.	  181-­‐182,	  236;	  [24]	  pp.	  164;	  [25]	  pp.	  49;	  [2]]	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Immune	  System	  Function	  Immune	  System	  Function	  accounts	  for	  influences	  on	  health	  and	  performance	  due	  to	  altered	  immunity	  that	  is	  possible	  during	  a	  mission.	  	  Exposure	  to	  radiation,	  altered	  nutrition,	  vehicle	  cleanliness,	  availability	  of	  medical	  care,	  sleep,	  fatigue,	  pressure	  and	  social	  support	  are	  examples	  of	  factors	  that	  may	  influence	  the	  functioning	  of	  crewmembers’	  immune	  systems.	  	  [[30]	  pps.	  169-­‐183;	  [56]	  pps.	  117-­‐130;	  [34]	  pp.	  59]	  Sleep	  Quantity	  and	  Quality	  Sleep	  Quantity	  and	  Quality	  addresses	  influences	  to	  due	  altered	  amounts	  or	  quality	  of	  sleep	  on	  health	  and	  performance.	  	  Sleep	  may	  be	  altered	  during	  missions	  due	  to	  factors	  such	  as	  a	  shift	  in	  circadian	  rhythm,	  whole	  body	  vibration	  during	  sleep	  times,	  lighting	  conditions,	  environmental	  noise,	  availability	  of	  privacy,	  psychological	  factors	  such	  as	  pressure	  or	  excitement,	  nutrition,	  task	  scheduling,	  and	  shift	  scheduling,	  especially	  when	  sleep	  shifting	  occurs.	  	  [[47]	  pps.	  89-­‐90;	  [26]	  pps.	  11,	  16,	  20,	  27,	  28,	  44,	  85-­‐116;	  [5]	  pp.	  181-­‐182,	  236,	  530-­‐533;	  [25]	  pp.	  49;	  [24]	  pp.	  166;	  [53]	  
Non-­Standard	  Physical	  Conditions	  Medication	  Side	  Effects	  Medication	  Side	  Effects	  is	  a	  factor	  that	  takes	  into	  account	  influences	  on	  health	  and	  performance	  that	  may	  occur	  during	  a	  mission	  due	  to	  altered	  responses	  from	  medication.	  	  An	  example	  is	  that	  medication	  taken	  to	  ease	  symptoms	  of	  Space	  Motion	  Sickness	  may	  affect	  alertness,	  response	  time	  and	  the	  accuracy	  of	  performing	  tasks.	  	  [[30]	  pps.	  18,	  48,	  195,	  197;	  [5]	  pp.	  181;	  [53,	  54]]	  Injury,	  Pain,	  or	  Discomfort	  Injury,	  Pain,	  or	  Discomfort	  factors	  address	  influences	  on	  health	  and	  performance	  possible	  if	  a	  crewmember	  is	  in	  discomfort,	  pain,	  or	  injured.	  	  It	  is	  decomposed	  into	  factors	  based	  on	  the	  International	  Classification	  of	  Diseases	  (ICD)	  10th	  Revision,	  or	  ICD-­‐10.	  	  ICD-­‐10	  Chapter	  XIX,	  “Injury,	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poisoning,	  and	  certain	  other	  consequences	  of	  external	  causes”.	  	  ICD-­‐10	  informs	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  following	  decomposed	  factors:	  Head,	  Neck,	  Chest,	  Abdomen/Lower	  Back,	  Shoulder/Upper	  Arm,	  Elbow/Forearm,	  Wrist/Hand,	  Hip/Thigh,	  Knee/Lower	  Leg,	  Ankle/Foot,	  Genitourinary,	  Burns/Corrosion	  and	  Poison/Toxin.	  [27,	  44,	  57]	  Illness	   Illness	  factors	  account	  for	  health	  and	  performance	  consequences	  of	  crewmembers	  being	  ill.	  The	  factors	  decomposed	  under	  Illness	  are	  taken	  from	  13	  of	  the	  first	  14	  ICD-­‐10	  chapters,	  excluding	  mental	  and	  behavioral	  disorders	  because	  they	  are	  incorporated	  in	  psychological	  factors.	  	  The	  factors	  included	  under	  Illness	  are:	  Infectious/Parasitic,	  Tumor,	  Blood/Blood-­‐forming	  Organs/Immune,	  Endocrine/Nutritional/Metabolic,	  Nervous	  System,	  Eye,	  Ear/Inner	  Ear,	  Circulatory,	  Respiratory,	  Digestive/Mouth/Stomach,	  Skin	  and	  Subcutaneous	  Tissue,	  Musculoskeletal	  and	  Connective	  Tissue,	  and	  Genitourinary.	  	  [27,	  44,	  57]	  
Existing	  Physical	  Conditions	  Pre-­‐existing	  Medical	  Conditions	  Pre-­‐existing	  Medical	  Conditions	  is	  present	  as	  a	  factor	  in	  order	  to	  account	  for	  any	  influences	  such	  conditions	  or	  medical	  history	  may	  have	  on	  other	  physical	  conditions.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  246]	  Gender	  Gender	  is	  present	  as	  a	  factor	  in	  order	  to	  address	  any	  influences	  gender	  may	  have	  on	  other	  physical	  conditions,	  such	  as	  differences	  in	  the	  side	  effects	  of	  certain	  medications.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  66;	  [30]	  pps.	  207-­‐219]	  Age	   Age	  is	  present	  as	  a	  factor	  in	  order	  to	  address	  any	  influences	  age	  may	  have	  on	  other	  physical	  conditions.	  	  [[26]	  pp.	  244]	  
 	   72	  
	  




























































 	   74	  
3.4 CONCLUSIONS	  FOR	  FACTOR	  IDENTIFICATION	  AND	  ORGANIZATION	  	   This	  section	  identifies	  a	  detailed	  set	  of	  factors	  that	  are	  capable	  of	  influencing	  human	  performance	  in	  a	  spaceflight	  environment,	  along	  with	  context-­‐specific	  definitions	  and	  references	  from	  aerospace,	  human	  performance	  and	  human	  reliability	  domains.	  	  This	  in-­‐depth	  set	  of	  factors	  provides	  a	  comprehensive	  starting	  point	  for	  defining	  a	  quantitatively	  modeled	  set	  of	  Performance	  Shaping	  Factors	  tailored	  for	  spaceflight	  applications.	  The	  organization	  scheme	  and	  set	  of	  factors	  presented	  in	  this	  section	  provide	  a	  common	  language	  framework	  for	  factors	  across	  disciplines	  to	  be	  discussed,	  compared	  and	  contrasted	  using	  common	  terminology.	  	  The	  organization	  scheme	  and	  diagram	  support	  integrated	  communication	  of	  the	  context	  of	  individual	  factors	  or	  groups	  of	  factors	  when	  viewed	  as	  potential	  risks	  to	  human	  health	  and	  performance,	  along	  with	  their	  relevant	  consequences.	  	  	  	  	  
CHAPTER	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CHAPTER	  4	  
4. FRAMEWORK	  FOR	  QUANTIFICATION	  OF	  FACTOR	  INFLUENCES	  
	  
4.1 BAYESIAN	  NETWORK	  INTRODUCTION	  AND	  DEVELOPMENT	  CONTEXT	  
	   Given	  the	  Contributing	  Factors	  and	  Functional	  Groupings	  in	  the	  Contributing	  Factor	  Map	  (CFM)	  shown	  in	  Figure	  10,	  we	  next	  consider	  what	  approach	  to	  use	  for	  modeling	  their	  influences	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  tasks.	  	  An	  important	  issue	  with	  current	  sets	  of	  Performance	  Shaping	  Factors	  in	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis	  (HRA)	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  explicit	  identification	  of	  factor	  dependencies	  [21].	  	  The	  approach	  to	  capture	  PSFs	  and	  their	  relationships	  investigated	  in	  this	  research	  is	  the	  use	  of	  Bayesian	  Networks	  (BNs).	  	  BNs	  have	  been	  used	  in	  domains	  with	  similar	  needs	  for	  understanding	  complex	  systems	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  uncertainty	  such	  as	  medical	  diagnostic	  systems	  [58-­‐63],	  aviation	  safety	  [64],	  maritime	  transportation	  [65],	  search	  and	  rescue	  operations	  [66],	  and	  real-­‐time	  weapons	  scheduling	  [59].	  	  Applications	  include	  decision-­‐making	  and	  planning	  support	  [58,	  59,	  67,	  68],	  data	  mining	  and	  analysis	  [59,	  67],	  various	  systems	  reliability	  efforts	  [69-­‐72],	  information	  retrieval	  [68,	  71],	  and	  recommender	  systems	  [73].	  	  See	  [70]	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  recent	  applications.	  	  BNs	  model	  a	  system	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  network	  or	  graph	  with	  nodes	  and	  links.	  	  Nodes	  represent	  variables	  or	  factors	  of	  importance,	  and	  the	  links	  represent	  a	  causal	  dependency	  relationship	  between	  the	  “parent”	  and	  “child”	  connected	  factors.	  	  	  These	  dependencies	  are	  then	  quantified	  with	  probabilistic	  expressions	  rather	  than	  deterministic	  ones.	  	  BNs	  offer	  a	  visual	  way	  to	  represent	  factors	  and	  their	  influences,	  instead	  of	  lists	  or	  tables	  commonly	  used	  in	  HRA	  methods.	  	  The	  use	  of	  BNs	  in	  modeling	  factors	  influencing	  human	  performance	  is	  a	  concept	  that	  has	  already	  begun	  to	  be	  explored	  in	  recent	  years,	  especially	  within	  the	  context	  of	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  [21,	  33,	  74-­‐76].	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   Sigurdsson,	  Walls	  and	  Quigley	  [71]	  describe	  three	  stages	  for	  building	  and	  using	  a	  BN;	  Problem	  Structuring,	  Instantiation	  and	  Inference.	  	  In	  the	  Problem	  Structuring	  phase,	  there	  are	  three	  steps,	  Identify	  Variables,	  Identify	  Network	  Structure,	  and	  Express	  as	  Statistical	  Variables.	  	  The	  previous	  work	  described	  in	  [23]	  and	  Chapter	  3	  captures	  information	  for	  step	  1,	  the	  identification	  of	  variables.	  	  This	  section	  of	  the	  dissertation	  focuses	  on	  step	  two,	  determining	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  BN.	  	  Following	  this,	  the	  factors	  in	  the	  network	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  statistical	  variables	  for	  step	  three.	  	  Stage	  two	  then	  involves	  quantifying	  the	  network	  with	  conditional	  probabilities.	  	  Finally,	  in	  stage	  three,	  observations	  of	  variable	  states	  in	  scenarios	  of	  interest	  can	  be	  entered	  into	  the	  network,	  and	  outcome	  probabilities	  can	  be	  calculated	  [71].	  	   	   There	  are	  two	  types	  of	  approaches	  for	  building	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  BN,	  data-­‐based	  and	  knowledge-­‐based	  [59].	  	  Data-­‐based	  approaches	  are	  typically	  employed	  in	  fields	  where	  large	  amounts	  of	  data	  can	  be	  mined	  to	  determine	  relationships	  between	  factors	  and	  outcomes	  [59,	  77].	  	  An	  example	  of	  this	  approach	  would	  be	  mining	  medical	  databases	  containing	  patient	  symptoms	  and	  diseases	  to	  determine	  a	  network	  structure	  [60].	  	  When	  large	  sets	  of	  data	  are	  not	  available,	  but	  expert	  domain	  knowledge	  is	  available,	  knowledge-­‐based	  techniques	  can	  be	  used	  [59,	  60,	  68].	  	  This	  is	  the	  case	  for	  the	  human	  spaceflight	  domain,	  as	  there	  is	  no	  unified	  set	  of	  data	  capturing	  the	  states	  of	  a	  common	  set	  of	  environmental	  factors,	  such	  as	  the	  set	  described	  in	  [23]	  and	  Chapter	  3,	  and	  their	  influences	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  tasks.	  	  Efforts	  at	  creating	  such	  data	  sets	  for	  the	  nuclear	  safety	  industry	  have	  been	  underway	  [78,	  79].	  	  	  The	  human	  spaceflight	  domain	  has	  not	  similarly	  progressed	  as	  of	  yet,	  although	  some	  efforts	  are	  described	  in	  [40,	  80].	  	  Data	  from	  the	  spaceflight	  domain	  more	  typically	  support	  characterization	  of	  factors	  in	  localized	  disciplines	  such	  as	  physiological	  adaptations,	  behavioral	  health	  or	  human	  factors	  engineering	  [26].	  	  Due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  data	  set	  encompassing	  a	  global	  set	  of	  factors	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  10,	  the	  knowledge-­‐based	  approach	  is	  utilized	  in	  this	  research	  to	  build	  the	  initial	  structure	  for	  a	  BN.	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   Various	  options	  exist	  for	  executing	  a	  knowledge-­‐based	  approach	  to	  BN	  structure	  construction.	  	  In	  [59],	  expert	  elicitation	  techniques	  are	  categorized	  into	  those	  that	  are	  unstructured	  and	  those	  that	  are	  structured.	  	  Unstructured	  methods	  rely	  on	  interviews	  in	  which	  the	  expert	  provides	  a	  narrative	  in	  response	  to	  open-­‐ended	  questions,	  and	  factors	  of	  importance	  and	  their	  relationships	  are	  identified	  through	  textual	  analysis	  [59].	  	  Another	  unstructured	  approach	  described	  in	  [66]	  is	  to	  show	  a	  simple	  example	  network	  for	  an	  unrelated	  topic,	  such	  as	  weather	  prediction,	  and	  allow	  experts	  to	  brainstorm	  factors	  and	  relationships	  for	  their	  domain	  application.	  	  In	  contrast,	  within	  structured	  techniques	  the	  experts	  are	  generally	  provided	  with	  previously	  identified	  variables	  of	  importance	  and	  are	  queried	  regarding	  the	  relationships	  among	  them.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  spaceflight	  domain-­‐specific	  taxonomy	  of	  variables	  shown	  in	  Figure	  10,	  this	  paper	  shows	  the	  use	  of	  structured	  techniques	  for	  our	  application	  in	  order	  to	  build	  upon	  that	  taxonomy	  and	  more	  efficiently	  focus	  future	  expert	  participation.	  	   	   A	  common	  structured	  technique	  for	  creating	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  BN	  is	  the	  use	  of	  adjacency	  matrices	  [59].	  	  These	  types	  of	  matrices	  typically	  have	  the	  complete	  set	  of	  factors	  along	  each	  axis,	  with	  one	  axis	  representing	  causes	  and	  the	  other	  axis	  representing	  effects	  [36,	  59].	  	  The	  entry	  in	  each	  cell	  of	  the	  matrix	  captures	  information	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  corresponding	  row	  and	  column	  factors,	  such	  as	  the	  causal	  direction	  and	  possibly	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  relationship.	  	  This	  type	  of	  information	  can	  be	  determined	  based	  on	  literature	  review	  and/or	  expert	  opinion	  [36,	  59].	  	   	   At	  this	  point,	  we	  must	  return	  to	  the	  application	  at	  hand,	  that	  of	  developing	  a	  BN	  structure	  for	  use	  by	  spaceflight-­‐domain	  HRA	  analysts	  with	  limitations	  on	  the	  number	  of	  factors	  that	  can	  be	  evaluated	  in	  a	  reasonable	  amount	  of	  time.	  	  This	  brings	  about	  the	  typical	  modeling	  trade-­‐off	  between	  comprehensive	  but	  complex	  and	  limited	  but	  simple	  models.	  	  Figure	  10	  represents	  a	  model	  of	  factors	  that	  is	  quite	  comprehensive,	  but	  overly	  complex	  for	  use	  in	  traditional	  predictive	  HRAs.	  	  Working	  at	  the	  Functional	  Grouping	  level	  of	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  factors	  still	  leaves	  21	  factors	  to	  be	  evaluated	  for	  each	  type	  of	  task.	  	  In	  forming	  a	  BN	  from	  these	  21	  factors,	  the	  number	  of	  conditional	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probabilities	  that	  must	  be	  determined	  to	  quantify	  the	  network	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  2n	  over	  all	  21	  factors,	  with	  n	  being	  the	  number	  of	  parents	  for	  each	  of	  the	  21	  factors	  and	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  states	  of	  the	  factors	  are	  all	  modeled	  as	  binary	  [81].	  	  	  Because	  the	  initial	  quantification	  of	  BN	  probabilities	  is	  expected	  to	  begin	  with	  expert	  opinion	  until	  additional	  data	  can	  be	  incorporated	  [68],	  	  a	  smaller	  number	  of	  factors	  to	  include	  in	  the	  initial	  BN	  structure	  is	  desired	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  probabilities	  to	  be	  elicited.	  	  Working	  at	  the	  next	  higher	  level	  of	  the	  hierarchy,	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  8	  Socio-­‐Technical	  Domain	  Categories,	  may	  be	  a	  reasonable	  option,	  however	  was	  not	  chosen	  due	  to	  that	  level’s	  separation	  from	  the	  definitions	  of	  the	  detailed,	  domain-­‐specific	  Contributing	  Factors.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  way	  to	  identify	  the	  dominant	  factors	  at	  the	  Functional	  Grouping	  level	  to	  include	  in	  a	  network	  model	  was	  sought.	  	  	  	   	   The	  desired	  simplification	  is	  not	  easily	  supported	  by	  common	  structured	  techniques	  such	  as	  the	  adjacency	  matrix,	  which	  aids	  in	  identifying	  relationships	  of	  already	  defined	  sets	  of	  factors.	  	  This	  section	  discusses	  how	  the	  Analytic	  Hierarchy	  Process	  (AHP),	  a	  decision	  support	  technique,	  was	  used	  to	  aid	  in	  the	  identification	  of	  factors	  believed	  to	  have	  the	  greatest	  influences,	  and	  are	  therefore	  of	  the	  most	  importance	  for	  inclusion	  in	  an	  initial	  simplified	  BN	  model.	  	  We	  also	  show	  how	  the	  Human	  Factors	  Analysis	  and	  Classification	  System	  (HFACS)	  structure	  supported	  the	  use	  of	  the	  AHP	  method.	  	  Further,	  we	  discuss	  how	  the	  AHP	  results	  can	  be	  used	  instead	  of	  an	  adjacency	  matrix	  for	  identifying	  relationships	  to	  include	  in	  the	  BN	  model.	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4.2 BAYESIAN	  NETWORK	  STRUCTURE	  DEVELOPMENT	  	  
4.2.1 BACKGROUND	  ON	  METHODS	  	  
4.2.1.1 Analytic	  Hierarchy	  Process	  	   	  The	  developer	  of	  the	  Analytic	  Hierarchy	  Process	  (AHP),	  Thomas	  Saaty,	  describes	  the	  AHP	  in	  [82]	  as	  “a	  theory	  of	  measurement	  concerned	  with	  deriving	  dominance	  priorities	  from	  paired	  comparisons	  of	  homogenous	  elements	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  common	  criteria	  or	  attribute”.	  	  It	  is	  this	  derivation	  of	  dominance	  that	  is	  of	  interest	  to	  us	  in	  deciding	  which	  factors	  to	  include	  in	  a	  simplified	  Bayesian	  Network	  (BN)	  model.	  	  AHP	  uses	  relative	  pair-­‐wise	  comparisons	  as	  it	  is	  generally	  more	  intuitive	  for	  people	  to	  make	  relative	  comparisons	  between	  two	  elements	  than	  to	  make	  absolute	  judgments	  [83].	  	  	  There	  are	  four	  main	  steps	  in	  the	  AHP	  [84]:	  1. Setting	  up	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  elements	  2. Making	  pair-­‐wise	  comparisons	  of	  the	  elements	  3. Finding	  the	  eigenvalue	  of	  the	  comparison	  matrices	  to	  estimate	  relative	  priorities	  of	  the	  elements	  4. Aggregating	  the	  relative,	  or	  local,	  priorities	  of	  the	  elements	  into	  global	  priorities	  The	  pair-­‐wise	  comparisons	  made	  in	  step	  2	  are	  performed	  using	  the	  scale	  shown	  in	  Table	  5,	  given	  by	  Saaty	  [82].	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Table	  5:	  Scale	  for	  AHP	  Comparisons	  [82]	  	  
4.2.1.2 Human	  Factors	  Analysis	  and	  Classification	  System	  	   The	  Human	  Factors	  Analysis	  and	  Classification	  System	  (HFACS)	  [44]	  was	  created	  for	  the	  aviation	  community.	  	  It	  is	  a	  taxonomy	  of	  human	  performance	  causal	  factors	  developed	  based	  on	  input	  from	  the	  U.S.	  Naval	  Safety	  Center,	  the	  U.S.	  Army	  Safety	  Center,	  the	  U.S.	  Air	  Force	  Safety	  Center,	  the	  National	  Transportation	  Safety	  Board	  and	  the	  Federal	  Aviation	  Administration	  [44].	  	  It	  builds	  on	  an	  approach	  to	  accident	  analysis	  proposed	  by	  James	  Reason	  [85]	  in	  which	  accidents	  involving	  human	  error	  are	  not	  merely	  caused	  by	  the	  human	  at	  the	  “sharp	  end”	  [2].	  	  Reason’s	  approach,	  and	  that	  adopted	  by	  HFACS,	  brings	  forward	  the	  concept	  of	  latent	  factors,	  such	  as	  environmental	  and	  organizational	  conditions,	  contributing	  to	  accidents,	  as	  well.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  HFACS	  taxonomy	  of	  factors	  is	  organized	  into	  four	  levels	  of	  increasing	  latency	  of	  influence:	  Unsafe	  Acts,	  Preconditions	  for	  Unsafe	  Acts,	  Unsafe	  Supervision,	  and	  Organizational	  Influences	  [44].	  	  This	  concept	  of	  identifying	  multiple	  levels	  of	  causal	  influence	  on	  human	  performance	  is	  what	  we	  used	  to	  help	  structure	  our	  AHP	  analysis	  and	  Bayesian	  Network,	  as	  described	  next.	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4.2.2 APPLICATION	  OF	  METHODS	  	   Celik	  and	  Cebi	  [86]	  demonstrated	  the	  use	  of	  the	  AHP	  to	  bring	  quantification	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  HFACS	  for	  accident	  analysis	  in	  the	  shipping	  industry.	  	  A	  case	  study	  of	  a	  2007	  boiler	  accident	  on	  a	  bulk	  carrier	  ship	  was	  analyzed.	  	  The	  authors	  performed	  AHP	  on	  the	  factors	  at	  each	  level	  of	  the	  HFACS	  as	  applied	  to	  the	  accident	  scenario	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  major	  contributing	  factors	  to	  the	  accident.	  	  We	  demonstrate	  a	  similar	  approach	  to	  determine	  the	  dominant	  factors	  for	  inclusion	  in	  a	  simplified	  BN	  model	  of	  the	  many	  spaceflight-­‐domain	  factors	  shown	  in	  the	  CFM.	  The	  scenario	  used	  as	  context	  for	  our	  analysis	  takes	  place	  during	  the	  return	  of	  a	  transfer	  vehicle	  from	  the	  International	  Space	  Station	  (ISS).	  	  The	  scenario	  assumes	  vehicle	  configuration	  requiring	  crew	  actions	  during	  the	  landing	  phase.	  	  The	  specific	  task	  in	  mind	  for	  this	  analysis	  was	  a	  crewmember	  pushing	  the	  appropriate	  button	  to	  release	  retractable	  landing	  gear	  in	  the	  “down”	  position.	  	  Any	  similar	  push	  button	  task	  may	  have	  been	  used	  in	  the	  case	  that	  the	  reference	  vehicle	  does	  not	  have	  landing	  gear	  (e.g.	  a	  capsule	  design).	  	  The	  total	  duration	  of	  the	  mission	  was	  assumed	  to	  be	  two	  weeks.	  	  
4.2.2.1 AHP	  Step	  1:	  Hierarchy	  Setup	  	   	  First	  we	  grouped	  the	  Contributing	  Factor	  Map	  (CFM)	  Functional	  Groupings	  into	  levels	  to	  form	  our	  AHP	  hierarchy.	  	  The	  level	  of	  the	  CFM	  analogous	  to	  the	  “Unsafe	  Acts”	  level	  of	  HFACS	  is	  the	  set	  of	  four	  cognitive	  functions	  or	  tasks	  from	  the	  Cognitive	  Reliability	  and	  Error	  Analysis	  Method	  (CREAM),	  Observation,	  Interpretation,	  Planning	  and	  Execution,	  shown	  near	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  CFM.	  	  The	  push-­‐button	  example	  used	  in	  this	  case	  is	  an	  Execution	  task,	  so	  that	  will	  represent	  the	  overall	  goal	  for	  this	  AHP	  analysis	  of	  performing	  the	  Execution	  task	  successfully.	  	  	  The	  next	  level	  of	  the	  AHP	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hierarchy,	  what	  we	  call	  Level	  A,	  is	  where	  inclusion	  of	  the	  factors	  begins.	  	  Level	  A	  consists	  of	  the	  Functional	  Groupings	  from	  the	  Individual	  Physical	  Characteristics	  and	  Individual	  Mental	  Characteristics	  Categories.	  	  These	  are	  the	  Functional	  Groupings	  shown	  in	  the	  bottom	  three	  rows	  of	  factors	  in	  the	  CFM.	  	  Level	  B	  incorporates	  the	  Functional	  Groupings	  in	  the	  next	  higher	  three	  rows	  in	  the	  CFM,	  those	  in	  the	  Task	  Specific	  Characteristics,	  Human	  System	  Interaction	  and	  Physical	  Environment	  Categories.	  	  Level	  C	  comprises	  the	  remaining	  Functional	  Groupings	  from	  the	  Team,	  Training	  and	  Organization	  Categories.	  	  The	  resulting	  AHP	  hierarchy	  is	  shown	  in	  Figure	  12.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  12:	  Hierarchy	  for	  AHP	  Analysis	  	  
4.2.2.2 AHP	  Step	  2:	  Pair-­‐Wise	  Comparisons	  	   The	  next	  step	  in	  the	  AHP	  analysis	  is	  to	  compare	  the	  factors	  at	  each	  level	  in	  a	  pair-­‐wise	  fashion	  to	  the	  preceding	  level.	  	  At	  Level	  A,	  this	  means	  comparing,	  for	  example,	  Situational	  Awareness	  and	  Cognitive	  Adaptations	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  Execution	  Task	  goal	  by	  asking,	  “Which	  of	  these	  factors	  has	  a	  stronger	  influence	  on	  the	  successful	  completion	  of	  the	  Execution	  Task,	  and	  by	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Figure	  13:	  Level	  A	  Comparisons	  Matrix	  	   The	  diagonal	  elements	  of	  the	  matrix	  are	  equal	  to	  one,	  as	  this	  is	  a	  factor’s	  comparison	  to	  itself.	  	  The	  entries	  are	  read	  as	  the	  comparison	  of	  the	  row	  entry’s	  strength	  of	  influence	  to	  the	  column	  entry’s	  strength	  of	  influence	  on	  the	  state	  of	  the	  Execution	  Task	  goal.	  	  The	  numerical	  value	  for	  each	  entry	  is	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  strengths	  using	  the	  AHP	  scale	  shown	  in	  Table	  5.	  	  The	  lower	  triangular	  elements	  are	  the	  reciprocals	  of	  the	  upper	  triangular	  elements,	  as	  each	  comparison	  pair	  was	  evaluated	  only	  once	  and	  the	  reciprocal	  taken	  for	  the	  corresponding	  pair	  entry.	  	  This	  approach	  saves	  evaluation	  time	  and	  improves	  matrix	  consistency.	  	  In	  some	  situations,	  one	  may	  wish	  to	  elicit	  explicit	  comparisons	  for	  both	  pairs	  to	  evaluate	  an	  expert’s	  consistency,	  although	  that	  would	  require	  additional	  time	  and	  effort.	  	  Next	  we	  move	  to	  Level	  B	  evaluations.	  	  Because	  there	  are	  7	  elements	  at	  Level	  A,	  Level	  B	  requires	  7	  individual	  matrices,	  in	  which	  each	  matrix	  has	  one	  of	  the	  Level	  A	  elements	  as	  its	  pivot.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  first	  matrix	  begins	  with	  the	  comparison	  of	  Level	  B	  factors	  Time	  Context	  and	  Task	  Familiarity	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  Level	  A	  pivot	  factor	  Situational	  Awareness.	  	  The	  question	  is	  asked,	  “In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  example	  scenario,	  which	  of	  these	  factors	  has	  a	  stronger	  influence	  on	  the	  state	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Figure	  15:	  Level	  C	  Comparisons	  Matrix	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4.2.2.3 AHP	  Step	  3:	  Local	  Priority	  Calculations	  	  The	  calculations	  based	  on	  the	  matrices	  represented	  by	  Figure	  13	  through	  Figure	  15	  then	  proceed	  as	  follows.	  	  First,	  the	  eigenvector	  of	  each	  matrix	  is	  found,	  giving	  one	  set	  of	  local	  priorities	  at	  Level	  A,	  7	  sets	  of	  local	  priorities	  at	  Level	  B,	  and	  8	  sets	  of	  local	  priorities	  at	  Level	  C.	  	  The	  eigenvectors	  shown	  in	  Figure	  16	  were	  calculated	  using	  an	  approach	  described	  in	  [82].	   	  
Figure	  16:	  Local	  Priorities	  	  
4.2.2.4 AHP	  Step	  4:	  Global	  Priority	  Calculations	  	  We	  are	  more	  interested	  in	  the	  global	  priorities	  of	  each	  factor,	  meaning	  the	  factor’s	  priority	  within	  its	  level	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  weights	  of	  the	  previous	  level(s).	  	  Let	  us	  define	  the	  following	  variables	  in	  order	  to	  calculate	  the	  global	  priorities.	  	  Let	  i	  be	  the	  index	  for	  each	  Level	  A	  factor,	  i	  =	  1,	  2,	  .	  .	  .	  ,	  7.	  	  Similarly,	  let	  j	  be	  the	  index	  for	  each	  Level	  B	  factor,	  j	  =	  1,	  2,	  .	  .	  .	  ,	  8,	  and	  let	  k	  be	  the	  index	  for	  each	  Level	  C	  factor,	  k	  =	  1,	  2,	  .	  .	  .	  ,	  6.	  	  Now	  let	  A	  be	  the	  vector	  of	  Level	  A	  priorities	  with	  respect	  to	  the	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Execution	  Task	  goal;	  this	  is	  the	  eigenvector	  of	  the	  Level	  A	  comparison	  matrix.	  	  Next	  let	  BAi	  be	  the	  vector	  giving	  the	  priorities	  of	  all	  Level	  B	  factors	  with	  respect	  to	  each	  Level	  Ai	  factor;	  this	  is	  the	  eigenvector	  of	  each	  of	  the	  i	  =1,	  2,	  .	  .	  .	  ,	  7	  Level	  B	  comparison	  matrices.	  	  Finally,	  let	  CBj	  be	  the	  vector	  giving	  the	  priorities	  of	  all	  Level	  C	  factors	  with	  respect	  to	  each	  Level	  Bj	  factor;	  this	  is	  the	  eigenvector	  of	  each	  of	  the	  j	  =	  1,	  2,	  .	  .	  .	  ,	  8	  Level	  C	  comparison	  matrices.	  To	  find	  the	  global	  ranking	  of	  each	  Level	  B	  factor	  with	  respect	  to	  one	  factor	  Ai,	  we	  calculate	  the	  vector	  
€ 
BAiglobal = A( i) ∗BAi .	   	   	   	   	   (1)	  	  This	  new	  vector	  results	  from	  the	  global	  weight	  of	  factor	  Ai	  multiplying	  the	  local	  priority	  ranking	  of	  each	  Level	  B	  factor	  with	  respect	  to	  Ai.	  Next	  we	  must	  add	  the	  contributions	  from	  all	  i	  global	  rankings	  to	  obtain	  the	  global	  ranking	  for	  element	  Bj	  	  [82],	  
€ 
Bjglobal = BAiglobal( j)
i=1
7
∑ .	   	   	   	   	   (2)	  	  This	  summation	  is	  repeated	  for	  j	  =	  1,	  2,	  .	  .	  .	  ,	  8	  for	  the	  full	  global	  priority	  vector	  at	  Level	  B,	  
€ 
Bglobal = B1global B2global B3global B4global B5global B6global B7global B8global[ ]
T .	   (3)	  	  As	  a	  sanity	  check,	  the	  sum	  of	  all	  elements	  in	  the	  global	  priority	  vector	  at	  each	  level	  should	  be	  unity.	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The	  same	  process	  is	  followed	  for	  Level	  C	  with	  the	  equations	  
€ 





∑ .	   	   	   	   	   (5)	  Similar	  to	  Level	  B,	  the	  summation	  repeated	  for	  k	  =	  1,	  2,	  .	  .	  .	  ,	  6	  provides	  the	  full	  global	  priority	  vector	  at	  Level	  C,	  
€ 
Cglobal = C1global C2global C3global C4global C5global C6global[ ]





Figure	  17:	  Global	  Priorities	  	  
4.2.3 RESULTS	  AND	  DISCUSSION	  	   With	  the	  global	  priorities	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  17,	  we	  were	  next	  able	  to	  use	  these	  values	  to	  support	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  for	  choosing	  which	  of	  the	  21	  Functional	  Groupings	  to	  include	  in	  our	  simplified	  model.	  	  At	  Level	  A,	  if	  all	  elements	  were	  equally	  weighted,	  their	  weight	  values	  would	  be	  0.14.	  	  This	  value	  could	  be	  used	  as	  an	  initial	  threshold,	  meaning	  that	  factors	  with	  values	  at	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or	  above	  this	  threshold	  would	  be	  included	  in	  the	  simplified	  model.	  	  This	  threshold	  value	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  inclusion	  of	  Situational	  Awareness,	  Cognitive	  Adaptations,	  Psychological	  Conditions,	  and	  Non-­‐Standard	  Physical	  Conditions.	  	  The	  influence	  of	  Physiological	  Adaptations	  was	  judged	  to	  be	  additionally	  important	  to	  include,	  and	  the	  Level	  A	  threshold	  was	  therefore	  decreased	  to	  0.12.	  At	  Level	  B,	  the	  starting	  threshold	  for	  equally	  weighted	  elements	  was	  0.125.	  	  This	  threshold	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  Time	  Context,	  Work	  Load,	  and	  Vehicle	  Physical	  Environment	  factors.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  Task	  Familiarity	  and	  User	  Interfaces	  were	  also	  judged	  to	  be	  influential,	  and	  again	  the	  threshold	  was	  lowered	  to	  0.12.	  Finally,	  at	  Level	  C,	  the	  starting	  threshold	  for	  equal	  weighting	  was	  0.167.	  	  This	  value	  leads	  to	  the	  inclusion	  of	  Task	  Planning	  &	  Scheduling	  and	  Organizational	  Support.	  	  For	  Level	  C,	  the	  Training	  Quality	  and	  Mission	  Planning	  elements	  were	  identified	  for	  inclusion,	  consistent	  with	  a	  reduced	  threshold	  of	  0.15.	  Now	  we	  turn	  to	  the	  question	  of	  which	  factor	  relationships	  to	  include	  in	  our	  simplified	  model.	  	  Level	  A	  factor	  relationships	  to	  the	  Execution	  task	  goal	  are	  the	  simplest	  case	  to	  decide.	  	  Because	  there	  is	  only	  one	  item,	  the	  Execution	  task,	  to	  which	  to	  create	  a	  relationship,	  all	  factors	  chosen	  for	  inclusion	  in	  the	  model	  will	  have	  relationships	  to	  the	  Execution	  task	  included.	  Next	  we	  look	  at	  which	  relationships	  from	  Level	  B	  factors	  to	  Level	  A	  factors	  we	  will	  model.	  	  At	  this	  level	  we	  must	  look	  at	  each	  of	  the	  Level	  A	  factors	  and	  how	  the	  Level	  B	  factors	  are	  weighted	  with	  respect	  to	  each	  one	  in	  its	  local	  priority	  vector.	  	  We	  used	  our	  starting	  threshold	  of	  equally	  weighted	  Level	  B	  factors,	  0.125	  to	  guide	  this	  decision.	  	  For	  Cognitive	  Adaptations,	  for	  example,	  this	  lead	  to	  the	  inclusion	  of	  influences	  from	  Time	  Context,	  Task	  Familiarity	  and	  Work	  Load.	  The	  same	  logic	  was	  used	  for	  deciding	  which	  relationships	  from	  Level	  C	  to	  Level	  B	  factors	  to	  model.	  	  We	  began	  with	  the	  initial	  threshold	  of	  equally	  weighted	  Level	  C	  factors,	  0.167.	  	  Looking	  at	  the	  local	  priority	  vector	  for	  Time	  Context,	  for	  example,	  we	  see	  the	  factors	  with	  values	  at	  or	  above	  this	  threshold	  are	  Task	  Planning	  &	  Scheduling	  and	  Shift	  Scheduling.	  	  Shift	  Scheduling,	  however,	  did	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not	  have	  a	  high	  enough	  global	  priority	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  model.	  	  Its	  influence	  on	  Time	  Context	  will	  therefore	  not	  be	  included.	  	  The	  next	  highest	  value	  of	  0.15	  in	  the	  local	  priority	  vector	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  Mission	  Planning	  factor.	  	  The	  Mission	  Scenarios	  component	  of	  Mission	  Planning	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  important	  enough	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  model	  due	  to	  its	  influences	  on	  the	  state	  of	  the	  Time	  Context.	  	  This	  indicates	  a	  threshold	  for	  Time	  Context	  contributors	  of	  ≥	  0.15.	  	  Similar	  logic	  was	  used	  for	  the	  remaining	  Level	  B	  factors	  and	  their	  Level	  C	  contributors.	  	  Table	  6	  shows	  the	  thresholds	  used	  for	  the	  Level	  B	  factors’	  contributors	  at	  Level	  C.	  	  
	  
Table	  6:	  Thresholds	  for	  Model	  Inclusion	  of	  Level	  C	  Factor	  Relationships	  to	  Level	  B	  	   The	  AHP	  analysis	  supported	  the	  determination	  of	  believed	  factor	  dominance.	  	  This	  insight	  supported	  decisions	  made	  in	  choosing	  a	  subset	  of	  original	  factors	  and	  relationships	  for	  inclusion	  in	  a	  simplified	  model.	  	  These	  decisions	  resulted	  in	  the	  Bayesian	  Network	  structure	  shown	  in	  Figure	  18.	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Figure	  18:	  Bayesian	  Network	  Structure	  Resulting	  from	  AHP	  Analysis	  	   Let	  us	  discuss	  the	  resulting	  structure.	  	  At	  Level	  A,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  Fatigue	  Conditions	  and	  Existing	  Physical	  Conditions	  were	  the	  two	  factors	  not	  included	  in	  the	  simplified	  model.	  	  The	  context	  scenario	  used	  for	  the	  pair-­‐wise	  comparisons	  provides	  an	  explanation	  for	  this	  result.	  	  Since	  the	  scenario	  involved	  only	  the	  task	  of	  pushing	  a	  button	  and	  not	  a	  more	  physically	  demanding	  Execution	  task,	  one	  can	  rationalize	  Fatigue	  Conditions	  and	  Existing	  Physical	  Conditions	  not	  being	  as	  influential.	  	  The	  presence	  of	  Physiological	  Adaptations	  and	  Non-­‐Standard	  Physical	  Conditions	  capture	  physical	  state	  such	  as	  illness	  or	  injury	  that	  may	  still	  affect	  even	  push-­‐button	  task	  performance.	  At	  Level	  B,	  the	  factors	  not	  included	  were	  Quality	  of	  Procedures,	  Vehicle	  Architecture	  and	  Habitability.	  	  Again,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  context	  scenario	  shaped	  these	  results.	  	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  push-­‐button	  task	  as	  a	  simple	  step	  would	  support	  the	  inclusion	  of	  Task	  Familiarity	  for	  addressing	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knowledge	  of	  the	  button’s	  location	  and	  feel.	  	  Since	  the	  task	  is	  not	  a	  complicated	  one,	  however,	  the	  Quality	  of	  Procedures	  would	  appear	  less	  important.	  	  The	  Vehicle	  Architecture	  and	  Habitability	  factors	  would	  seem	  to	  have	  greater	  influences	  in	  the	  context	  of	  tasks	  other	  than	  Execution	  tasks	  after	  mission	  durations	  of	  longer	  than	  the	  two	  weeks	  in	  our	  example.	  	  For	  instance,	  one	  might	  expect	  their	  influences	  on	  Psychological	  Conditions	  at	  Level	  A,	  and	  then	  Interpretation	  or	  Planning	  tasks	  to	  be	  greater	  in	  a	  long-­‐duration	  scenario.	  Finally	  at	  Level	  C,	  we	  observe	  the	  factors	  Crew	  Collaboration	  Quality	  and	  Shift	  Scheduling	  were	  not	  included.	  	  Because	  the	  task	  in	  our	  context	  scenario	  is	  not	  one	  requiring	  elaborate	  coordination	  with	  other	  crewmembers,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  see	  Crew	  Collaboration	  Quality	  not	  being	  included.	  	  As	  for	  Shift	  Scheduling,	  it	  is	  possible	  this	  did	  not	  weigh	  above	  the	  Level	  C	  global	  threshold	  because	  its	  main	  influence	  may	  eventually	  be	  seen	  through	  Fatigue	  Conditions,	  which	  were	  not	  evaluated	  as	  strongly	  influencing	  this	  type	  of	  Execution	  task.	  	  
4.2.4 FUTURE	  WORK	  FOR	  STRUCTURE	  DEVELOPMENT	  	   Future	  work	  includes	  performing	  the	  same	  analysis	  process	  using	  different	  context	  scenarios	  for	  the	  same	  type	  of	  task.	  	  For	  example,	  using	  a	  more	  physically	  demanding	  Execution	  Task	  as	  the	  context	  scenario	  action,	  such	  as	  opening	  a	  spacecraft	  hatch	  instead	  of	  pushing	  a	  button,	  may	  produce	  results	  with	  Fatigue	  Conditions	  and	  related	  factors	  more	  dominant	  in	  the	  resulting	  structure.	  	  This	  type	  of	  work	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  determination	  of	  different	  network	  structures	  required	  for	  subcategories	  of	  tasks	  (e.g.	  Physically	  Demanding	  Execution	  Tasks	  vs.	  Not-­‐Physically	  Demanding	  Execution	  Tasks).	  	  	  Similarly,	  the	  analysis	  process	  can	  be	  performed	  for	  the	  other	  three	  types	  of	  cognitive	  tasks:	  Observation,	  Interpretation	  and	  Planning	  Tasks.	  	  It	  is	  expected	  that	  slightly	  different	  network	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structures	  will	  result	  for	  tasks	  of	  a	  more	  mental	  than	  physical	  nature.	  	  Altering	  the	  context	  scenario	  mission	  duration	  may	  be	  an	  additionally	  influential	  context	  variable	  across	  the	  types	  of	  tasks.	  Additional	  efforts	  may	  also	  include	  opinion	  elicitation	  from	  multiple	  experts	  for	  the	  comparison	  matrix	  entries.	  	  There	  are	  various	  techniques	  available	  for	  combining	  inputs	  from	  multiple	  experts	  [60,	  64,	  87].	  With	  a	  traceable	  approach	  supporting	  the	  determination	  of	  a	  simplified	  BN	  structure	  in	  place,	  efforts	  can	  next	  address	  the	  ascertainment	  of	  the	  probabilities	  needed	  to	  quantify	  the	  BN.	  	  The	  network	  structure	  developed	  in	  this	  example	  analysis	  requires	  112	  probabilities	  for	  full	  quantification.	  	  This	  is	  opposed	  to	  the	  (27)+(28)(7)+(26)(8)	  =	  2432	  probabilities	  required	  if	  all	  21	  Functional	  Groupings	  and	  their	  relationships,	  even	  as	  constrained	  by	  the	  hierarchy,	  were	  modeled.	  	  This	  reduced	  number	  is	  especially	  important	  in	  our	  situation	  in	  which	  a	  global	  database	  of	  probabilities	  for	  factor	  influences	  does	  not	  exist,	  and	  expert	  opinion	  elicitation	  is	  the	  primary	  reasonable	  initial	  source	  of	  probabilistic	  information.	  	  
4.2.5 CONCLUSIONS	  FOR	  STRUCTURE	  DEVELOPMENT	  	   This	  section	  demonstrates	  a	  method	  for	  determining	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  Bayesian	  Network	  when	  a	  global	  set	  of	  data	  for	  algorithmic	  analysis	  is	  not	  available.	  	  This	  method	  was	  built	  on	  an	  existing	  set	  of	  detailed	  factors	  influencing	  the	  performance	  of	  tasks	  in	  the	  spaceflight	  domain.	  	  It	  employed	  a	  commonly	  used	  decision-­‐support	  method,	  the	  Analytic	  Hierarchy	  Process,	  and	  causal	  latency	  concepts	  from	  the	  Human	  Factors	  Analysis	  and	  Classification	  System	  in	  a	  novel	  way	  to	  guide	  choices	  for	  modeling	  the	  dominant	  set	  of	  factors	  and	  relationships	  in	  a	  simplified	  Bayesian	  Network	  model	  structure.	  	  This	  structure	  allows	  for	  the	  next	  task	  in	  Bayesian	  Network	  development	  of	  probabilistic	  quantification	  to	  be	  more	  tractable,	  especially	  when	  using	  expert	  opinion.
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4.3	   BAYESIAN	  NETWORK	  QUANTIFICATION	  	   	  Now	  that	  we	  have	  discussed	  an	  initial	  approach	  for	  Bayesian	  Network	  (BN)	  structure	  development,	  we	  turn	  to	  what	  Sigurdsson,	  Walls	  and	  Quigley	  [71]	  identify	  as	  step	  3	  in	  stage	  1	  of	  the	  Bayesian	  Network	  development	  process,	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  factors	  as	  statistical	  variables.	  	  We	  also	  address	  stage	  2,	  Instantiation,	  or	  the	  quantification	  of	  factor	  influences.	  	  Ideally,	  our	  network	  model	  would	  evolve	  from	  the	  more	  abstracted	  level	  of	  the	  Functional	  Groupings	  used	  in	  Section	  4.2	  to	  the	  more	  detailed	  level	  of	  the	  Contributing	  Factors.	  	  A	  major	  motivation	  behind	  this	  eventual	  goal	  is	  that	  many	  human	  performance	  research	  studies	  operate	  at	  the	  more	  detailed	  level,	  examining	  influences	  of	  the	  more	  specific	  variables	  on	  each	  other	  and	  on	  performance.	  	  This	  section	  therefore	  describes	  an	  approach	  for	  modeling	  the	  Contributing	  Factors	  as	  statistical	  variables.	  	  It	  also	  provides	  an	  approach	  for	  using	  existing	  design	  requirements,	  standards	  and	  human	  performance	  data	  in	  the	  quantification	  of	  the	  factor	  influences.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  work	  has	  been	  done	  in	  the	  area	  of	  object-­‐oriented	  Bayesian	  Networks	  (OOBNs)	  [88,	  89].	  	  Frameworks	  and	  implementations	  of	  networks	  have	  been	  developed	  that	  allow	  for	  various	  levels	  of	  abstraction	  to	  be	  modeled,	  such	  as	  the	  levels	  in	  the	  hierarchy	  shown	  in	  the	  Contributing	  Factor	  Map	  (CFM)	  of	  Figure	  10.	  	  OOBNs	  can	  be	  used	  to	  support	  more	  efficient	  and	  rich	  modeling	  achieved	  by	  allowing	  subclasses	  of	  model	  elements,	  such	  as	  the	  Contributing	  Factors,	  to	  relate	  to	  properties	  of	  more	  abstract	  elements,	  such	  as	  the	  Functional	  Groupings.	  	  This	  capability	  would	  allow	  the	  connection	  to	  be	  made	  between	  a	  more	  abstract	  model,	  such	  as	  the	  example	  in	  Figure	  18	  quantified	  by	  expert	  opinion,	  and	  detailed	  quantification	  as	  described	  in	  this	  section.	  Let	  us	  begin	  the	  discussion	  of	  network	  quantification	  in	  the	  spaceflight	  domain	  with	  a	  simplified	  BN	  example	  relevant	  to	  conditions	  in	  a	  space	  vehicle,	  shown	  in	  Figure	  19.	  The	  two	  variables	  modeled	  are	  shown	  as	  the	  Acceleration/Gravity	  Level	  and	  Visual	  Perception	  Function	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nodes.	  	  The	  link	  is	  the	  arrow	  showing	  the	  direction	  of	  influence	  from	  the	  Acceleration/Gravity	  Level	  parent	  to	  the	  Visual	  Perception	  Function	  child.	  	  A	  root	  node	  is	  that	  which	  has	  no	  parent	  [21]	  ,which	  in	  this	  example	  is	  the	  Acceleration/Gravity	  Level	  node.	  In	  order	  to	  quantify	  the	  relationships	  indicated	  by	  the	  links,	  BNs	  make	  use	  of	  Conditional	  Probability	  Tables	  (CPTs).	  	  The	  state	  of	  a	  node	  is	  conditional	  upon	  the	  states	  of	  its	  parent	  nodes.	  	  If	  the	  node	  is	  a	  root	  node,	  the	  table	  is	  the	  unconditional	  probability	  distribution	  of	  that	  node	  [90].	  	  In	  the	  simple	  example	  shown	  in	  Figure	  19,	  each	  node	  can	  have	  a	  state	  of	  OK,	  or	  Not	  OK.	  	  The	  root	  node	  Acceleration/Gravity	  Level	  has	  the	  given	  probability	  distribution,	  and	  the	  node	  Visual	  Perception	  Function	  has	  a	  distribution	  that	  depends	  on	  the	  state	  of	  the	  Acceleration/Gravity	  Level	  node.	  	  Local	  relationships	  such	  as	  the	  one	  shown	  in	  Figure	  19	  can	  be	  combined	  into	  a	  global	  BN	  model	  of	  a	  spacecraft	  system	  using	  factors	  such	  as	  those	  shown	  on	  the	  Contributing	  Factor	  Map	  (CFM)	  in	  Figure	  10.	  	  In	  such	  a	  global	  model,	  the	  child	  nodes	  of	  the	  greatest	  interest	  are	  health	  factors	  shown	  near	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  CFM,	  and	  the	  performance	  of	  tasks	  represented	  by	  the	  four	  cognitive	  functions	  from	  the	  Cognitive	  Reliability	  and	  Error	  Analysis	  Method	  (CREAM)	  [2],	  just	  below	  the	  horizontal	  line	  on	  the	  CFM.	  	  When	  the	  CPTs	  of	  all	  nodes	  in	  the	  network	  are	  defined,	  the	  outcome	  marginal	  probabilities	  for	  the	  child	  nodes	  of	  interest	  can	  be	  calculated	  using	  conditional	  probability	  laws	  and	  algorithms	  developed	  over	  decades	  [58,	  91,	  92].	  The	  BN	  approach	  to	  understanding	  the	  influences	  of	  factors	  on	  crew	  health	  and	  performance	  has	  shaped	  the	  thinking	  for	  gathering	  information	  about	  the	  factors.	  	  The	  relation	  of	  this	  approach	  to	  how	  it	  may	  be	  used	  for	  requirements	  development	  applications	  is	  discussed	  next.	  	  	  	  












Figure	  19:	  Representative	  Nodes	  and	  their	  CPTs	  in	  a	  Bayesian	  Network	  
	  
4.3.1 REQUIREMENT-­	  AND	  DATA-­INFORMED	  FACTOR	  MODELING	  	   Figure	  19	  shows	  the	  most	  basic	  probability	  information	  required	  to	  quantify	  the	  relationships	  between	  BN	  nodes,	  captured	  in	  CPTs.	  	  In	  determining	  the	  values	  for	  probabilities	  such	  as	  x,	  y	  and	  z,	  there	  is	  additional	  information	  we	  would	  like	  to	  gather	  in	  order	  to	  characterize	  each	  node	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  nodes.	  	  We	  describe	  this	  additional	  information	  in	  Section	  4.3.1,	  with	  an	  example	  following	  in	  Section	  4.3.2.	  	  
4.3.1.1 Parent	  Factor	  Characterization	  	   The	  parent	  factor	  characterization	  information	  allows	  ties	  to	  be	  made	  between	  the	  description	  of	  the	  factor	  as	  a	  variable	  and	  existing	  requirements	  or	  standards.	  
Metric	  The	  metric	  is	  how	  the	  “goodness”	  of	  the	  state	  of	  the	  factor	  may	  be	  measured	  [93].	  	  A	  simple	  example	  is	  for	  the	  factor	  Acceleration/Gravity	  Level,	  the	  metric	  Acceleration,	  in	  terms	  of	  g’s,	  may	  be	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used.	  	  If	  a	  relevant	  requirement	  exists,	  the	  metric	  used	  for	  verification	  is	  likely	  an	  appropriate	  metric	  to	  use	  for	  this	  information.	  
Possible	  States	  The	  definition	  of	  possible	  states	  for	  a	  factor	  supports	  its	  use	  as	  a	  statistical	  variable	  in	  the	  Bayesian	  Network.	  	  Often	  the	  states	  are	  modeled	  as	  discrete,	  not	  continuous,	  variables	  for	  simplification	  of	  calculations	  [71].	  	  The	  simplest	  set	  of	  states	  is	  a	  discrete	  binary	  set	  such	  as	  “OK”	  and	  “Not	  OK”.	  
Observables	  Observables	  are	  a	  separate	  piece	  of	  information	  from	  the	  factor’s	  metric,	  although	  in	  many	  cases	  the	  observable	  and	  metric	  may	  be	  the	  same.	  	  Observables	  may	  be	  necessary	  to	  identify	  in	  cases	  when	  the	  metric	  is	  not	  directly	  measurable	  itself,	  but	  observable	  quantities	  must	  be	  used	  as	  proxies,	  instead.	  	  An	  example	  is	  for	  the	  Bone	  Strength	  factor,	  for	  which	  there	  is	  no	  direct	  measurement.	  	  Bone	  strength	  indices	  exist,	  using	  dual	  energy	  X-­‐ray	  absorptiometry	  (DXA)	  and	  quantitative	  computed	  tomographic	  (QCT)	  measurements	  of	  bone	  density	  and	  geometry,	  for	  example	  [8].	  	  A	  mapping	  from	  the	  observable	  to	  the	  metric	  should	  ideally	  be	  captured	  here,	  as	  well.	  
Threshold	  for	  Acceptable	  States	  The	  threshold	  for	  acceptable	  states	  is	  the	  level	  on	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  metric	  at	  which	  the	  factor’s	  state	  is	  no	  longer	  adequate	  for	  the	  desired	  performance.	  	  This	  threshold	  should	  ideally	  be	  
determined	  by	  a	  standard	  or	  requirement	  if	  an	  appropriate	  one	  exists.	  	  An	  example	  using	  the	  Acceleration/Gravity	  Level	  factor	  is	  to	  define	  a	  threshold	  for	  acceptable	  g-­‐levels	  during	  launch.	  
References	  for	  Threshold	  Definition	  This	  information	  field	  is	  where	  the	  documents	  or	  sources	  used	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  threshold	  for	  acceptable	  state	  are	  captured.	  	  The	  existing	  standard,	  requirement,	  data	  or	  expert	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sources	  should	  be	  logged	  for	  future	  reference	  and	  analysis,	  along	  with	  its	  corresponding	  level	  of	  evidence.	  	  A	  possible	  scale	  for	  the	  level	  of	  evidence,	  similar	  to	  a	  scale	  from	  NASA’s	  Human	  Research	  Program	  Evidence	  Book	  [26],	  is:	  
• Category	  I	  data	  are	  based	  on	  flight	  or	  mission	  data	  from	  the	  same	  vehicle,	  set	  of	  vehicles	  or	  environment.	  
• Category	  II	  data	  are	  based	  on	  flight	  or	  mission	  data	  from	  a	  similar	  vehicle,	  set	  of	  vehicles	  or	  environment.	  
• Category	  III	  data	  are	  based	  on	  ground	  analog	  or	  simulation	  studies.	  
• Category	  IV	  data	  are	  based	  on	  expert	  reports	  or	  opinions	  of	  respected	  authorities	  that	  are	  based	  on	  clinical	  experiences,	  bench	  research,	  or	  ‘first	  principles’.	  
Probability	  of	  State	  Occurrence	  The	  probability	  of	  a	  factor	  being	  in	  any	  of	  its	  possible	  states	  is	  captured	  here.	  	  These	  are	  the	  probability	  values	  as	  shown	  in	  a	  factor’s	  CPT,	  such	  as	  x	  and	  (1-­x)	  in	  Figure	  19.	  	  Ideally	  this	  type	  of	  probability	  distribution	  information	  would	  come	  from	  data,	  but	  expert	  opinion	  is	  often	  used	  as	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  an	  initial	  distribution.	  
References	  for	  State	  Probabilities	  This	  information	  field	  is	  where	  the	  documents	  or	  sources	  used	  in	  the	  estimation	  of	  the	  probabilities	  of	  occurrences	  of	  the	  factor’s	  various	  states	  are	  captured.	  	  The	  existing	  standard,	  requirement,	  data	  or	  expert	  sources	  should	  be	  logged	  for	  future	  reference	  and	  analysis,	  along	  with	  their	  level	  of	  evidence.	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Mission	  Phase	  This	  piece	  of	  information	  addresses	  during	  which	  mission	  phase(s)	  the	  factor	  and	  its	  probability	  distribution	  are	  applicable.	  	  Different	  distributions	  may	  be	  required	  for	  different	  mission	  phases.	  
Mission	  Category	  This	  piece	  of	  information	  addresses	  during	  which	  types	  of	  missions	  the	  factor	  and	  its	  probability	  distribution	  are	  applicable.	  	  Examples	  of	  mission	  categories	  are	  a	  lunar	  sortie	  or	  a	  round-­‐trip	  mission	  to	  Mars.	  	  Different	  distributions	  may	  be	  required	  for	  different	  mission	  categories.	  	  
4.3.1.2 Relationship	  Characterization	  	   Just	  as	  for	  the	  nodes,	  there	  is	  information	  we	  would	  like	  to	  capture	  characterizing	  the	  relationships	  themselves.	  	  This	  information	  aids	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  network	  by	  supporting	  the	  existence	  of	  links	  between	  nodes	  and	  the	  strength	  of	  those	  links.	  
References	  for	  Relationship	  Existence	  This	  field	  provides	  a	  way	  to	  capture	  the	  type	  and	  level	  of	  evidence	  supporting	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  relationship.	  	  Similar	  to	  the	  reference	  information	  fields	  for	  the	  parent	  node,	  this	  should	  capture	  the	  existing	  standard,	  requirement,	  data	  or	  expert	  sources	  supporting	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  relationship,	  along	  with	  their	  level	  of	  evidence.	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Strength	  of	  Relationship	  Not	  only	  is	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  relationship	  between	  two	  factors	  important,	  but	  the	  strength	  of	  that	  relationship	  must	  be	  understood,	  as	  well.	  	  In	  the	  Bayesian	  Network	  model,	  this	  information	  is	  translated	  into	  the	  conditional	  probabilities	  for	  the	  child	  node,	  such	  as	  y	  and	  z	  shown	  in	  Figure	  19.	  	  An	  initial	  set	  of	  qualitative	  value	  options	  may	  be	  as	  simple	  as	  High,	  Medium	  and	  Low.	  
References	  for	  Relationship	  Strength	  This	  piece	  of	  information	  captures	  the	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  relationship.	  	  Again,	  similar	  to	  the	  reference	  information	  fields	  for	  the	  parent	  node,	  this	  should	  capture	  the	  existing	  standard,	  requirement,	  data	  or	  expert	  sources	  supporting	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  strength	  of	  a	  relationship,	  along	  with	  their	  level	  of	  evidence.	  	  
4.3.1.3 Child	  Factor	  Characterization	  	   The	  characterization	  information	  for	  a	  child	  node	  is	  largely	  the	  same	  as	  for	  a	  parent	  node.	  	  The	  difference	  lies	  in	  capturing	  the	  probability	  distributions.	  
Probability	  of	  State	  Occurrence	  The	  probability	  of	  a	  factor	  being	  in	  any	  of	  its	  possible	  states	  is	  captured	  here,	  just	  as	  for	  the	  parent	  factors.	  	  With	  a	  child	  node,	  however,	  the	  conditional	  probabilities	  given	  the	  state	  of	  the	  parent	  node(s)	  are	  defined	  in	  order	  for	  marginal	  probabilities	  to	  be	  calculated	  and	  captured	  here.	  	  This	  is	  discussed	  further	  in	  the	  example	  in	  Section	  4.3.2.	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4.3.2 EXAMPLE	  FACTOR	  MODELS	  	  
4.3.2.1 Acceleration/Gravity	  Level	  Parent	  Factor	  Characterization	  	   The	  Parent	  Factor	  Characterization	  information	  is	  shown	  in	  Table	  7	  with	  illustrative	  content	  for	  the	  Acceleration/Gravity	  Level	  node.	  	  
Factor	  Characterization	  
Information	  
Example	  Values	  Metric	   Acceleration	  (g’s)	  Possible	  States	   OK;	  Not	  OK	  Observables	   Acceleration	  (g’s)	  Acceptable	  States	   OK	  Threshold	  for	  Acceptable	  States	   Acceleration	  <	  Requirement	  6.5.1,	  Fig.	  4,	  +Gz	  Sustained	  Translational	  Acceleration	  Limits,	  Limit	  for	  Launch	  to	  Mission	  Destination	  [47]	  References	  for	  Threshold	  Definition	   NASA-­‐STD-­‐3001,	  Vol.	  2	  [47]	  –	  Category	  II	  Probability	  of	  State	  Occurrence	   Not	  OK	  =	  x;	  OK	  =	  (1-­x)	  References	  for	  State	  Probabilities	   Example	  historical	  data	  set	  based	  on	  similar	  vehicle	  –	  Category	  II	  Mission	  Phase	   Launch	  Mission	  Category	   Lunar	  Sortie	  	  
Table	  7:	  Acceleration/Gravity	  Level	  Factor	  Characterization	  Information	  	  Some	  of	  the	  characterization	  information	  can	  be	  shown	  on	  a	  probability	  distribution	  graph,	  as	  in	  Figure	  20.	  	  The	  horizontal	  axis	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  metric,	  Acceleration,	  with	  the	  corresponding	  unit	  of	  g’s.	   	  The	  vertical	  axis	   is	  defined	  by	  probability	  values	  between	  zero	  and	  one.	   	  The	  dashed	  vertical	  line	  represents	  the	  threshold	  for	  acceptable	  levels	  of	  acceleration,	  in	  this	  case	  defined	  by	  the	  dashed	  blue	   middle	   line	   in	   Figure	   21.	   	   The	   probability	   of	   having	   acceleration	   levels	   greater	   than	   the	  threshold	  is	  shown	  illustratively	  by	  the	  variable	  x	  in	  Figure	  20,	  along	  with	  its	  corresponding	  state	  of	  Not	  OK.	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Figure	  20:	  Example	  Parent	  Factor	  Characterization	  Information	  	   	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
	   	  	  	  	  






 	   103	  
4.3.2.2 Relationship	  Characterization	  	   Example	  inputs	  for	  relationship	  characterization	  information	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  8.	  	  
Factor	  Characterization	  
Information	  
Example	  Values	  References	  for	  Relationship	  Existence	   Balldin,	  2002	  [94]	  –	  Category	  III	  Strength	  of	  Relationship	   High	  References	  for	  Relationship	  Strength	   Fig.	  33-­‐6	  in	  Balldin,	  2002	  [94]	  –	  Category	  III;	  Fig.	  17	  in	  Ch.	  1	  of	  Huntoon	  et	  al.,	  2004	  [51]	  Fig.	  7	  in	  Stoll,	  1956	  [95]	  –	  Category	  III	  	  
Table	  8:	  Relationship	  Characterization	  Information	  	  
4.3.2.3 Visual	  Perception	  Function	  Child	  Factor	  Characterization	  	   The	  Child	  Factor	  Characterization	  information	  is	  shown	  in	  Table	  9	  with	  example	  content	  for	  the	  Visual	  Perception	  Function	  node.	  	  The	  marginal	  probability	  distribution,	  in	  this	  example	  the	  quantities	  v	  and	  (1-­v),	  is	  listed	  in	  Table	  9	  and	  discussed	  next.	  	  
	  
	  Table	  9:	  Visual	  Perception	  Child	  Factor	  Characterization	  Information	  	  
Factor	  Characterization	  
Information	  
Example	  Values	  Metric	   Presence	  of	  visual	  symptoms	  Possible	  States	   OK	  =	  no	  symptoms	  present;	  Not	  OK	  =	  visual	  symptoms	  or	  unconsciousness	  present	  Observables	   Presence	  of	  visual	  symptoms	  Acceptable	  States	   OK	  Threshold	  for	  Acceptable	  States	   No	  visual	  symptoms	  References	  for	  Threshold	  Definition	   None	  identified	  as	  of	  yet,	  therefore	  base	  initial	  threshold	  determination	  on	  expert	  opinion.	  –	  Category	  IV	  Probability	  of	  State	  Occurrence	   Not	  OK	  =	  v;	  OK	  =	  (1-­v)	  References	  for	  State	  Probabilities	   Calculations	  using	  conditional	  probabilities	  obtained	  by	  expert	  opinion	  –	  Category	  IV	  Mission	  Phase	   Launch	  Mission	  Category	  	   Lunar	  Sortie	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In	  order	  to	  calculate	  the	  marginal	  probability	  distribution,	  we	  use	  the	  data	  from	  the	  CPTs	  of	  both	   the	   child	   and	   parent	   nodes.	   	   Let	   us	   define	   variables	   for	   the	   terms	   in	   the	   CPT	   where	   V	  represents	  the	  Visual	  Perception	  Function	  node	  being	  in	  the	  OK	  state,	  and	  V’	  represents	  it	  being	  in	  the	  Not	  OK	  state.	  	  Similarly,	  let	  A	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  Acceleration/Gravity	  Level	  being	  in	  the	  OK	  state,	  and	  A'	  as	  it	  being	  in	  the	  Not	  OK	  state.	  	  Then	  the	  marginal	  probability	  v	  is	  given	  by	  
	  
€ 
v = P ʹ′ V ( ) = P ʹ′ V | A( ) × P A( ) + P ʹ′ V | ʹ′ A ( ) × P ʹ′ A ( ) .	   (7)	  
Substituting	  variables	  from	  the	  CPTs	  in	  Figure	  19,	  we	  have	  
	  
€ 
v = P ʹ′ V ( ) = y( ) × 1 − x( ) + z( ) × x( ) .	   (8)	  
Similarly,	  the	  marginal	  probability	  (1-­v)	  is	  given	  by	  
	  
€ 
1 − v = P V( ) = P V | A( ) × P A( ) + P V | ʹ′ A ( ) × P ʹ′ A ( ) .	   (9)	  
Again	  substituting	  variables	  from	  the	  CPTs	  in	  Figure	  19,	  we	  have	  
	  
€ 
1 − v = P V( ) = 1 − y( ) × 1 − x( ) + 1 − z( ) × x( ) .	   (10)	  
The	   results	   of	   these	   marginal	   probability	   calculations	   can	   also	   be	   shown	   on	   a	   probability	  distribution	  graph,	  as	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  22.	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Figure	  22:	  Example	  Child	  Factor	  Characterization	  Information.	  	  
4.3.3 ANALYSES	  ENABLED	  	  
4.3.3.1 Requirement	  and	  Knowledge	  Gap	  Identification	  	   When	  the	  Contributing	  Factor	  Map	  (CFM)	  is	  used	  as	  the	  global	  framework	  allowing	  integration	  of	  the	  information	  described	  in	  Section	  4.3.1,	  gaps	  can	  be	  identified	  for	  factors	  that	  are	  thought	  to	  be	  relevant,	  but	  do	  not	  have	  associated	  requirements	  or	  standards.	  	  Even	  before	  a	  BN	  model	  is	  built	  to	  calculate	  probabilistic	  predictions	  quantitatively,	  a	  searchable	  model	  or	  database	  containing	  the	  information	  from	  Section	  4.3.1	  allows	  such	  gap	  identification.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  particular	  factor	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  important	  for	  consideration	  in	  the	  vehicle	  design,	  but	  there	  are	  no	  associated	  standards,	  requirements	  or	  design	  documents	  capturing	  its	  necessary	  state	  and	  metric	  thresholds,	  this	  approach	  allows	  that	  fact	  to	  be	  identified.	  	  Consequently,	  a	  new	  requirement	  may	  need	  to	  be	  added	  to	  the	  current	  baseline	  set.	  	  Identifying	  such	  gaps	  across	  different	  mission	  types	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and	  mission	  phases	  may	  also	  illuminate	  areas	  in	  which	  additional	  understanding	  should	  be	  captured	  in	  requirements	  or	  standards.	  Similarly,	  factors	  in	  a	  model	  or	  database	  that	  do	  not	  have	  evidence	  or	  that	  have	  high	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  evidence	  supporting	  their	  probability	  distributions	  can	  support	  the	  identification	  of	  gaps	  in	  knowledge	  regarding	  those	  factors.	  	  In	  addition,	  relationships	  and	  their	  strengths	  that	  do	  not	  have	  high	  certainty	  references	  identified	  may	  also	  indicate	  knowledge	  gaps.	  	  These	  types	  of	  gaps	  may	  indicate	  the	  need	  for	  future	  research	  in	  factor	  and/or	  relationship	  characterization.	  	  	  
4.3.3.2 Commonality	  Assessment	  	   	  Capturing	  the	  information	  described	  in	  Section	  4.3.1	  also	  supports	  the	  assessment	  of	  standards	  and	  requirements	  across	  various	  organizations.	  	  Using	  the	  CFM	  as	  an	  organizational	  scheme	  provides	  a	  framework,	  or	  a	  set	  of	  structured	  bins,	  for	  relating	  requirements	  or	  standards	  on	  the	  same	  or	  similar	  factors	  from	  different	  organizations.	  	  Thus,	  references	  from	  various	  organizations	  supporting	  a	  factor’s	  threshold	  values	  and	  probabilities	  of	  state	  occurrences,	  for	  example,	  can	  be	  compared	  and	  evaluated	  to	  assess	  their	  commonality	  and	  understand	  any	  differences	  in	  values.	  	  
4.3.3.3 Relevancy	  and	  Impact	  Assessments	  	   	  Again,	  even	  before	  a	  BN	  is	  created	  based	  on	  the	  data	  in	  Section	  4.3.1,	  simple	  relevancy	  and	  impact	  assessments	  can	  be	  made	  based	  on	  information	  in	  a	  searchable	  model	  or	  database.	  	  For	  example,	  with	  relationships	  identified	  explicitly	  in	  the	  database,	  all	  of	  the	  immediate	  parents	  and	  children	  for	  any	  particular	  factor	  can	  be	  identified.	  	  With	  relationship	  strength	  information	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captured,	  we	  can	  assess,	  for	  example,	  which	  parents	  are	  believed	  to	  have	  the	  strongest	  influences	  on	  a	  particular	  child	  node.	  	  This	  may	  guide	  decisions	  for	  which	  design	  “knobs”	  may	  be	  the	  most	  effective	  to	  put	  effort	  into	  “turning”.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  requirements	  related	  to	  a	  specific	  factor	  may	  be	  selected	  for	  adjustment	  when	  the	  factor’s	  impact	  on	  crewmember	  health	  or	  performance	  is	  more	  clearly	  understood	  to	  be	  high	  with	  the	  help	  of	  the	  relationship	  characterization.	  Once	  child	  factor	  probabilities	  are	  calculated,	  they	  can	  be	  evaluated	  in	  terms	  of	  whether	  the	  values	  are	  in	  acceptable	  ranges	  or	  not.	  	  If	  the	  probabilities	  for	  the	  child	  factor	  states	  are	  not	  as	  desired,	  this	  may	  motivate	  requirement	  or	  design	  changes.	  	  As	  an	  example	  from	  our	  simple	  case,	  if	  the	  probability	  that	  visual	  symptoms	  exist	  is	  viewed	  as	  too	  high,	  acceleration	  requirements	  and	  design	  profiles	  meeting	  those	  requirements	  may	  be	  adjusted	  for	  the	  vehicle.	  	  Additionally,	  when	  an	  entire	  Bayesian	  Network	  is	  developed,	  sensitivity	  analyses	  can	  be	  performed	  that	  would	  provide	  more	  global	  understanding	  of	  the	  impacts	  of	  various	  factors	  on	  health	  and	  performance	  outcomes	  of	  interest.	  	  This	  would	  further	  support	  identification	  of	  design	  “knobs”	  to	  adjust	  in	  trades	  throughout	  the	  design	  process.	  	  
4.3.4 CONCLUSIONS	  FOR	  REQUIREMENT-­	  AND	  DATA-­INFORMED	  BN	  QUANTIFICATION	  	   The	  Contributing	  Factor	  Map	  (CFM)	  has	  been	  developed	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Safety	  and	  Mission	  Assurance	  domain	  application	  of	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis,	  but	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  support	  requirements	  development	  activities	  during	  the	  design	  process,	  as	  well.	  	  The	  CFM	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  roadmap	  for	  requirement	  gap	  identification	  given	  its	  breadth	  and	  depth	  of	  coverage.	  	  If	  additional	  information	  as	  described	  in	  this	  section	  is	  used	  to	  characterize	  the	  factors	  on	  the	  CFM,	  insight	  may	  be	  gained	  to	  support	  analysis	  of	  similar	  requirements	  from	  different	  organizations	  and	  to	  enable	  requirement	  validity	  and	  impact	  assessments.	  	  Because	  the	  CFM	  addresses	  factors	  influencing	  the	  health	  and	  performance	  of	  crewmembers,	  its	  use	  can	  allow	  improved	  incorporation	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of	  these	  design	  variables	  into	  the	  trade	  space	  and	  provide	  additional	  structure	  to	  the	  efforts	  of	  spacecraft	  designers	  whose	  goal	  is	  to	  develop	  a	  safe	  and	  efficiently	  operated	  vehicle.	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  potential	  for	  requirements	  development	  support	  in	  the	  design	  phases	  of	  vehicle	  development,	  efforts	  towards	  quantification	  of	  the	  CFM	  can	  be	  used	  to	  aid	  in	  the	  identification	  of	  future	  research.	  	  Capturing	  the	  information	  described	  in	  this	  section	  would	  identify	  factors	  and	  relationships	  whose	  characterizations	  are	  not	  well	  understood.	  	  Factors	  with	  high	  impacts	  on	  other	  factors	  or	  performance,	  but	  with	  high	  uncertainty	  in	  their	  characterizations,	  may	  be	  targets	  for	  additional	  research.	  	  Similarly,	  if	  relationships	  are	  identified	  as	  strong	  but	  have	  high	  uncertainty	  in	  their	  supporting	  references,	  those	  relationships	  may	  require	  additional	  research	  for	  improved	  understanding.	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CHAPTER	  5	  
5. APPROACH	  FOR	  APPLICATION	  OF	  FACTORS	  IN	  HUMAN	  RELIABILITY	  ANALYSIS	  	  
5.1. DESCRIPTION	  OF	  EXAMPLE	  BAYESIAN	  NETWORK	  
	  
5.1.1. REVIEW	  OF	  BN	  STRUCTURE	  AND	  DEVELOPMENT	  	   	  Let	  us	  now	  recall	  the	  stages	  of	  Bayesian	  Network	  (BN)	  development	  and	  application	  as	  described	  by	  Sigurdsson,	  Walls	  and	  Quigley	  [71]	  and	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  4;	  Problem	  Structuring,	  Instantiation,	  and	  Inference.	  	  	  Chapter	  3	  discussed	  step	  1	  in	  the	  Problem	  Structuring	  phase,	  the	  identification	  of	  variables,	  captured	  in	  the	  Contributing	  Factor	  Map	  (CFM).	  	  Chapter	  4	  discussed	  step	  2	  and	  step	  3	  in	  stage	  1,	  identifying	  the	  network	  structure	  and	  expressing	  the	  factors	  as	  statistical	  variables.	  	  The	  second	  stage,	  Instantiation,	  defined	  by	  step	  4	  that	  is	  the	  quantification	  of	  the	  network	  with	  conditional	  probabilities,	  was	  also	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  4	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  options	  of	  using	  data	  or	  expert	  opinion.	  	  This	  chapter	  will	  describe	  an	  example	  quantification	  based	  on	  the	  author’s	  opinion,	  for	  illustrative	  purposes.	  	  This	  chapter	  then	  moves	  on	  to	  stage	  three,	  Inference.	  	  	  We	  will	  demonstrate	  how	  to	  incorporate	  observations	  of	  variable	  states	  from	  an	  example	  spaceflight	  scenario	  into	  the	  network,	  and	  show	  how	  outcome	  probabilities	  result.	  	  
5.1.2. QUANTIFICATION	  OF	  EXAMPLE	  BN	  	   	  The	  network	  used	  for	  our	  example	  is	  that	  described	  in	  Chapter	  4	  and	  shown	  in	  Figure	  18.	  	  We	  began	  the	  quantification	  activity	  by	  setting	  the	  absolute	  scale	  with	  the	  probabilities	  in	  the	  Conditional	  Probability	  Table	  (CPT)	  for	  the	  outcome	  node,	  Execution	  Task	  Success.	  	  The	  marginal	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probability	  for	  the	  False	  state	  of	  this	  node,	  calculated	  once	  the	  entire	  network	  is	  quantified,	  provides	  the	  quantity	  similar	  to	  the	  nominal	  Human	  Error	  Probability	  (HEP)	  provided	  by	  other	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis	  (HRA)	  methods.	  	  Many	  HRA	  methods	  use	  values	  such	  as	  1	  E-­‐03	  for	  a	  nominal	  task	  execution	  HEP	  [6],	  and	  we	  used	  this	  value	  for	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  Execution	  Task	  Success	  node	  being	  False	  for	  all	  CPT	  entries	  in	  which	  1	  out	  of	  5	  of	  the	  parent	  nodes	  are	  Not	  OK.	  	  We	  then	  used	  an	  order-­‐of-­‐magnitude	  adjustment	  for	  three	  of	  the	  other	  categories	  of	  CPT	  entries,	  just	  as	  Groth	  and	  Mosleh	  did	  in	  [75],	  for	  similar	  illustrative	  purposes.	  	  The	  Groth	  and	  Mosleh	  example	  has	  a	  maximum	  error	  probability	  of	  1	  when	  4	  parent	  error	  conditions	  are	  present,	  however,	  our	  model	  has	  5	  parents.	  	  	  We	  therefore	  used	  the	  probability	  complement	  of	  the	  CPT	  entries	  with	  1	  parent	  Not	  OK	  condition	  for	  CPT	  entries	  with	  4	  parent	  Not	  OK	  conditions.	  	  We	  used	  the	  same	  complement	  approach	  for	  the	  CPT	  entries	  with	  5	  parent	  Not	  OK	  conditions.	  	  The	  resulting	  values	  chosen	  for	  the	  Execution	  Task	  Success	  example	  CPT	  are	  summarized	  in	  Table	  10.	  	   	   Execution	  Task	  Success	  
#	  NOT	  OK	  Parents	   TRUE	   FALSE	  0	   0.9999	   1	  E-­‐04	  1	   0.999	   1	  E-­‐03	  2	   0.99	   1	  E-­‐02	  3	   0.9	   1	  E-­‐01	  4	   1	  E-­‐03	   .999	  5	   1	  E-­‐04	   .9999	  	  
Table	  10:	  Execution	  Task	  Success	  Conditional	  Probability	  Table	  Values	  	   	  We	  continued	  the	  network	  quantification	  activity	  by	  populating	  the	  CPTs	  for	  the	  factor	  nodes.	  	  These	  quantifications	  are	  of	  a	  relative	  nature,	  covering	  the	  probabilities	  from	  0%	  to	  100%	  in	  order	  to	  span	  the	  entire	  range	  of	  possibilities	  of	  the	  parent	  influences	  on	  the	  child	  node.	  	  We	  used	  the	  scale	  developed	  by	  Renooij	  and	  Witteman	  [96]	  due	  to	  its	  common	  adoption	  in	  the	  field	  of	  Bayesian	  Network	  probability	  elicitation,	  its	  roots	  in	  multiple	  experiments,	  and	  its	  verbal	  and	  numerical	  presentation.	  	  	  The	  scale	  relates	  the	  following	  probabilities	  to	  verbal	  expressions:	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Prob.	  (%)	   0	   15	   25	   50	   75	   85	   100	  
Expression	   Impossible	   Improbable	   Uncertain	   Fifty-­‐fifty	   Expected	   Probable	   Certain	  	  
Table	  11:	  Probability	  Scale	  From	  [96]	  	  An	  example	  Conditional	  Probability	  Table	  (CPT)	  for	  the	  Cognitive	  Adaptations	  node	  is	  shown	  in	  Table	  12.	  	  The	  full	  set	  of	  CPTs	  quantified	  based	  on	  the	  author’s	  judgment	  for	  this	  illustrative	  example	  network	  is	  given	  in	  the	  Appendix.	  	  	   	   	   	   Cognitive	  Adaptations	  
Time	  Context	   Task	  Familiarity	   Work	  Load	   OK	   NOT	  OK	  OK	   OK	   OK	   0.99	   0.01	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.85	   0.15	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.85	   0.15	  Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   0.85	   0.15	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.75	   0.25	  Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.75	   0.25	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.75	   0.25	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.5	   0.5	  	  
Table	  12:	  Example	  Conditional	  Probability	  Table	  for	  Cognitive	  Adaptations	  	  
5.1.3. RESULTING	  EXAMPLE	  BN	  	   	  Once	  the	  Conditional	  Probability	  Tables	  for	  each	  node	  in	  the	  network	  are	  populated,	  the	  initial	  marginal	  probabilities	  for	  each	  node	  can	  then	  be	  calculated,	  a	  task	  much	  simplified	  by	  the	  limited	  structure	  of	  the	  network.	  	  The	  software	  program	  NeticaTM	  [97]	  was	  used	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  network	  shown	  in	  Figure	  23.	  	  The	  nodes	  were	  created	  and	  the	  quantities	  for	  their	  CPTs	  were	  entered	  into	  the	  program.	  	  The	  values	  are	  calculated	  by	  applying	  
€ 
P x( ) = P(xi | xπ i )
i
∏ ,	   	   	   	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  (11)	  
where	  P(xi|	  xπi)	  is	  the	  local	  conditional	  probability	  for	  node	  i	  given	  the	  probabilities	  from	  its	  parents	  indicated	  by	  the	  subscript	  πi	  [91].	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Figure	  23:	  Example	  Quantified	  Bayesian	  Network.	  Output	  provided	  by	  NETICA	  [97].	  	  	   A	  key	  point	  to	  recognize	  is	  that	  this	  network	  represents	  prior	  information	  in	  the	  Bayesian	  sense	  [75].	  	  It	  models	  what	  is	  known	  about	  the	  relationships	  between	  factors	  and	  the	  outcome	  task	  without	  observations	  of	  particular	  node	  states	  for	  any	  given	  specific	  example.	  	  Once	  an	  analyst	  has	  information	  regarding	  the	  states	  of	  particular	  nodes	  within	  a	  scenario,	  this	  information	  is	  entered	  into	  the	  network,	  and	  the	  probabilities	  throughout	  the	  network	  are	  updated	  through	  Bayesian	  inference.	  	  An	  illustrative	  example	  of	  this	  process	  is	  described	  in	  the	  upcoming	  sections.	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5.2. ENTERING	  SCENARIO	  EVIDENCE	  	   	  We	  now	  progress	  to	  the	  third	  and	  final	  stage	  of	  those	  described	  by	  Sigurdsson,	  Walls	  and	  Quigley	  [71]	  ,	  Inference.	  	  Within	  stage	  3,	  step	  5	  of	  the	  overall	  process	  is	  entering	  evidence	  in	  the	  network	  for	  the	  scenario	  of	  interest.	  	  Recall	  the	  scenario	  used	  as	  context	  for	  the	  analysis	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  	  The	  scenario	  takes	  place	  during	  the	  return	  of	  a	  transfer	  vehicle	  from	  the	  International	  Space	  Station	  (ISS),	  and	  assumes	  vehicle	  configuration	  requiring	  crew	  actions	  during	  the	  landing	  phase.	  	  The	  specific	  task	  in	  mind	  was	  a	  crewmember	  pushing	  the	  appropriate	  button	  to	  release	  retractable	  landing	  gear	  in	  the	  “down”	  position,	  although	  any	  similar	  push	  button	  task	  may	  have	  been	  used	  in	  the	  case	  that	  the	  reference	  vehicle	  does	  not	  have	  landing	  gear	  (e.g.	  a	  capsule	  design).	  	  The	  total	  duration	  of	  the	  mission	  was	  assumed	  to	  be	  two	  weeks.	  	   One	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  advantages	  of	  using	  a	  Bayesian	  Network	  for	  factor	  evaluations	  in	  a	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis	  is	  that	  evaluations	  of	  factors	  that	  the	  analyst	  has	  information	  about	  can	  be	  entered	  in	  the	  network,	  but	  evaluations	  of	  factors	  that	  the	  analyst	  does	  not	  have	  insight	  into	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	  entered	  [76].	  	  The	  factors	  that	  are	  not	  observable	  by	  the	  analyst	  are	  left	  with	  their	  prior	  probability	  distributions	  given	  by	  the	  original	  network	  for	  the	  evidence	  setting	  stage	  [75].	  	  	  In	  this	  example,	  we	  enter	  the	  evidence	  shown	  in	  Table	  13.	  	  The	  evaluations	  for	  factors	  in	  the	  Operations	  Domain	  are	  similar	  to	  those	  given	  in	  [20]	  for	  a	  Mission	  Control	  scenario	  used	  in	  a	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis.	  	  The	  Vehicle	  Design	  Domain	  factor	  User	  Interfaces	  is	  also	  evaluated	  favorably,	  similar	  to	  what	  is	  shown	  in	  [20].	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Node	   State	  Evaluation	  Training	  Quality	   OK	  Organizational	  Support	   OK	  Time	  Context	   OK	  Task	  Familiarity	   OK	  Work	  Load	   OK	  User	  Interfaces	   OK	  	  
Table	  13:	  Evidence	  Entered	  in	  Example	  Bayesian	  Network	  for	  Scenario	  	  The	  remaining	  nodes	  do	  not	  have	  evidence	  set.	  	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  remaining	  nodes,	  such	  as	  Cognitive	  Adaptations	  and	  Psychological	  Conditions,	  are	  in	  the	  Human	  Domain.	  	  An	  analyst	  would	  likely	  have	  less	  insight	  into	  the	  state	  of	  the	  Human	  Domain	  variables;	  therefore,	  these	  are	  left	  with	  their	  prior	  distributions.	  	  The	  node	  Vehicle	  Physical	  Environment	  also	  does	  not	  have	  evidence	  set,	  to	  account	  for	  the	  unknown	  state	  of	  its	  Contributing	  Factors	  such	  as	  Acceleration/Gravity	  Level	  and	  Vibration	  Level	  during	  this	  landing	  phase	  of	  flight.	  	  The	  Task	  Planning	  &	  Scheduling	  and	  Mission	  Planning	  nodes	  are	  also	  left	  with	  their	  prior	  distributions	  to	  account	  for	  unknowns	  in	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  reentry	  and	  the	  accompanying	  preparatory	  tasks.	  To	  actually	  set	  the	  evidence	  for	  the	  nodes	  as	  given	  in	  Table	  13,	  the	  probabilities	  for	  the	  states	  evaluated	  are	  changed	  from	  their	  prior	  value	  to	  100%.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  Figure	  23,	  the	  node	  Time	  Context	  has	  a	  prior	  value	  of	  98.4%	  of	  being	  in	  the	  OK	  state.	  	  We	  now	  enter	  the	  evidence	  for	  this	  node	  by	  changing	  that	  value	  to	  100%,	  and	  the	  Not	  OK	  value	  correspondingly	  is	  changed	  to	  0%.	  Bayesian	  Networks	  also	  allow	  evidence	  to	  be	  entered	  in	  the	  form	  of	  updated	  distributions.	  	  This	  means	  that	  if	  an	  analyst	  has	  insight	  into	  a	  different	  distribution	  for	  a	  particular	  scenario,	  such	  as	  a	  60%	  chance	  of	  being	  in	  the	  OK	  state	  and	  40%	  chance	  for	  Not	  OK,	  that	  evidence	  can	  be	  entered	  in	  the	  same	  way	  [76].	  	  With	  the	  evidence	  for	  the	  appropriate	  nodes	  entered	  in	  the	  network,	  we	  are	  now	  ready	  to	  progress	  to	  the	  next	  step	  in	  the	  process,	  evidence	  propagation.	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5.3. PROPAGATING	  EVIDENCE	  IN	  THE	  NETWORK	  	   	  In	  the	  Inference	  stage,	  the	  overall	  step	  6	  as	  given	  by	  Sigurdsson,	  Walls	  and	  Quigley	  [71]	  is	  for	  propagating	  the	  evidence	  entered	  for	  the	  scenario	  throughout	  the	  network.	  	  For	  our	  purposes,	  the	  commercially	  available	  software	  NeticaTM	  by	  Norsys	  [97]	  performed	  this	  step	  automatically.	  This	  software	  makes	  use	  of	  an	  algorithm	  called	  the	  junction	  tree	  in	  order	  to	  calculate	  the	  updated	  probabilities	  based	  on	  the	  evidence	  entered	  in	  the	  network	  [91,	  92,	  98].	  	  Pearl	  pioneered	  the	  discussion	  of	  algorithms	  for	  belief	  updating	  by	  network	  propagation	  [58],	  and	  algorithms	  such	  as	  the	  junction	  tree	  followed	  [98].	  	  Additional	  techniques	  taking	  into	  account	  laws	  of	  large	  numbers	  have	  allowed	  approximate	  inference	  approaches	  to	  be	  developed,	  as	  well,	  such	  as	  Monte	  Carlo	  and	  variational	  algorithms	  [91].	  	  Therefore,	  if	  one	  wishes	  to	  explore	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  evidence	  propagation	  in	  various	  commercially	  available	  tools	  or	  to	  develop	  independent	  implementations,	  options	  such	  as	  these	  exist.	  	  
5.4. DISCUSSION	  OF	  THE	  RESULTS	  	   	  The	  last	  step	  in	  the	  process	  of	  developing	  and	  using	  a	  Bayesian	  Network	  is	  to	  interpret	  the	  results	  of	  the	  evidence	  propagation	  [71].	  	  The	  outcome	  node	  Execution	  Task	  Success	  has	  an	  updated	  failure	  probability	  of	  3.4	  E-­‐04	  in	  this	  example,	  as	  shown	  by	  the	  bottom	  node	  in	  Figure	  24.	  	  	  This	  is	  a	  reduction	  of	  approximately	  a	  factor	  of	  4	  below	  the	  original	  failure	  probability	  of	  1.4	  E-­‐03	  due	  to	  the	  positively	  evaluated	  factor	  evidence	  entered	  from	  the	  example	  scenario.	  	  This	  result	  is	  the	  same	  order	  of	  magnitude	  obtained	  for	  an	  Execution	  task	  example	  in	  the	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis	  shown	  by	  Hamlin	  [20].	  	  Clearly	  this	  comparison	  is	  not	  detailed	  enough	  for	  quantitative	  validation,	  however,	  it	  does	  provide	  an	  initial	  sanity	  check.	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Figure	  24:	  Example	  Bayesian	  Network	  with	  Output	  Based	  on	  Evidence	  Set.	  Output	  provided	  
by	  NETICA	  [97].	  	   It	  is	  also	  interesting	  to	  note	  the	  updated	  probability	  distributions	  for	  the	  other	  nodes	  in	  the	  network.	  	  The	  nodes	  in	  gray	  in	  Figure	  24	  have	  had	  their	  evidence	  set,	  and	  the	  remaining	  nodes	  have	  had	  their	  probabilities	  updated	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  evidence	  propagation.	  	  When	  the	  distributions	  of	  these	  factors	  are	  compared	  to	  the	  prior	  distributions	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  23,	  we	  notice	  that	  the	  values	  for	  the	  Not	  OK	  states	  have	  decreased	  for	  all	  of	  these	  factors,	  as	  well.	  	  This	  result	  is	  quite	  logical,	  as	  the	  evidence	  entered	  was	  indicative	  of	  a	  more	  supportive	  environment,	  and	  the	  updated	  distributions	  reflect	  those	  influences.	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5.5. INCORPORATING	  RESULTS	  IN	  HRA	  AND	  PRA	  	   	  Once	  the	  failure	  probability	  for	  a	  particular	  task,	  such	  as	  the	  Execution	  Task	  example,	  has	  been	  derived,	  the	  analysis	  is	  repeated	  for	  other	  tasks	  in	  the	  scenario.	  	  Dependencies	  between	  the	  tasks	  are	  evaluated,	  and	  the	  failure	  probability	  for	  the	  scenario	  is	  calculated	  based	  on	  the	  contributions	  from	  the	  multiple	  tasks	  involved	  [20].	  	  This	  overall	  Human	  Error	  Probability	  (HEP)	  can	  then	  be	  incorporated	  into	  the	  higher-­‐level	  system	  Probabilistic	  Risk	  Assessment,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2	  and	  represented	  by	  the	  Fault	  Tree	  diagram	  in	  Figure	  6.	  	  
5.6. CONCLUSIONS	  FOR	  THE	  BAYESIAN	  NETWORK	  APPLICATION	  EXAMPLE	  	   	  Major	  strengths	  of	  the	  Bayesian	  Network	  for	  use	  in	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis	  have	  been	  demonstrated	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  First,	  we	  have	  shown	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  network	  to	  explicitly	  model	  the	  influences	  of	  factors	  on	  one	  another	  and	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  tasks.	  	  The	  existence	  of	  these	  relationships	  is	  captured	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  network	  by	  the	  connections	  between	  nodes,	  and	  the	  strengths	  of	  these	  relationships	  are	  captured	  in	  the	  Conditional	  Probability	  Tables	  for	  each	  node	  in	  the	  network.	  	  We	  also	  have	  shown	  an	  advantage	  the	  network	  provides	  for	  entering	  evidence	  during	  the	  analysis	  of	  a	  scenario.	  	  This	  advantage	  allows	  an	  analyst	  to	  enter	  information	  for	  nodes	  in	  which	  they	  have	  insight,	  but	  does	  not	  require	  scenario-­‐specific	  inputs	  for	  nodes	  whose	  states	  are	  unknown.	  	  	  	  	  	  
 	   118	  
CHAPTER	  5	  RESULTING	  PRESENTATIONS	  AND/OR	  PUBLICATIONS	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CHAPTER	  6	  
6. CONCLUSIONS	  	  Each	  chapter	  will	  now	  be	  summarized,	  and	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  research	  related	  to	  their	  significance	  in	  the	  broader	  human	  spaceflight	  domain.	  	  
6.1 SUMMARY	  OF	  CHAPTERS	  	  Chapter	  1	  provided	  the	  rationale	  and	  motivation	  for	  the	  research.	  	  Crew	  performance	  is	  fundamental	  to	  the	  success	  of	  human	  spaceflight	  missions,	  and	  the	  factors	  that	  influence	  crewmember	  performance	  in	  space	  have	  not	  previously	  been	  identified	  in	  a	  comprehensive,	  structured	  manner,	  especially	  for	  use	  in	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis	  (HRA).	  	   Chapter	  2	  gave	  insight	  into	  the	  background	  and	  context	  for	  the	  research,	  from	  high-­‐level	  spacecraft	  design,	  next	  to	  the	  risk	  quantification	  portion	  of	  project	  and	  risk	  management	  processes,	  followed	  by	  an	  introduction	  to	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis.	  	  The	  chapter	  concluded	  with	  motivations	  for	  identifying	  factors	  specifically	  for	  the	  spaceflight	  environment,	  and	  a	  list	  of	  the	  research	  objectives.	  	  The	  next	  chapters	  in	  the	  dissertation	  addressed	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  research:	  1. Identify	  factors	  influencing	  the	  performance	  of	  crewmembers	  in	  spaceflight.	  2. Develop	  a	  framework	  to	  quantify	  Performance	  Shaping	  Factor	  influences	  on	  task	  performance	  for	  spaceflight	  applications.	  3. Develop	  an	  approach	  to	  apply	  new	  Performance	  Shaping	  Factors	  within	  a	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis	  method	  for	  spaceflight	  applications.	  	  Chapter	  3	  addressed	  objective	  1,	  the	  identification	  of	  factors	  influencing	  the	  performance	  of	  crewmembers	  in	  spaceflight.	  	  Prior	  to	  the	  list	  of	  factors	  given,	  the	  generalization/specialization	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hierarchy	  defined	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  a	  contribution	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  providing	  a	  reference	  for	  the	  classification	  of	  various	  influences.	  	  The	  hierarchy	  allows	  for	  the	  differentiation	  among	  various	  levels	  of	  abstraction	  when	  using	  the	  terminology	  developed,	  such	  as	  Functional	  Grouping	  and	  Contributing	  Factor.	  	  Next,	  the	  list	  of	  factors	  as	  defined	  within	  the	  hierarchy	  was	  presented,	  an	  important	  step	  in	  building	  a	  set	  of	  factors	  specifically	  developed	  to	  encompass	  influences	  on	  crew	  health	  and	  performance	  in	  the	  spaceflight	  environment,	  instead	  of	  nuclear	  power	  plant-­‐based	  factors	  as	  in	  existing	  HRA	  methods.	  	  This	  list	  supports	  the	  standardization	  of	  terminology	  for	  those	  discussing	  risks	  across	  spaceflight	  domain	  disciplines.	  	  Also	  presented	  in	  this	  chapter	  was	  the	  visual	  representation	  of	  the	  factors	  on	  the	  Contributing	  Factor	  Map	  (CFM).	  	  The	  CFM	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  communication	  tool.	  	  It	  can	  support	  researchers	  specializing	  in	  certain	  areas	  to	  see	  the	  broader	  context	  and	  gain	  insights	  into	  relationships	  with	  research	  in	  other	  areas.	  	  It	  may	  support	  the	  identification	  of	  potential	  synergistic	  efforts	  and	  collaboration	  with	  other	  disciplines	  or	  organizations.	  	  It	  can	  also	  aid	  in	  bridging	  gaps	  between	  detailed	  views	  of	  the	  factors	  and	  high-­‐level	  management	  views	  of	  the	  entire	  socio-­‐technical	  system.	  Chapter	  4	  addressed	  objective	  2,	  the	  development	  of	  a	  framework	  to	  quantify	  factor	  influences	  on	  task	  performance	  for	  spaceflight	  applications.	  	  Techniques	  within	  current	  HRA	  methods	  are	  mainly	  ones	  in	  which	  the	  relationships	  between	  factors	  are	  not	  explicitly	  quantified.	  Bayesian	  Networks	  were	  described	  as	  the	  approach	  investigated	  in	  this	  research	  due	  to	  their	  explicit	  modeling	  of	  relationships	  and	  their	  common	  use	  in	  modeling	  complex	  systems	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  uncertainty.	  	  Chapter	  4	  next	  addressed	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  develop	  the	  structure	  for	  a	  Bayesian	  Network	  in	  the	  spaceflight	  domain.	  	  The	  Human	  Factors	  Analysis	  and	  Classification	  System	  provided	  an	  initial	  guide	  to	  the	  network	  structure.	  	  The	  Analytic	  Hierarchy	  Process	  was	  then	  applied	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  dominant	  factors	  in	  our	  system	  to	  include	  in	  a	  simplified	  model.	  The	  process	  presented	  in	  the	  chapter	  provides	  a	  repeatable	  procedure	  that	  can	  be	  followed	  to	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develop	  structures	  for	  networks	  related	  to	  tasks	  other	  than	  the	  Execution	  Task	  example.	  	  The	  procedure	  provides	  a	  transparent	  way	  to	  start	  with	  a	  large	  list	  of	  factors,	  such	  as	  those	  on	  the	  CFM,	  and	  progress	  to	  a	  simplified	  model.	  	  The	  process	  provides	  visibility	  into	  why	  modeling	  decisions	  were	  made.	  	  In	  the	  future	  those	  decisions	  can	  be	  changed	  or	  accepted	  as	  desired,	  but	  using	  this	  technique,	  the	  rationale	  is	  available	  for	  examination.	  Chapter	  4	  continued	  with	  the	  discussion	  of	  Bayesian	  Network	  quantification	  informed	  by	  existing	  standards,	  requirements,	  and	  human	  performance	  data.	  	  It	  discussed	  how	  to	  use	  these	  existing	  resources	  to	  inform	  the	  model	  and	  clarify	  the	  definition	  of	  probabilities	  required	  for	  quantification.	  	  In	  the	  spaceflight	  domain,	  the	  contribution	  of	  how	  to	  utilize	  this	  type	  of	  local	  information	  is	  important	  because	  there	  does	  not	  currently	  exist	  a	  global	  data	  set	  for	  analysis	  of	  factor	  relationships	  and	  their	  influences	  on	  crew	  health	  and	  performance.	  	  This	  chapter	  continued	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  how,	  even	  before	  a	  Bayesian	  Network	  is	  built,	  capturing	  the	  factor	  and	  relationship	  characterization	  information	  as	  described	  enables	  many	  useful	  analyses,	  such	  as	  the	  determination	  of	  requirement	  gaps,	  requirements	  commonality	  assessments,	  and	  requirements	  relevancy	  and	  impact	  assessments.	  Chapter	  5	  then	  addressed	  objective	  3	  by	  demonstrating	  an	  example	  application	  of	  a	  Bayesian	  Network	  built	  on	  the	  factors	  developed	  in	  this	  research	  within	  a	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis	  in	  the	  spaceflight	  domain.	  	  An	  example	  quantified	  Bayesian	  Network	  was	  shown,	  and	  the	  process	  of	  setting	  evidence	  in	  the	  network	  for	  a	  scenario	  of	  interest	  was	  described.	  	  The	  chapter	  briefly	  introduced	  evidence	  propagation.	  	  It	  then	  discussed	  the	  example	  results	  and	  conceptually	  how	  to	  incorporate	  them	  in	  the	  higher-­‐level	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis	  and	  Probabilistic	  Risk	  Assessment	  processes.	  	  
 	   122	  
6.2 ADDITIONAL	  OUTCOMES	  	   A	  secondary	  goal	  of	  this	  research	  was	  to	  facilitate	  the	  sharing	  of	  knowledge,	  experience,	  and	  methods	  of	  problem	  solving	  across	  the	  Safety	  and	  Mission	  Assurance	  and	  Space	  Life	  Sciences	  communities.	  	  Both	  of	  these	  communities	  have	  the	  overarching	  goal	  of	  contributing	  to	  safe	  human	  space	  missions.	  	  The	  desire	  to	  identify	  and	  manage	  risk	  is	  a	  common	  component	  of	  this	  goal,	  and	  the	  different	  viewpoints	  from	  these	  communities	  provide	  valuable	  insights	  when	  shared.	  	  Since	  the	  requirements,	  standards,	  and	  human	  performance	  data	  discussed	  in	  this	  research	  are	  typically	  developed	  by	  those	  in	  the	  Space	  Life	  Sciences	  community,	  that	  community	  is	  in	  the	  best	  position	  to	  provide	  the	  proper	  data	  to	  inform	  a	  Bayesian	  Network	  model.	  	  The	  application	  of	  such	  a	  model	  within	  the	  Safety	  and	  Mission	  Assurance	  community	  and	  the	  project	  design	  process	  have	  been	  the	  main	  contexts	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  however,	  the	  advantages	  of	  applying	  these	  concepts	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  risk	  management	  processes	  within	  the	  Space	  Life	  Sciences	  research	  community	  are	  apparent,	  as	  well.	  	  These	  benefits	  include:	  1. The	  factor	  organizational	  hierarchy	  and	  Contributing	  Factor	  Map	  (CFM)	  can	  be	  applied	  as	  the	  common	  framework	  and	  set	  of	  terminology	  for	  organizing	  human	  system	  risks,	  such	  as	  those	  found	  in	  the	  Human	  Research	  Program	  Integrated	  Research	  Plan	  [11].	  	  This	  allows	  integration	  of	  risk-­‐related	  research	  efforts	  across	  disciplines	  as	  common	  Contributing	  Factors	  are	  identified.	  2. Factor	  characterization	  information	  gathered	  for	  the	  factors	  can	  support	  the	  identification	  of	  research	  gaps.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  relationship	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  strong,	  but	  there	  exists	  only	  a	  low	  level	  of	  evidence,	  additional	  research	  may	  be	  required.	  3. The	  Bayesian	  Network	  approach	  brings	  statistical	  modeling	  concepts	  forward	  to	  support	  the	  evaluation	  of	  risk	  outcome	  probabilities.	  	  Risks	  can	  be	  modeled	  by	  the	  identification	  of	  the	  crew	  health	  and	  performance	  outcomes	  of	  interest	  and	  quantification	  of	  their	  associated	  conditional	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probabilities	  based	  on	  the	  states	  of	  parent	  factors.	  	  This	  approach	  can	  support	  quantitative	  likelihood	  assessments	  to	  inform	  the	  risk	  management	  process.	  4. The	  statistical	  variable	  modeling	  required	  for	  the	  Bayesian	  Network	  approach	  can	  also	  support	  the	  determination	  of	  appropriate	  tracking	  metrics	  for	  risks.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  closure	  metric	  for	  a	  risk	  may	  be	  the	  probability	  of	  an	  outcome	  factor	  being	  in	  the	  “Not	  OK”	  state.	  	  In	  this	  situation,	  the	  risk	  related	  to	  that	  outcome	  factor	  may	  be	  closed	  if	  the	  probability	  is	  below	  an	  acceptable	  level.	  5. After	  a	  Bayesian	  Network	  is	  built,	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  use	  it	  to	  perform	  sensitivity	  analyses	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  factors	  on	  outcome	  probabilities	  of	  interest.	  	  This	  type	  of	  impact	  analysis	  may	  be	  combined	  with	  funding	  information	  to	  support	  risk	  reduction	  effort	  prioritization	  decisions.	  A	  Bayesian	  Network	  built	  using	  the	  factors	  described	  in	  this	  research	  can	  support	  the	  vehicle	  and	  operations	  design	  processes,	  as	  well.	  	  Designers	  of	  spacecraft	  typically	  work	  within	  a	  trade	  space	  defined	  by	  variables	  such	  as	  mass,	  power,	  volume,	  functionality,	  performance	  level,	  cost	  and	  schedule	  in	  order	  to	  efficiently	  build	  operational	  vehicles	  and	  achieve	  mission	  success.	  Designers	  developing	  spacecraft	  intended	  for	  human	  occupancy	  must	  also	  account	  for	  additional	  dimensions	  in	  the	  trade	  space	  that	  address	  variables	  supporting	  crew	  health	  and	  performance.	  These	  trade	  space	  variables	  may	  be	  looked	  upon	  as	  “knobs”	  to	  “turn”	  during	  the	  design	  process,	  and	  have	  requirements	  that	  must	  be	  defined,	  designed	  to,	  and	  eventually	  verified	  that	  they	  have	  been	  met.	  	  The	  set	  of	  factors	  identified	  in	  Chapter	  3	  can	  be	  used	  to	  address	  crew	  health	  and	  performance	  and	  represent	  these	  dimensions	  in	  the	  trade	  space.	  	  	  Having	  a	  quantified	  Bayesian	  Network	  capturing	  the	  influences	  of	  design	  choices	  on	  human	  performance	  can	  provide	  a	  way	  for	  past	  system	  performance	  data	  to	  inform	  new	  design	  choices	  for	  next-­‐generation	  systems.	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6.3 FUTURE	  RESEARCH	  	  There	  will	  likely	  always	  be	  some	  degree	  of	  refinement	  possible	  related	  to	  the	  identification	  and	  organization	  of	  factors	  influencing	  human	  performance	  in	  space.	  	  Factor	  terminology	  could	  be	  modified,	  groupings	  could	  be	  adjusted,	  and	  factor	  definitions	  could	  be	  defined	  in	  greater	  detail,	  depending	  on	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  specific	  application	  of	  the	  factor	  list	  and	  Contributing	  Factor	  Map.	  In	  the	  area	  of	  applying	  Analytic	  Hierarchy	  Process	  analysis	  techniques	  for	  developing	  a	  Bayesian	  Network	  structure,	  future	  work	  includes	  using	  different	  context	  scenarios	  for	  the	  same	  type	  of	  task	  to	  evaluate	  difference	  in	  the	  resulting	  network	  structure.	  	  Similarly,	  additional	  investigations	  include	  performing	  the	  analysis	  for	  other	  types	  of	  tasks	  than	  the	  Execution	  Task	  example.	  	  Once	  Bayesian	  Networks	  with	  particular	  structures	  are	  quantified,	  sensitivity	  studies	  analyzing	  the	  structural	  choices	  could	  provide	  insight	  into	  additional	  factors	  and	  relationships	  to	  include,	  or	  into	  factors	  and	  relationships	  initially	  included	  that	  could	  be	  removed.	  	  A	  significant	  portion	  of	  future	  work	  is	  in	  the	  area	  of	  data	  collection.	  	  Ideally,	  a	  database	  for	  collecting	  relevant	  spaceflight	  domain-­‐specific	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis	  data	  would	  be	  created	  to	  inform	  the	  quantification	  of	  a	  Bayesian	  Network	  model.	  	  Finally,	  model	  validation	  through	  simulation	  and	  experiments	  would	  support	  the	  adoption	  of	  Bayesian	  Network	  techniques	  within	  the	  Human	  Reliability	  Analysis	  and	  Probabilistic	  Risk	  Assessment	  communities.	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APPENDIX	  A:	  ACRONYM	  LIST	  
	  AHP	   	   Analytic	  Hierarchy	  Process	  BN	   	   Bayesian	  Network	  CFM	   	   Contributing	  Factor	  Map	  CPC	   	   Common	  Performance	  Condition	  CPT	   	   Conditional	  Probability	  Table	  CREAM	  	   Cognitive	  Reliability	  and	  Error	  Analysis	  Method	  CRM	   	   Continuous	  Risk	  Management	  HEP	   	   Human	  Error	  Probability	  HFACS	   	   Human	  Factors	  Analysis	  and	  Classification	  System	  HRA	   	   Human	  Reliability	  Analysis	   	  HSRB	   	   Human	  System	  Risk	  Board	  ISS	   	   International	  Space	  Station	  NASA	   	   National	  Aeronautics	  and	  Space	  Administration	  PRA	   	   Probabilistic	  Risk	  Assessment	  PSF	   	   Performance	  Shaping	  Factor	   	  RIDM	   	   Risk-­‐Informed	  Decision	  Making	  TIM	   	   Technical	  Interchange	  Meeting	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APPENDIX	  B:	  EXAMPLE	  NETWORK	  QUANTIFICATIONS	  
	  













Adaptations	   TRUE	   FALSE	  OK	   OK	   OK	   OK	   OK	   0.9999	   1E-­‐04	  OK	   OK	   OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.999	   0.001	  OK	   OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.999	   0.001	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   0.999	   0.001	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   OK	   0.999	   0.001	  Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   OK	   OK	   0.999	   0.001	  OK	   OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.99	   0.01	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.99	   0.01	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.99	   0.01	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.99	   0.01	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.99	   0.01	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   0.99	   0.01	  Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.99	   0.01	  Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.99	   0.01	  Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   0.99	   0.01	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   OK	   0.99	   0.01	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.9	   0.1	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.9	   0.1	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.9	   0.1	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.9	   0.1	  Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.9	   0.1	  Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.9	   0.1	  Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.9	   0.1	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.9	   0.1	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.9	   0.1	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   0.9	   0.1	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.001	   0.999	  Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.001	   0.999	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.001	   0.999	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.001	   0.999	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.001	   0.999	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   1E-­‐04	   0.9999	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Table	  B.2:	  Situational	  Awareness	  Node	  Probabilities	  	   	   	   	   	   	   SITUATIONAL	  









Environment	   Work	  Load	   TRUE	   FALSE	  OK	   OK	   OK	   OK	   OK	   0.99	   0.01	  Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   OK	   OK	   0.75	   0.25	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   OK	   0.75	   0.25	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   0.85	   0.15	  OK	   OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.85	   0.15	  OK	   OK	   OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.85	   0.15	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.5	   0.5	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.5	   0.5	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   0.5	   0.5	  Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.5	   0.5	  Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   0.5	   0.5	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   OK	   0.5	   0.5	  OK	   OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.5	   0.5	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.5	   0.5	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.5	   0.5	  Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.5	   0.5	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.25	   0.75	  Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.25	   0.75	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.25	   0.75	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   0.25	   0.75	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.25	   0.75	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.25	   0.75	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.25	   0.75	  Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.25	   0.75	  Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.25	   0.75	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.25	   0.75	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.15	   0.85	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.15	   0.85	  Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.15	   0.85	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.15	   0.85	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.15	   0.85	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.99	   0.01	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Table	  B.3:	  Cognitive	  Adaptations	  Node	  Probabilities	  
	  
	   	   	   COGNITIVE	  ADAPTATIONS	  OK	  
Time	  Context	   Task	  Familiarity	   Work	  Load	   TRUE	   FALSE	  OK	   OK	   OK	   0.99	   0.01	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.85	   0.15	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.85	   0.15	  Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   0.85	   0.15	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.75	   0.25	  Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.75	   0.25	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.75	   0.25	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.5	   0.5	  
	  
Table	  B.4:	  Psychological	  Conditions	  Node	  Probabilities	  
	  
	   	   	   PSYCHOLOGICAL	  CONDITIONS	  OK	  
Time	  Context	   Work	  Load	   Task	  Familiarity	   TRUE	   FALSE	  OK	   OK	   OK	   0.99	   0.01	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.85	   0.15	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.85	   0.15	  Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   0.85	   0.15	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.75	   0.25	  Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.5	   0.5	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.5	   0.5	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.15	   0.85	  
	  
Table	  B.5:	  Non-­Standard	  Physical	  Conditions	  Node	  Probabilities	  
	  
	   	   	   NON-­STANDARD	  PHYSICAL	  
CONDITIONS	  OK	  
Vehicle	  Physical	  
Environment	   Work	  Load	   Time	  Context	   TRUE	   FALSE	  OK	   OK	   OK	   0.99	   0.01	  Not	  OK	   OK	   OK	   0.25	   0.75	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.75	   0.25	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.85	   0.15	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   OK	   0.15	   0.85	  Not	  OK	   OK	   Not	  OK	   0.15	   0.85	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.25	   0.75	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.15	   0.85	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Table	  B.6:	  Physiological	  Adaptations	  Node	  Probabilities	  
	  
	   	   NON-­STANDARD	  PHYSICAL	  
CONDITIONS	  OK	  
Vehicle	  Physical	  
Environment	   Work	  Load	   TRUE	   FALSE	  OK	   OK	   0.99	   0.01	  Not	  OK	   OK	   0.25	   0.75	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.75	   0.25	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.15	   0.85	  	  
Table	  B.7:	  Time	  Context	  Node	  Probabilities	  
	  
	   	   TIME	  CONTEXT	  OK	  
Task	  Planning	  &	  
Scheduling	   Mission	  Planning	   TRUE	   FALSE	  OK	   OK	   0.99	   0.01	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.85	   0.15	  Not	  OK	   OK	   0.5	   0.5	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.15	   0.85	  	  
Table	  B.8:	  Task	  Familiarity	  Node	  Probabilities	  
	  
	   	   TASK	  FAMILIARITY	  OK	  
Task	  Planning	  &	  
Scheduling	   Training	  Quality	   TRUE	   FALSE	  OK	   OK	   0.99	   0.01	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.5	   0.5	  Not	  OK	   OK	   0.85	   0.15	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.15	   0.85	  
	  
Table	  B.9:	  Vehicle	  Physical	  Environment	  Node	  Probabilities	  
	  
	   	   VEHICLE	  PHYSICAL	  ENVIRONMENT	  OK	  
Organizational	  
Support	   Mission	  Planning	   TRUE	   FALSE	  OK	   OK	   0.99	   0.01	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.85	   0.15	  Not	  OK	   OK	   0.75	   0.25	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.25	   0.75	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Table	  B.10:	  Work	  Load	  Node	  Probabilities	  
	  
	   	   WORK	  LOAD	  OK	  
Task	  Planning	  &	  
Scheduling	   Training	  Quality	   TRUE	   FALSE	  OK	   OK	   0.99	   0.01	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.75	   0.25	  Not	  OK	   OK	   0.5	   0.5	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.15	   0.85	  	  
Table	  B.11:	  User	  Interfaces	  Node	  Probabilities	  
	  
	   	   USER	  INTERFACES	  OK	  
Organizational	  
Support	   Training	  Quality	   TRUE	   FALSE	  OK	   OK	   0.99	   0.01	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.85	   0.15	  Not	  OK	   OK	   0.85	   0.15	  Not	  OK	   Not	  OK	   0.15	   0.85	  	  
Table	  B.12:	  Task	  Planning	  and	  Scheduling	  Node	  Probabilities	  
	  
TASK	  PLANNING	  AND	  SCHEDULING	  OK	  
TRUE	   FALSE	  0.99	   0.01	  	  
Table	  B.13:	  Training	  Quality	  Node	  Probabilities	  
	  
TRAINING	  QUALITY	  OK	  
TRUE	   FALSE	  0.99	   0.01	  
	  
Table	  B.14:	  Mission	  Planning	  Node	  Probabilities	  
	  
MISSION	  PLANNING	  OK	  
TRUE	   FALSE	  0.99	   0.01	  
	  
Table	  B.15:	  Organizational	  Support	  Node	  Probabilities	  
	  
ORGANIZATIONAL	  SUPPORT	  OK	  
TRUE	   FALSE	  0.99	   0.01	  	  
